All statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 486 (2003). To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish that it violates the constitution.

Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 458; see also People v. Moore, 343 Ill. App. 3d 331, 346, 797 N.E.2d 217 (2003) (where the defendant sought to compare the sentences for first degree murder with a firearm and first degree murder without a firearm, "[C]omparative proportionality review is inappropriate here because the new firearms provisions of the first-degree murder sentencing statute serve a second, more specific purpose and target a unique type of danger that is absent when the offender does not possess a firearm"); People v. Zapata, 347 Ill. App. 3d 956, 971, 808 N.E.2d 1064 (2004) (following Hill and Moore and explaining "the threshold issue is whether deterring the carrying or use of a firearm during a murder is a purpose more specific and distinct from that of the general murder statute"). Here, the defendant argues that this case is similar to People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 472-73, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), where the supreme court held that Public Act 91-404 (Act) (Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff.

He appeals.         Defendant first argues his convictions must be reversed because the attempt statute was held unconstitutional by our supreme court in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), and People v. Moss, 206 Ill.2d 503, 276 Ill.Dec. 855, 795 N.E.2d 208 (2003). The issue presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.

Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2) violates the proportionate penalties clause by imposing a greater sentencing range of punishment for attempted first degree murder than for second degree murder is without merit. Defendant further argues that his extended-term sentence for attempted first degree murder is unconstitutional pursuant to People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470 (2003). In Morgan, our supreme court considered the constitutionality of the attempt statute ( 720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West 2000)), as amended by Public Act 91-404 (Pub.

See Hill, 199 Ill.2d at 458-59, 264 Ill.Dec. 670, 771 N.E.2d 374.         We note that, in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003), our supreme court held that "the attempt statute (720 ILCS 5/8-4 (West 2000)), as amended by Public Act 91-404, is unconstitutional because it permits a defendant convicted of attempted first degree murder to be subject to penalties that are not set according to the seriousness of the offense." Morgan, 203 Ill.2d at 491, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994.

In 2003, this court held the statute creating firearm enhancements for attempted murder unconstitutional as a violation of the Illinois proportionate penalty clause. People v. Morgan , 203 Ill. 2d 470, 489-92, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003). ¶ 4 On September 2, 2005, the State filed a "Motion to Impose Mandatory Minimum and Mandatory Consecutive Sentence."

“The general rule is that courts will not consider the validity of a statutory provision unless the person challenging the provision is directly affected by it or the unconstitutional feature is so pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid.” People v. Morgan, 203 Ill.2d 470, 482, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003). “In either case, a party has standing to bring a constitutional challenge only if the party is able to show himself to be within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality.” Morgan, 203 Ill.2d at 482, 272 Ill.Dec. 160, 786 N.E.2d 994.

"The general rule is that courts will not consider the validity of a statutory provision unless the person challenging the provision is directly affected by it or the unconstitutional feature is so pervasive as to render the entire statute invalid." People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 482 (2003). "In either case, a party has standing to bring a constitutional challenge only if the party is able to show himself to be within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality."

The trial court denied defendant's motions with respect to the attempted-first-degree-murder and home-invasion charges, but granted defendant's motion with respect to the armed-robbery charge. Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's ruling with respect to the attempted-first-degree-murder charge in light of the supreme court's decision in People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 492 (2003) (finding that the sentencing ranges created by the attempted-first-degree-murder statute violate the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution). The trial court denied the motion to reconsider but agreed that, pursuant to Morgan, defendant should not be subject to an enhanced sentence if convicted of attempted first-degree murder.

Arnold, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 676. Though courts have found that the "15/20/25-to-life" sentence enhancement provision violated the proportionality clause when applied to offenses other than first degree murder (see Moss, 206 Ill. 2d at 531 (finding enhancement unconstitutional when applied to armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking); People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470, 491-92, 786 N.E.2d 994 (2003) (finding enhancement unconstitutional when applied to attempted first degree murder); Walden, 199 Ill. 2d at 396-97 (15-year enhancement added to armed robbery conviction unconstitutional); People v. Garcia, 199 Ill. 2d 401, 770 N.E.2d 208 (2002) (same); People v. Dryden, 349 Ill. App. 3d 115, 811 N.E.2d 302 (2004) (15-year enhancement to home invasion violates proportionate penalties clause)), no court has found the enhancement unconstitutional when applied to first degree murder (see People v. Zapata, 347 Ill. App. 3d 956, 968-72, 808 N.E.2d 1064 (2004) (finding the 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm during the commission of first degree murder was constitutional); Arnold, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 673-76 (same); Moore, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 343-47 (upholding constitutionality of the 25-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm or death during the commission of first degree murder); People v. Sawczenko-Dub, 345 Ill.