People v. Moorhead

15 Citing cases

  1. People v. Washington

    269 Ill. App. 3d 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 17 times

    ( Creagh, 214 Ill. App.3d at 747; People v. Worlow (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 112, 114, 435 N.E.2d 795.) Testimony by an arresting officer that the defendant "fit the general description" of an offender is insufficient to uphold an investigatory stop where no specific information is provided regarding the description of the perpetrator. People v. Talley (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 506, 509, 340 N.E.2d 167; People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 527-28, 308 N.E.2d 381. In the instant case, the only evidence introduced to explain the detention of the defendant was the officers' testimony that the defendant "fit the description of the robbery suspect."

  2. People v. McGee

    513 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    The record fails to show, however, that Kwielford ever regarded McGee as anything other than a potential suspect. Defendants rely on People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 308 N.E.2d 381. Defendants assert that the trial court also improperly relied on evidence that defendant McGee's shoes were muddy as being relevant because there were footprints left in the mud at the scene of the attempted burglary.

  3. People v. Pruitte

    125 Ill. App. 3d 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 2 times

    The issue now becomes whether the stop was properly based upon specific and articulable facts which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion under Terry. The defendant argues that there were no reasonable grounds for a Terry stop of the defendant by Officer Ryan and cites as authority People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 308 N.E.2d 381. We agree with the People that Moorhead is distinguishable from the facts in the present case.

  4. People v. McMullen

    403 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 8 times

    • 3 In this case the detention and interrogation of defendant, unlike an arrest, did not require probable cause (see Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 148-49, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 618, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924-25; People v. Ussery (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 864, 868, 321 N.E.2d 718, 721) and was properly made by the police officers. Defendant contends his running from the police and the fact that he matched the general description of the assailant did not justify the officers' stopping and questioning him. Defendant cites People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 308 N.E.2d 381, to support his position. In Moorhead, the defendant was stopped by police who found narcotic drugs in his possession.

  5. People v. Byrd

    47 Ill. App. 3d 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 16 times
    In Byrd, a police officer observed the defendant wearing "a silver colored, waist length, leather jacket, walking along the intersection of 61st and Racine Streets."

    Rather, it was the numerous repetitions of the walks up and down the same street and peering into the store window which justifiably aroused the suspicions of the police. The facts in People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 308 N.E.2d 381, parallel those in the instant case. In Moorhead the police stopped the defendant approximately three hours after hearing a report of a cleaning store robbery.

  6. People v. Talley

    34 Ill. App. 3d 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 12 times
    In People v. Talley (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 506, 507, 340 N.E.2d 167, the defendant and a companion had been stopped by the police because they "fitted the description" of two suspects wanted for a crime committed three days previously in the same area. This court reversed the conviction, noting the testimony of the arresting officer was merely a conclusion.

    There was no testimony concerning the source of the description or any details of the description. The facts in the instant case closely parallel the facts in the recent case of People v. Moorhead, 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 308 N.E.2d 381. In Moorhead, the arresting officer testified that he was looking for a man who had robbed a cleaning store in the area an hour before.

  7. People v. Jackson

    348 Ill. App. 3d 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)   Cited 43 times
    Recognizing that " ‘the mere fact that a citizen is identified will not automatically impart credibility and reliability to his statement’ " (quoting People v. Ertl , 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 873, 226 Ill.Dec. 955, 686 N.E.2d 738 (1997) )

    have repeatedly recognized that the time of the stop in relation to the time of the crime is a factor that may be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. See Walters, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 236 ("It is well established that a reasonable suspicion supporting an investigatory stop can be derived, in part, from observing suspects similar to those believed to be fleeing from a recent crime when the suspects are located in the general area where fleeing suspects would be expected to be found, given the time and distance from the crime scene"); People v. Lippert, 89 Ill. 2d 171, 181 (1982) (important factor in upholding stop and subsequent arrest of defendant was that the defendant was "in the area of the robbery within a short time after its occurrence"); People v. Byrd, 47 Ill. App. 3d 804, 808 (1977) ("[T]he general description, combined with the remote time and place of defendant's seizure, compels a finding that the officer's stop of defendant was unreasonable"); People v. Moorhead, 17 Ill. App. 3d 521, 528 (1974) (officer's testimony that defendant fit the general description of the offender "combined with the remote time and place of defendant's seizure, do not comport with the standard of specific information which the Supreme Court has required an officer to have before he may lawfully stop an individual on the street"). In this case, the stop occurred two weeks after the burglary and was based upon information provided by a noneyewitness who did not provide any details as to the crime or the description of the offender.

  8. People v. Galvin

    161 Ill. App. 3d 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 3 times

    Although the factual patterns of the cases falling under the instant statute are too diverse to permit generalizations, the courts in this State have often forbidden the subject police activity as violative of the statutory directive. See People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 308 N.E.2d 381. The State's brief on appeal asserts that reversal of the instant suppression order is strongly supported by the supreme court's decision in People v. McGowan (1977), 69 Ill.2d 73, 370 N.E.2d 537.

  9. People v. Roberts

    96 Ill. App. 3d 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 21 times

    The objective determination to be made is whether the facts available to the officer would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was appropriate. ( People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 308 N.E.2d 381.) Each case involving an investigatory stop must be decided on its own facts. People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239, 311 N.E.2d 681, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026, 42 L.Ed.2d 302, 95 S.Ct. 506.

  10. People v. Zielinski

    91 Ill. App. 3d 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    The objective standard to be used is whether the facts warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that the action was appropriate. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-06, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80; Gunderson, 66 Ill. App.3d 516, 522, 383 N.E.2d 1296, 1301; People v. Moorhead (1974), 17 Ill. App.3d 521, 526, 308 N.E.2d 381, 384. • 2 Here, we believe that the radio bulletin coupled with the information provided by the victim's husband carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the stop.