Opinion
November 5, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Broome County (Monserrate, J.).
On April 10, 1990, a warrant was issued by a Binghamton City Court Judge authorizing a search of the first floor apartment at 9 Mulberry Street in the City of Binghamton, Broome County. The warrant was supported by the affidavit of Binghamton Police Investigator William Yeager and the written witnessed confession-statement of Linda Netherton. Execution of the warrant resulted in the seizure of cocaine, other controlled substances, related drug paraphernalia and two handguns. The seizure led to a six-count indictment against defendant, who resided in the apartment. Defendant moved to suppress the contraband and evidence seized under the warrant, contending that the warrant had been granted upon an insufficient and defective application. Upon denial of the motion, defendant pleaded guilty to the first count in full satisfaction of the entire indictment.
On this appeal, defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in its denial of his suppression motion. He argues that the absence of a jurat on the confessional affidavit and the failure of the People to establish that Netherton had been duly sworn requires application of the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test, and that the instant warrant application failed to meet the standards of that test. We disagree with both arguments.
When a search warrant is issued upon an affidavit by a law enforcement officer who recites hearsay information relayed to him by an undisclosed informant, (1) the veracity or reliability of the informant must be demonstrated and (2) the basis of the informant's knowledge must be established (Spinelli v United States, 393 U.S. 410; Aguilar v Texas, 378 U.S. 108).
An unsworn statement can provide probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant provided adequate indicia of the accuracy of the contents is established (see, People v Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 183, 188; People v Butchino, 152 A.D.2d 854, 855). Statements made against the penal interest of an informant can be sufficient to establish the reliability even where the identity of the informant has not been disclosed to the court (see, United States v Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583). Here, the statement was made by a clearly identified individual with personal firsthand knowledge of the detailed facts asserted therein. The statement implicating defendant as the possessor and dealer of cocaine is part of a comprehensive confession by Netherton clearly implicating her in both possessing and trafficking cocaine, and is sufficient to establish the reliability of the statement (see, People v Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 403-404; People v Comforto, 62 N.Y.2d 725; People v Butchino, supra; see also, Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213). The fact that Netherton was in custody on serious charges does not suggest unreliability (see, People v Rodriguez, 52 N.Y.2d 483, 490). The statement was a part of a formal confession to police officers after Netherton had been advised of her Miranda rights orally and in writing on the caption of the confession. Moreover, the testimony showed that the statement was made of her own free will without promises of anything offered to her or hope of reward, favor, or expectation of leniency extended.
The affidavit of Yeager satisfied the requirement of both the 4th Amendment to the US Constitution and CPL 690.35 (1) that the application for the search warrant be sworn to (see, People v Butchino, supra; People v Zimmer, 112 A.D.2d 500, 501). "Where a search warrant has been secured, the bona fides of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case * * * [S]earch warrant applications should not be read in a hypertechnical manner as if they were entries in an essay contest. On the contrary, they must be considered in the clear light of everyday experience and accorded all reasonable inferences" (People v Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 558-559). Here, probable cause was firmly established and the warrant application was in correct form.
Mercure, Crew III, Mahoney and Casey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).