• 3, 4 As courts have noted numerous times in the past, this statute delineates and prohibits two distinct kinds of conduct: "The first is entry upon land with notice that such entry is prohibited; the second is remaining upon land after notice is given to depart, without regard to the lawfulness of the initial entry." ( People v. Vazquez (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 291, 292, 270 N.E.2d 229; see also People v. Ulatowski (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 893, 896, 368 N.E.2d 174; People v. Morgan (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 41, 43, 337 N.E.2d 400; People v. Spencer (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 551, 553-54, 268 N.E.2d 192.) As the defendant concedes in his brief, the facts of this case fall within the second category of proscribed conduct under which the elements of the offense are (1) an individual is on the land of another; (2) he is directed to leave by the owner or occupant; and (3) he does not leave. As the court in Vazquez held, whether the initial entry is lawful is irrelevant to this category of trespass, and it was thus not necessary for the State to allege in the complaint that the defendant was on the land wrongfully. It is apparent that all of the required elements of criminal trespass to land are set forth in the complaint under which defendant was convicted in this case.
The statute contemplates two distinct offenses: first, to enter upon the land of another despite a warning that entry is forbidden; second, to remain on the land of another after receiving notice from the owner or occupant to leave. ( People v. Morgan (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 41, 337 N.E.2d 400; People v. Spencer (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 551, 268 N.E.2d 192.) We are dealing with the latter situation since Ulatowski originally entered the apartment with the occupant's permission.