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People v. Morgan

199 Colo. 237 (Colo. 1980)
People v. Morgan

42 Citing cases

  1. People v. Holloway

    649 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1982)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that the defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecution destroyed police dispatch tapes that were "not merely incidental" to the defense theory of misidentification (quoting People v. Morgan , 199 Colo. 237, 241, 606 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1980) )

    Following a hearing, the court dismissed the case. In People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980), we provided the guidelines for determining whether a defendant's due process rights have been violated when evidence has been lost or destroyed. Quoting from earlier cases, we noted that the three-prong test is: "(1) Whether the evidence was suppressed or destroyed by the prosecution; (2) whether the evidence is exculpatory; and (3) whether the evidence is material to the defendant's case."

  2. People v. Greathouse

    742 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1987)   Cited 33 times
    Concluding that the appeal, which was filed within the statutory deadline, was timely even though it was erroneously filed with the court of appeals rather than the supreme court

    We have noted that the destruction of evidence in a case where there is no defendant at the time the evidence is destroyed may constitute a due process violation. People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 240 n. 1, 606 P.2d 1296, 1298 n. 1 (1980). However, in light of our adoption of the Trombetta standard, we regard the time period in which the destruction of evidence occurred as a factor to be considered.

  3. People v. Sams

    685 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 14 times

    1983); People v. Garries, 645 P.2d 1306 (Colo. 1982); People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980). In determining whether a defendant's due process rights have been abridged, three factors must be considered: (1) whether the evidence was suppressed or destroyed by the prosecution; (2) whether the evidence is exculpatory; and (3) whether the evidence is material to the defendant's case.

  4. People v. District Court

    656 P.2d 1287 (Colo. 1983)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that the police's failure to conduct a trace-metal test on victim's hands before burial was a suppression of evidence when it was "implausible" that the "test had no value"

    Also, in our later cases we have not required a request by the defendant as an essential part of a showing of a due process violation, for there may be no defendant or no defense counsel at the time evidence is destroyed. People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980). Only is all three parts of the test are met is there a due process violation.

  5. People v. Sheppard

    701 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1985)   Cited 16 times
    In Sheppard, the defendant was left with no evidence to support his theory of defense that the automobile crash that killed the victim was due to mechanical failure.

    Brady v. Maryland; People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court; People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1982); People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980). As noted in People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1287, 1290 n. 7 (1983), "in our later cases, we have not required a request by the defendant as an essential part of a showing of a due process violation, for there may be no defendant or defense counsel at the time evidence is destroyed.

  6. People v. Ullery

    984 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1999)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding that defendant who failed to make a record indicating why material should remain privileged despite section 16-8-103.6 could not "overcome the presumption that the trial court's ruling [that the materials were discoverable] was correct"

    1987); Laessig, 157 Colo. at 262, 402 P.2d at 185; Application of Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo.App. 1985). If the appealing party fails to provide us with such a complete record, we must presume the correctness of the trial court's proceedings. See People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 242, 606 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1980); Herrera v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 416, 418 (Colo.App. 1987). Here, the record does indicate that Ullery objected to the discovery of the file containing the disputed materials.

  7. People v. District Court

    808 P.2d 831 (Colo. 1991)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that there must be a `reasonable probability' that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different

    Nevertheless, that discretion is not unlimited. "The imposition of sanctions serves the dual purposes of protecting the integrity of the truth-finding process and deterring the prosecutor and the police from [misconduct]." People v. District Court, 656 P.2d at 1293; see also People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 240, 606 P.2d 1296, 1298 (1980). In serving the purpose of protecting the truth-finding process, we have required that the sanction "be `no more restrictive than necessary to protect the defendant's right to due process.'"

  8. People v. Vigil

    718 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1986)   Cited 91 times
    Holding that the disqualification of a juror was not required, even though the juror's brother was a police officer in a different jurisdiction and the juror testified that he might be inclined to give more weight to the testimony of law enforcement people, where the juror stated that he would be able to follow the court's instructions on credibility and that, if he did so, he could be “fair and impartial to both sides”

    See, e.g., People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 656 P.2d 1287 (Colo. 1982); People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980). We agree with the People that the evidence at issue here was not suppressed by the prosecution and that the evidence is of doubtful exculpatory value.

  9. People v. Shaw

    646 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1982)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that destruction of the original notes containing substantial recitations of the witnesses statements was a discovery violation, although not one of constitutional materiality

    We have not required governmental bad faith as a condition for the imposition of a judicial sanction in connection with a defendant's due process claim based upon the loss or destruction of evidence. People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 606 P.2d 1296 (1980); People v. Harmes, 38 Colo. App. 378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976). It is the character of the evidence lost, not the degree of culpability in the loss, which is constitutionally significant.

  10. People v. Eason

    516 P.3d 546 (Colo. App. 2022)   Cited 2 times
    In Eason, ¶ 21, announced after the trial in this case, a division of this court concluded that Crim. P. 24(c)(4) is a procedural rule that does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

    Id. (quoting People v. Morgan , 199 Colo. 237, 241, 606 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1980) ). But the record in this case is devoid of any comparable facts.