¶20 One exception to the exclusionary rule is the independent source doctrine, under which "unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be admitted if the prosecution can establish that it was also discovered by means independent of the illegality." People v. Arapu , 2012 CO 42, ¶ 32, 283 P.3d 680 (quoting People v. Morley , 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000) ). Among other circumstances, the doctrine may apply where evidence was initially discovered during an unlawful warrantless entry or search but later seized (or re-seized) when the police executed a valid search warrant.

The question whether the police would have pursued a second search and arrested the defendant but for what they observed during the earlier unlawful search is a question of fact. Murray , 487 U.S. at 543, 108 S.Ct. 2529 ; People v. Morley , 4 P.3d 1078, 1081 (Colo. 2000). Except in the rare case in which the timing of the second search is such as to preclude a finding that it was prompted by an earlier unlawful search, see, e.g. , Morley , 4 P.3d at 1081 (holding that remand was unnecessary when warrant procurement procedures were initiated well before illegal entry, which occurred only five minutes before warranted search, and there was no evidence subverting a conclusion of independence), this question of fact must be resolved by the trial court, Murray , 487 U.S. at 543, 108 S.Ct. 2529 ; Schoondermark , 759 P.2d at 719.

¶ 29 Next, we consider whether the firearm would have been discovered by means independent of Officer Olson's observation, and therefore should not be suppressed. Under the independent source exception to the exclusionary rule, “unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be admitted if the prosecution can establish that it was also discovered by means independent of the illegality.” People v. Morley, 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo.2000); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 & n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (“what counts is whether the actual illegal search had any effect in producing the warrant”). The Morley and Murray cases are instructive in our analysis because those cases are factually similar to this case.

The exclusionary rule seeks to deter improper police conduct by suppressing evidence obtained by the police in violation of the Fourth Amendment from presentation during the prosecution's case-in-chief.People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Colo. 2001); People v. Morley, 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000). The exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."

¶ 15 Second, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed primarily to deter unlawful searches and seizures by law enforcement officials. People v. Morley , 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000). Under this rule, "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution" must usually be suppressed.

¶20 In general, materials seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment are excluded from evidence. People v. Morley , 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000). This exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy that is primarily designed to deter unlawful searches and seizures by law enforcement officials.

When an individual is subjected to a constitutionally unreasonable search, any evidence seized during that search may be suppressed, absent certain exceptions not relevant here. SeePeople v. Morley , 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000). ¶14 In Colorado, traffic stops typically constitute investigatory stops that implicate this Fourth Amendment protection.

When the government has conducted an unreasonable search, the evidence obtained through that search may be suppressed and therefore not admitted at trial. See People v. Morley, 4 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000) (defining "the exclusionary rule" as a "judicially created remedy ... [that] operates to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. constitution] and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution") (citing People v. Burola, 848 P.2d 958, 960–61 (Colo. 1993) ). ¶ 7 If an individual voluntarily consents to a search, that search is reasonable, and suppression of any evidence obtained is not warranted.

This is not a case where the officers initiated the warrant process before the warrantless entry. Cf. People v. Morley, 4 P.3d 1078, 1081 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (holding that a remand was not necessary on the first Murray prong where officers initiated the warrant application procedure before the illegal entry). Accordingly, as in Murray, we believe that the appropriate disposition is a limited remand for the suppression court to determine whether the police would have sought a warrant regardless of the illegal entry.

We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo, because the legal effect of the facts is a question of law. People v. Allison, 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo. 2004); People v. Morley, 4 P.3d 1078, 1079-80 (Colo. 2000). Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by both the United States and Colorado Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. "Unreasonable `physical entry of the home' is the `chief evil' against which the Fourth Amendment is directed."