Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCD214957 Stephanie Sontag, Judge.
HALLER, J.
Alejandro Morales pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) causing injury. (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a).) The court ordered Morales to pay restitution and placed him on probation for five years. On appeal, Morales challenges the probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless and random searches and seizures. We conclude that even if Morales properly preserved this issue, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the probation condition. Accordingly, we affirm.
The facts are based on the probation report because there was no trial.
Morales was driving at about 75 to 100 miles per hour on the freeway when he lost control of his car and hit another car driven by Steven McLaughlin. The impact caused McLaughlin's car to collide with a third car. The third car hit the concrete center median and flipped over. McLaughlin and his young son (who was a passenger in the car) sustained minor injuries. Morales admitted to drinking seven beers before driving and said he fell asleep at the wheel. He failed the sobriety test and his blood alcohol level was.19. Morales pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury.
The court ordered Morales to pay restitution of $10,345.63 to McLaughlin and $1,300 to McLaughlin's son. The court placed Morales on probation for five years and imposed several conditions, including abstaining from drinking alcohol, not entering places where alcohol is the main item for sale (except in the course of employment), and successfully completing a substance abuse program. The probation order also specifically required that Morales submit to searches and seizures without a warrant and without reasonable cause. At the sentencing hearing, the court identified these probation conditions by numbers and letters listed on the probation order, and asked Morales whether he reviewed the probation conditions with his lawyer. Morales responded affirmatively.
DISCUSSION
I. Waiver of Search and Seizure Rights
Morales contends the court erred in imposing the probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches and seizures. However, he waived this contention by not objecting to the condition below. Generally, if a criminal defendant does not challenge a probation condition in the trial court, the defendant forfeits the right to raise the claim on appeal. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880.) Morales argues this waiver rule does not apply because (1) he received inadequate notice of the condition; and (2) his claim raises a constitutional issue. We need not reach these contentions because even if Morales had properly preserved the issue, his challenge fails on the merits.
II. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
A " 'sentencing court has broad discretion to determine whether an eligible defendant is suitable for probation and, if so, under what conditions.' " (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) " 'The primary goal of probation is to ensure "[t]he safety of the public... through the enforcement of court-ordered conditions of probation." [Citation.]' " (Ibid., quoting People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) A probation condition " 'will not be held invalid unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality...." [Citation.]' " (Ibid.; People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698, 702.) Thus, a probation condition is proper if it is reasonably related either to the crime of which the defendant is convicted or to the goal of deterring future criminality. (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 380-381; People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65; see People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) A trial court's determination that a probation condition is warranted is entitled to substantial deference and must be upheld unless the court's determination was "arbitrary or capricious" and exceeds the " ' " 'bounds of reason.' " ' " (People v. Carbajal, supra, at p. 1121; see People v. Olguin, supra, at p. 379.)
Under these principles, the courts have long upheld probation conditions that require the defendant to waive search and seizure rights. (See People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 68.) The courts reason that the waiver condition is an effective tool for law enforcement to determine whether the probationer is obeying the law and to deter the individual from violating the law and other probation conditions. (Ibid.; see People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 752; In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1006; People v. Wardlow (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 360, 366.) The search waiver condition is also viewed as an appropriate limitation on a defendant's rights in exchange for circumventing a prison sentence. " 'When warrantless search and seizure conditions are imposed upon a probationer... it is established that the individual "consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term. Probation is not a right, but a privilege." [Citation.]' " (People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 65-66.)
Six years ago, the California Supreme Court applied these principles to find a search waiver was a reasonable probation condition for a DUI crime. (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 504-506.) In Ramos, the defendant was convicted of a DUI with injury and was granted probation subject to the condition that he " 'submit his person, property and automobile... to search and seizure....' " (Id. at p. 505.) Relying on this waiver condition, the police later searched the defendant's house and truck without a warrant, and found evidence of criminal activity. (Id. at pp. 504-506.) In seeking to suppress this evidence, the defendant argued the search waiver condition had been improperly imposed because it was not reasonably related to the prior DUI crime. (Id. at p. 505.) The high court rejected this argument, and concluded the trial court properly found the search waiver was reasonably related to the DUI conviction because it was necessary to protect the public. (Id. at pp. 505-506.) The court explained, " 'the purpose of the search condition is to deter the commission of crimes and to protect the public, and the effectiveness of the deterrent is enhanced by the potential for random searches.' " (Id. at p. 506, citing People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753.) The court further emphasized " '[t]he level of intrusion is de minimis and the expectation of privacy greatly reduced when the subject of the search is on notice that his activities are being routinely and closely monitored." (Id. at p. 506.)
Although the Ramos defendant did not challenge the probation condition when initially imposed, the California Supreme Court found the defendant did not waive the argument because the condition was imposed before the high court had prospectively adopted the waiver rule. (People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 505.)
As in Ramos, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the search and seizure waiver probation condition for Morales's DUI with injury crime. In granting probation, the court ordered Morales to "[t]otally abstain" from drinking alcohol and to refrain from entering stores that sell primarily alcohol (unless for employment purposes). Morales does not challenge these conditions. To ensure Morales was complying with these rules and refraining from driving under the influence, the court had a reasonable basis to conclude it was proper to require Morales to submit to warrantless searches and seizures. This condition was reasonably related to the goal of preventing future DUI violations because it would deter Morales from drinking alcohol and/or driving while intoxicated and would assist law enforcement officers to monitor Morales's compliance with the law and the conditions of his probation. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 505-506; People v. Wardlow, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 366.)
Relying on People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827, Morales argues that "[i]t is well settled that search and seizure is not a reasonable term of probation for a defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol." Keller does not support this broad assertion. Keller involved a petty offense, not a DUI conviction, and did not hold that a search waiver is an unreasonable condition for a DUI offense. (Id. at p. 830.) Further, in Balestra, this court expressly abandoned the broad language found in Keller because it was "inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence... [¶]... [¶]... and with subsequent case authority from both the United States and California Supreme Courts." (People v. Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66-67.)
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P.J., AARON, J.