Opinion
E033089.
11-4-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUDOLPH RONNIE MOORE, Defendant and Appellant.
Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Barry J.T. Carlton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Kristine A. Gutierrez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant unsuccessfully challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of felony evading an officer. (Pen. Code, § 2800.2.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between 2:15 and 2:30 a.m. on November 20, 2001, Donna Mejia returned to her Riverside residence after working the night shift at Riverside Community Hospital. She noticed a Mustang parked at the corner with an African-American male, later identified as Joshua Ford, in the drivers seat. She saw another man, later identified as defendant, slouching near the tire of her car which was parked behind the Mustang. He was wearing black clothing and a ski mask. She asked if there was something she could do for him. He approached her, put a gun to her face and nervously demanded her purse. She gave him her purse and asked him not to hurt her. He ran and entered the passenger side of the Mustang.
Riverside Police Officer Gaspard was driving his marked patrol car when he saw headlights approaching him very slowly. As the two cars passed each other, both vehicles were moving slowly and the officer looked at the driver and the passenger. The driver appeared to be surprised, so the officer made a U-turn. The Mustang sped away. The officers patrol car has a red light on the top that is visible from the front when it is turned on. Activating his lights and sirens, the officer followed the Mustang. A high-speed chase through city streets ensued, ending with a foot pursuit by police officers and the eventual arrest of defendant and Ford. Defendant was found hiding on a couch under a carpet in the carport of a nearby residence. Ford was found hiding in a dryer in a side yard of a different residence. Mejia identified defendant as the robber and Ford as the driver of the Mustang.
Defendant did not present any evidence. He argued, based on cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, that he was guilty only of misdemeanor evading and grand theft from a person because he was the driver of the car and not the robber.
The jury found him guilty of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and felony evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1) and that he personally used a handgun during the commission of the robbery (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)). The court sentenced him to a 15-year prison term.
DISCUSSION
Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for felony evasion of a pursuing police officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2. He argues there was insufficient evidence that the light activated by the officer was red and that he aided Ford in the commission of this offense. We affirm.
"`The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] `Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witnesss credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]" (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, quoting People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
There was sufficient evidence the emergency light activated by the officer was red. A conviction of evading requires, in addition to other elements, proof that the officers motor vehicle exhibited at least one red lamp visible from the front. (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.1, subd. (a)(1), 2800.2.) Here, the officer testified that the lights on top of his patrol car include a red light that is visible from the front when it is turned on. Shortly thereafter he testified that when he made a U-turn behind the Mustang, the car sped away quickly, at which point, he "initiated [his] lights and sirens, and the pursuit began." From this evidence, the jury reasonably could infer that the "lights" he turned on when he initiated the pursuit included the red light.
The cases cited by defendant to support his claim that the evidence was insufficient are distinguishable. In People v. Acevedo (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 195, the officer testified he activated his overhead emergency lights, but there was no evidence presented to the jury to establish that the pursuing car displayed a red light, as required by the statute. (Id. at pp. 197-198.) In the case before us, the officer testified one of his overhead lights was red and visible from the front. In People v. Brown (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 596, the pursuing officer testified that her squad car was equipped to display three possible light signals, depending on which switch was activated: a flashing amber light to the rear, blinking blue and white lights to the front and rear, or rotating red, blue and white lights. The officer recalled that she "activated [her] overhead signals" but could not recall which ones. (Id. at p. 599.) Bystander witnesses testified that the squad cars lights were on at the time, but their testimony did not establish the color of the lights. (Id. at p. 600.) Thus, as the People conceded, the evidence established that the officers lights were on, but not whether any of them were red. (Id. at p. 599.) In the case before us, the People made no such concession and the officers testimony was not uncertain as to whether he activated the overhead red light. Rather, the officer testified one of his overhead lights was red and visible from the front and he "initiated [his] lights and sirens, and the pursuit began."
There was sufficient evidence that defendant aided and abetted the felony evasion of the officer. "`A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime. [Citations.]" (People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409, quoting People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.) Mere presence at the scene of a crime and even knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to prove aiding and abetting. (People v. Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) However, factors such as presence at the scene of the crime, companionship with the perpetrators, and conduct before and after the offense may circumstantially prove aiding and abetting. (Ibid.) Whether the defendant aided and abetted the crime is a question of fact, and all conflicts and reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the judgment. (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence showed that defendant robbed Mejia at gunpoint. Immediately after the robbery, defendant entered the waiting Mustang and fled the crime scene. Both defendant and Ford looked at the officer when Ford drove past the patrol car. When the officer began to follow the Mustang, it sped away, beginning the chase. While being chased, the gun that defendant used, the ski mask that he wore, and the purse that he took from Mejia were thrown out the passenger side of the Mustang. When the Mustang stopped, defendant jumped out of the passenger side of the car and ran from the officer. The foregoing evidence established that the Mustang was the getaway car for the robbery, that defendant who was the robber had reason to flee the officer, and that he continued to flee from the officer when the vehicle chase ended. Thus, the jury reasonably could conclude that defendant was not an innocent, passive or unwitting bystander and that he played an affirmative supporting role in evading the officer during the vehicle pursuit. In these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the jurys verdict.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur, WARD, J. and KING, J. --------------- Notes: As the People note in their brief, defendants attorney conceded at trial that this element of the offense had been proven when he argued that defendant was guilty only of misdemeanor evading and grand theft from a person because he was the driver of the car and not the robber.