People v. Morlock

9 Citing cases

  1. Frazier v. State

    485 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972)   Cited 7 times
    In Frazier, this Court held that five burglaries, all committed on the same day against separate tenants in the same building should be considered as only one offense for purposes of an habitual criminal prosecution.

    " In People v. Morlock the Supreme Court of Michigan (1926) 234 Mich. 683, 209 N.W. 110. Under Michigan's rule enhancing the punishment for second offenses, the Court held that the prior conviction, though on appeal, could be made the basis of a first conviction. There the Court said: "The complaint, warrant, and information charged the violation as a second offense.

  2. People v. Clapp

    67 Cal.App.2d 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944)   Cited 39 times
    In Clapp, the court upheld the sufficiency of a charge of prior conviction to enhance punishment (see Pen. Code, §§ 969, 969a) against defendant's claim that "he had not been convicted because his judgment of conviction in the former case was on appeal."

    The courts of other jurisdictions have likewise upheld the practice of alleging the prior conviction even though the judgment based thereon was on appeal at the time of the trial for the second offense. ( State v. Eisminger, 124 Kan. 464 [260 P. 661]; State v. Smith, 128 Ore. 515 [ 273 P. 323]; People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683 [ 209 N.W. 110]; Shaffer v. State, 124 Neb. 7 [244 N.W. 921].) [6a] There was no error in receiving evidence of the former felony because the "testimony fails to show any similarity in the means used to produce" the two miscarriages.

  3. Whack v. State

    338 Md. 665 (Md. 1995)   Cited 59 times
    Affirming application of predecessor statute to C.L. § 5-905 where Whack had previously been convicted of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and was presently convicted of importing a controlled dangerous substance

    Several other jurisdictions, as we have noted, approve the use of a prior conviction pending appeal as the predicate for an enhanced penalty. E.g., Prock v. State, 471 So.2d 519 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985); Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct.App. 1983); State v. Swartz, 140 Ariz. 516, 683 P.2d 315 (Ct.App. 1984); Birchett v. State, 291 Ark. 379, 724 S.W.2d 492 (1987); People v. Sarnblad, 26 Cal.App.3d 801, 103 Cal.Rptr. 211 (Ct.App. 1972); People v. District Court, Etc., 192 Colo. 375, 559 P.2d 235 (1977); Maisonet v. State, 448 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind. 1983); State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290 (Me. 1978); People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, 209 N.W. 110 (1926); Jackson v. State, 418 So.2d 827 (Miss. 1982).

  4. State v. Haliski

    140 N.J. 1 (N.J. 1995)   Cited 74 times
    Noting legislative inaction is unreliable as it may be attributable to the Legislature's "'unawareness'" or "'indifference'" to a judicial decision

    See, e.g., Prock v. State, 471 So.2d 519 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985); Wright v. State, 656 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct.App. 1983); State ex rel. Corbin v.Court of Appeals, 103 Ariz. 315, 441 P.2d 544 (1968); Statev. Swartz, 140 Ariz. 516, 683 P.2d 315 (Ct.App. 1984); Birchett v. State, 291 Ark. 379, 724 S.W.2d 492 (1987); Glick v. State, 286 Ark. 133, 689 S.W.2d 559 (1985); People v. Sarnblad, 26 Cal.App.3d 801, 103 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1972); People v. Clapp, 67 Cal.App.2d 197, 153 P.2d 758 (1944); People v. District Court of Tenth Judicial Dist., 192 Colo. 375, 559 P.2d 235 (1977); Maisonet v. State, 448 N.E.2d 1052 (Ind. 1983); State v. Eisminger, 124 Kan. 464, 260 P. 661 (1927); State v. Martin, 316 So.2d 740 (La. 1975); State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290 (Me. 1978); People v.Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, 209 N.W. 110 (1926); Jackson v.State, 418 So.2d 827 (Miss. 1982); State v. Radi, 176 Mont. 451, 578 P.2d 1169 (1978), appeal after remand, 185 Mont. 38, 604 P.2d 318 (1979); State v. Romero,1 Or. App. 217, 461 P.2d 70 (1969); State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct.App. 1993); State v. Wimmer, 152 Wis.2d 654, 449 N.W.2d 621 (1989), review denied, 454 N.W.2d 806 (Wis. 1990); cf. State v. Tipton, 77 N.M. 1, 419 P.2d 216 (1966) (stating that for purposes of habitual-offender statute, plea of guilty constitutes a "conviction" even though sentence has not yet been imposed).

  5. State v. Heald

    382 A.2d 290 (Me. 1978)   Cited 36 times
    Stating that "a reasonable prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of criminal laws is inherent in our criminal justice system . . ."

    The effect of the appeal was as though it had not been taken. State v. Eisminger, 124 Kan. 464, 260 P. 661 (1927); People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, 209 N.W. 110 (1926); State ex rel. Corbin v. Court of Appeals, Division I, 103 Ariz. 315, 441 P.2d 544 (1968); People v. Sarnblad, 26 Cal.App.3d 801, 103 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1972). Equal Protection Violation — Unequal enforcement of habitual offender statute

  6. People v. Funk

    321 Mich. 617 (Mich. 1948)   Cited 29 times
    In People v. Funk, 321 Mich. 617, 621, 33 N.W.2d 95, 96, 5 A.L.R.2d 1077 (1948), it was held that the habitual criminal statutes of Michigan did not make imposition of sentence upon the previous conviction a prerequisite to the enhancement of punishment upon a following conviction.

    "'" In People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, we held that a violation of the prohibition law might be charged as a second offense, although the first conviction had been removed to the Supreme Court on exceptions, before sentence, and remained there undecided still. In People v. Adams, 95 Mich. 541, we held that in a prosecution for second offense under the local option law, the record of the first conviction, which remains unreversed, is admissible, even though a void sentence was imposed.

  7. State v. Chuchelow

    128 Conn. 323 (Conn. 1941)   Cited 14 times

    This limitation was unnecessary. The judgment was not vacated by the appeal. General Statutes, Cum. Sup. 1939, 1464e(b); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 511, 24 Sup. Ct. 154; Shaffer v. State, 124 Neb. 7, 10, 244 N.W. 921; People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, 685, 209 N.W. 110. See also, for an extensive discussion of the wide field open to the trial judge in obtaining information, after conviction, relevant to mitigation or aggravation of the seriousness of the offense, People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A. L. R. 1199.

  8. Attorney General v. Montgomery

    275 Mich. 504 (Mich. 1936)   Cited 54 times
    Rejecting claim that review of criminal conviction prohibiting service as county clerk would constitute impermissible collateral attack on ground that attack was based on convicting court's lack of jurisdiction, rather than legal errors

    Egan v. Jones, 21 Nev. 433 ( 32 P. 929). This, in effect, was the holding in People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112; People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264; People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683, and the sense in which the term is used in the criminal statutes, 3 Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 17130, 17329, 17341, 17346, and Act No. 328, Pub. Acts 1931, § 5, and accords with the common use of the language. It is claimed defendant was not convicted of an infamous crime because no jury found him guilty; that a constitutional jury of 12 is an essential part of the mandatory tribunal for the trial of criminal cases in courts of record and cannot be waived by the defendant consenting to proceed with 11 jurors.

  9. People v. Panknin

    4 Mich. App. 19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 47 times
    In People v Panknin, 4 Mich. App. 19; 143 N.W.2d 806 (1966), this Court held that a discharge of the defendant by an examining magistrate on preliminary examination was not a bar to further prosecution for the same offense, because the preliminary examination did not place the defendant in jeopardy.

    "Where an officer, by the exercise of his power of observation, in a place where he has a lawful right to be, sees evidence which leads him to believe that a felony has been committed or is contemplated, he has a right to arrest the suspected offender and search his person or property."People v. Chomis, 223 Mich. 289; People v. Cardella, 233 Mich. 505; People v. Morlock, 234 Mich. 683; People v. Duvall, 243 Mich. 498; People v. Nappo, 251 Mich. 89; People v. Mohl, 252 Mich. 469; People v. Ring, 267 Mich. 657. The officers were legally in the home of Alfred Panknin by express invitation, at the time of the observation of the shoes of defendant connecting him directly with the crime which supplied the necessary ingredient of reasonable cause to justify the arrest and search.