Opinion
NO. 5-17-0347
05-13-2020
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY T. MOORE JR., Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
Decision filed 05/13/20. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County.
No. 15-CF-982
Honorable Randall W. Kelley, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Welch and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Because the admonishments given to the defendant did not comply with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rules 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) and 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001), we vacate the order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 The defendant, Anthony T. Moore Jr., entered a negotiated plea of guilty in the circuit court of St. Clair County to one count of forgery. He appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw that guilty plea. For the following reasons, we vacate the order denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The facts necessary to our disposition of this direct appeal follow. On August 28, 2015, the defendant was indicted on four charges, two of which were for forgery and two of which were for
obstructing justice. Of relevance to this appeal, one of the forgery charges alleged that the defendant "knowingly made a false document apparently capable of defrauding another, being a notarized statement entitled 'Affidavit' signed by [the defendant] dated April 1, 2015, claiming that [the defendant] murdered Kevin McVay and Charles Black." The second forgery charge alleged that the defendant "knowingly made a false document apparently capable of defrauding another, being an undated statement entitled 'Affidavit' signed by [the defendant], claiming that [the defendant] murdered Kevin McVay and Charles Black." The State's theory of the case was that the defendant did not in fact murder McVay or Black, but was offered money to aver that he did.
¶ 5 On January 6, 2017, the defendant, represented by counsel, entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the first forgery count described above. During that court appearance, the State represented to the trial judge that part of the plea agreement included a cooperation agreement whereby the defendant would testify against a defendant in a different case. The State represented that it had "also indicated to the defendant as well as to the defense counsel that it will use its best efforts to transport the defendant to a facility, a jail outside of St. Clair County. However, the cooperation agreement is not contingent upon that guarantee." The State noted that it would "notify the appropriate jail staff and recommend that the defendant be transported outside of St. Clair County pending successful cooperation with the agreement that he will enter into this morning." The State would recommend a two-year prison sentence in this case, and at the time of sentencing would seek to dismiss the remaining three counts in the indictment. Defense counsel agreed with the representations about the plea agreement made by the State, and the trial judge then admonished the defendant in an attempt to ensure that the defendant's entry into the plea agreement was knowing and voluntary. Thereafter, the trial judge told the defendant that sentencing would take place at a future court appearance, but if the defendant complied with the agreement, the trial
judge would accept the sentencing recommendation and sentence the defendant to a two-year term, and would allow the other charges to be dismissed.
¶ 6 Defense counsel subsequently stated, "If I may, Your Honor, there's one concern my client had that he would like on the record, and that the—that if he is kept any longer in St. Clair County and he's not transferred immediately, that he be put in the general population because right now he is in segregation, and I believe he's been there for some[ ]time." The State reiterated that it would attempt to get the defendant transferred elsewhere, and would recommend that he be removed from segregation if he remained in St. Clair County, but that the State could not guarantee either. The trial judge asked the defendant if he understood that the State could not make him any guarantees. The defendant did not respond. The following colloquy then occurred:
"THE COURT: Does that affect your—anything about your decision making?
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, I feel like I'm *** going to go through [with] the *** agreement anyway. I just *** want it for *** just noted to you that I've been in solitary confinement for five straight months. I take psychotropics. Since I've been back there, they put me back on high blood pressure medicine that I've been off for like a year and a half. I'm only twenty-four years old. They say that it's for my protection, or whatever, et cetera, but I tell them I write complaint forms and that, hey, if I have an issue where I'm in population, I will note it. You know what I'm saying? I will let somebody know, you know. But I can't take this of being in this cell, and it's just bothering my mental and—
THE COURT: But that's not why you're entering into these agreements, because you've been in solitary for five months? You're still—You believe it's in your best interests to enter into this agreement?
THE DEFENDANT: It—I mean, it's a good deal. It's a good deal. I mean, it's a good deal. I mean, that's not the reason—
THE COURT: But it does affect your decision? It's fair to say—
THE DEFENDANT: It—
THE COURT: I mean you want to get out of solitary?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I mean, county—I do, but—
THE COURT: But even if *** you were housed in a fashion that you would want to be out right now, you would still be entering into this agreement, is that fair to say?
THE DEFENDANT: Probably—probably wouldn't—I don't know if I would—I would be willing to cooperate and testify on—for the State, but I don't know if I'd be pleading guilty to my other offenses.
But I will do it—I'm content with it now as—since I spoke to my attorney and this—I feel like it's my best interests ***; but at the same time, Your Honor, I just—my mental."
¶ 7 The trial judge, at the request of the State, then recessed the proceedings for "about five minutes" so that the defendant could speak privately with his attorney. Following the recess, the defendant indicated that he was prepared to proceed with the plea under the terms established by the State. When asked if he had any additional questions or concerns, the defendant answered, "No, sir." The defendant signed the written plea agreement, and the trial judge provided further admonishments in an attempt to ensure that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. The State provided a factual basis for the plea, the defendant agreed to the plea, and the trial judge set the matter for sentencing at a later date.
¶ 8 Thereafter, the defendant, although still represented by counsel, filed several pro se documents, asking the trial judge to dismiss the charges against the defendant because the defendant's speedy trial rights had been violated, and taking issue with the conditions of his confinement at the St. Clair County jail. On March 23, 2017, following a hearing at which the
defendant appeared with counsel, the trial judge entered an order in which he set an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's "8th Amendment motion to be transferred out of segregation in the St. Clair County Jail." On April 4, 2017, the State filed a motion in which it asked the trial judge to vacate the order for an evidentiary hearing. Therein, the State noted that the defendant had not been sentenced yet, and contended that because the Sheriff of St. Clair County was not a party to this action, the trial judge did not have personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction to grant the defendant the relief he requested. Following a hearing on April 6, 2017, at which argument was presented—and at which the defendant was permitted, via what was essentially unsworn testimony, to extensively describe his view of the differences between being housed in segregation and being housed in the general population area—the trial judge granted the State's motion, noting that he agreed with the State's jurisdictional arguments.
¶ 9 The trial judge then addressed the defendant directly, stating "I want to remind you, Mr. Moore, that voluntarily and without coercion, according to the terms of the plea that we took on January the 6th, that you did enter into a plea agreement." He reiterated that because the defendant had not been sentenced yet, issues such as "sentencing improprieties" were not properly before the trial judge. He added, "You didn't file a motion to set aside your plea. I've tried to read your motions *** in a fashion wherein I could even extrapolate some requests to withdraw the plea in the midst of those, and there's just not language there to substantiate that." The trial judge then stated, "So, we have the plea still proceeding. The sentencing still is being held in abeyance consistent with your cooperation agreement. Now, at the same time, I note you haven't filed any requests anywhere or any motions anywhere to be released from the cooperation agreement."
¶ 10 On April 24, 2017, the defendant, by counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therein, he alleged, inter alia, that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. On May 30, 2017, a hearing was held wherein the defendant was sentenced pursuant to his previous agreement with
the State, with the understanding that sentencing was necessary, as a procedural matter, before the trial judge could consider the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The parties agreed that a hearing would be set for soon thereafter to address the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that the defendant would, as per his request, proceed pro se, although he would adopt the motion previously filed by his counsel. The trial judge then stated the following:
"You have a right to appeal from my sentence. If you wish to appeal, within thirty days of today's date, you would need to file this motion to set aside your plea. If your motion—If you need a lawyer to help you do that, I will appoint one for you free of charge. If your motion is granted, we'll set aside your plea, we'll address all these issues, and proceed as if today—and as if this plea never happened. If your motion is denied, you'll have thirty days from that date to file a notice of appeal. If you can't afford a lawyer or transcripts to help you prepare the notice of appeal, those will be provided for you free of charge. Do you understand your rights on appeal?"
The defendant answered, "Yes, sir." Thereafter, with regard to the defendant's desire to represent himself, the trial judge stated that he would allow the defendant to do so, and added the following:
"And I am not appointing anyone in an advisory capacity at this time. That's something, Mr. Moore, if this case continues to persist and you continue to represent yourself and there's still going to be some stuff ongoing, we will discuss at that time if you need *** an advisory lawyer with you. But we'll talk about that. I know right now you don't want that, and I'm not giving you that."
The defendant again answered, "Yes, sir." With regard to the motion to withdraw guilty plea previously filed by counsel, the trial judge stated to the defendant, "we'll just go on that one unless you file something else."
¶ 11 That same day, May 30, 2017, the trial judge entered a written order in which he set a hearing for June 28, 2017, on the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial judge also filed a mittimus in which he sentenced the defendant to two years in prison on the forgery count, to be followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. On June 28, 2017, the trial judge entered an order in which he continued, until August 3, 2017, the hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
¶ 12 On August 3, 2017, the hearing was held. The trial judge began the hearing by stating, "Mr. Moore is present. You're representing—He's representing himself at this point." Immediately thereafter, the trial judge announced who was present for the State, then proceeded to the substance of the hearing. He allowed the defendant to file, inter alia, the defendant's own handwritten affidavit—which was dated at the top right of the first page, and again beneath his signature on the final page, "June 17, 2017"—in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and to read the affidavit into the record, as the defendant's argument on his motion. The defendant did not offer any argument other than the June 17, 2017, affidavit. The trial judge then allowed the State to respond to the defendant's argument. The State contended that the defendant's speedy trial rights were never violated in this case, and that the record demonstrated that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowing and voluntary, and therefore should not be set aside. The defendant, when given the opportunity, declined to respond to the State's argument. The trial judge then stated to the defendant, with regard to the defendant's plea of guilty to the forgery charge, the following:
"I've reviewed the plea that we did, you clearly stated on the record that you were satisfied with [plea counsel's] representation. You further clearly stated that you understood what you were doing, as far as that plea was concerned, you were doing it of your own free [will] and that you had—you were not under the influence of any drugs or medication that would make it impossible for you to understand what was going on. There's no question in my
mind that your plea to that charge that day was free and voluntary and that you understood what you were doing."
The trial judge then stated that he believed the defendant was unsatisfied with the assistance of counsel the defendant had received in other pending cases, and that the trial judge therefore would deny the defendant's motion in this case, so that the defendant could "immediately" appeal "through an Appellate Public Defender so you've got a lawyer again working for you but not somebody that's affiliated with the Public Defender's Office." The defendant responded, "Yes, sir." Subsequently, the trial judge stated, "You can't afford a lawyer to handle your notice of appeal, can you? You don't have any money to hire a lawyer for anything right now, do you?" The defendant responded, "No, sir." The trial judge then stated that he would appoint a lawyer to help the defendant prepare a notice of appeal, and that it would "be someone that's not on the payroll of the Public Defender's Office." He added, "And then the Appellate Defender's Office can pick that part up from there." The defendant subsequently stated that he did not want assistance filing the notice of appeal, and the trial judge again admonished him of the time frame in which to get it filed, adding "don't mess that date up." Following the hearing, the trial judge entered a written order in which he denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 On appeal, the defendant's sole contention is that the trial judge "violated Supreme Court Rules 605(c) and 604(d), preventing [the defendant's] challenges to his guilty plea from being fully resolved." In support of this contention, the defendant notes that Rule 605(c) requires substantial compliance, whereas Rule 604(d) requires strict compliance, and posits that in this case, the admonishments given by the trial judge did not meet the requisite standards under either rule. In particular, with regard to Rule 605(c), he claims the trial judge's admonishments: (1) "stated
the right to appeal solely in terms of the sentence, though the plea itself could be appealed," (2) did not inform the defendant that his postplea motion must set forth the grounds for withdrawal of the plea or that issues omitted would be forfeited, (3) "did not explain that vacatur of the plea would mean a trial date would be set or that the State could reinstate dropped charges," and (4) told the defendant only that he could have free transcripts to prepare his notice of appeal, not that he could have free transcripts to prepare the postplea motion itself, "as stated in the Rule." Accordingly, the defendant contends, the admonishments "failed to convey the requisite steps for appealing, and thus do not demonstrate substantial compliance," and moreover "misled [the defendant] about the scope of the appeal and omitted the consequences of withdrawing the plea." He adds that the admonishments "ignored a key part of preserving an issue for appeal—putting the issue in the postplea motion," and contends that courts in this state "have found no substantial compliance based on similarly incomplete admonitions."
¶ 15 With regard to Rule 604(d), the defendant claims that "at the start of the [August 3, 2017] postplea hearing, the court did not inquire into [the defendant's] desire for counsel; it merely stated that [the defendant] was representing himself and then moved on with the hearing. *** This conduct violated Rule 604(d), an error that should be remedied with new postplea proceedings." The defendant thereafter discusses "several possibly meritorious claims" that he contends the purportedly inadequate admonishments prevented him from raising. He notes that he is not required to show that he was prejudiced by the purportedly inadequate admonishments, but adds that "the possible issues outlined [in his brief] strengthen the case for ordering new postplea proceedings."
¶ 16 The State reponds by contending that the admonishments were adequate, although the State concedes the admonishments "were not a model of clarity." With regard to Rule 605(c), the State points to case law which holds that admonishments pursuant to the rule are compliant if, taken as
a whole, they substantially advised the defendant of the requirements of the rule, so as to put the defendant on notice of the steps necessary to preserve an appeal. To rebut the defendant's specific arguments, the State points to facts in the record that the State contends excuse the lack of information found in the admonishments. First, the State claims that it does not matter that the trial judge failed to tell the defendant that he could appeal not only his sentence but the plea as well, because the defendant, by counsel, had already filed a motion to withdraw his plea and therefore clearly knew he could do so. Second, the State claims that "the trial judge fully complied with Rule 605(c)(3) and substantially complied with Rule 605(c)(4) when he told defendant that if the motion was granted, the plea would be set aside and they would proceed "as if this plea never happened." Third, the State claims the trial judge informed the defendant that "if he needed a lawyer to help him prepare a motion to withdraw guilty plea, he would appoint one free of charge," and that if the defendant "could not afford a lawyer or transcripts to help prepare the notice of appeal, one would be provided for him free of charge." The State concedes that the trial judge "did not mention transcripts of the plea," but posits that "the transcript of the guilty plea had already been prepared and placed in the common law record and [the] defendant, representing himself, would have had access to it." The State adds that the "defendant adopted the motion to withdraw guilty plea drafted by prior counsel, which contained the primary gist of his motion, and [the] defendant added his own motion to withdraw guilty plea raising a venue claim and a speedy trial claim." Finally, the State notes that "[t]he only portion of Rule 605(c) that the trial court did not address was that any claim of error not raised in the motion to withdraw guilty plea would be deemed waived," but argues that "[n]onetheless, there is no issue on appeal that allegations were left out of defendant's motion as a result of this oversight."
¶ 17 With regard to Rule 604(d), the State maintains that because the defendant had already chosen to proceed pro se, and did not subsequently request or accept offers of counsel, the trial
judge was not required to ask the defendant at the beginning of the defendant's August 3, 2017, postplea hearing if the defendant persisted in his desire to represent himself. The State bases its position on case law that holds, under what is known as the "continuing waiver rule," that if a defendant makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to proceed pro se, that choice persists through subsequent proceedings. The State posits that "circumstances requiring readmonishment include lengthy delays between trial phases, newly discovered evidence which might require or justify advice of counsel, new charges brought, or a request from [the] defendant," and that here, "there was only a short period between the time defendant was granted leave to proceed pro se and the motion to withdraw guilty plea." The State also contends there is no merit to any of the "possibly meritorious claims" alluded to by the defendant in his opening brief on appeal, and discusses each of the claims in detail.
¶ 18 In reply to the State's arguments, the defendant reiterates "there was no compliance with Rule 605(c)," because after sentencing the defendant, the trial judge "omitted admonitions concerning forfeiture of claims, the consequences of a plea being vacated, and the nature of the appeal right, and misstated the admonition concerning free transcripts." With regard to Rule 604(d), he notes that the State, pursuant to its "continuing waiver rule" theory, cites cases holding "that a pretrial waiver of counsel applies through sentencing," but no cases holding "that it carries through postplea proceedings." He contends no such cases exist because "a defendant's postplea proceedings are a separate phase, with distinct procedures set out in Rule 604(d)," and that "a prior waiver thus does not carry through to these proceedings." He adds that the defendant's "earlier waiver of counsel, though sufficient for proceeding with standby counsel, was insufficient to allow him to proceed complete[ly] unassisted." The defendant also reiterates that he is not attempting, via this appeal, to litigate the "possibly meritorious claims" he listed, but only brought them up "to show the results of the mishandled procedure below, and to show the court's abdication of its role
as decision-maker." He notes again that he is not required to show that prejudice resulted from the trial court's purportedly errant admonishments.
¶ 19 We review de novo a defendant's claim that a trial judge failed to comply adequately with Illinois Supreme Court rules. See, e.g., People v. Morris, 2013 IL App (1st) 110413, ¶ 76. If we conclude that a trial judge has not complied adequately with Rule 605(c), or with Rule 604(d), we remand for proper admonishments. People v. Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 11 (for Rule 605(c)); People v. Hinton, 362 Ill. App. 3d 229, 234 (2005) (for Rule 604(d)). As the defendant notes, Rules 605(c) and 604(d) provide a complementary set of procedures to guide the litigation of postplea motions (see, e.g., Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 13), with Rule 604(d) setting out the events that must transpire between a guilty plea and a perfected appeal, and Rule 605(c) (which is given after the sentence is imposed) requiring the trial judge to explain the events in Rule 604(d), as well as the consequences of a vacated guilty plea. Of relevance to this appeal, one of the requirements of Rule 604(d) is that upon receipt of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a trial judge "shall then determine whether the defendant is represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel." Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Rule 605(c) states as follows:
"In all cases in which a judgment is entered upon a negotiated plea of guilty, at the time of imposing sentence, the trial court shall advise the defendant substantially as follows:
(1) that the defendant has a right to appeal;
(2) that prior to taking an appeal the defendant must file in the trial court, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, a written motion asking to have the judgment vacated and for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty, setting forth the grounds for the motion;
(3) that if the motion is allowed, the plea of guilty, sentence and judgment will be vacated and a trial date will be set on the charges to which the plea of guilty was made;
(4) that upon the request of the State any charges that may have been dismissed as a part of a plea agreement will be reinstated and will also be set for trial;
(5) that if the defendant is indigent, a copy of the transcript of the proceedings at the time of the defendant's plea of guilty and sentence will be provided without cost to the defendant and counsel will be appointed to assist the defendant with the preparation of the motions; and
(6) that in any appeal taken from the judgment on the plea of guilty any issue or claim of error not raised in the motion to vacate the judgment and to withdraw the plea of guilty shall be deemed waived.
For the purposes of this rule, a negotiated plea is one in which the prosecution has bound itself to recommend a specific sentence, or a specific range of sentence, or where the prosecution has made concessions relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge or charges then pending." Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001).
¶ 20 As a general proposition, substantial compliance with Rule 605(c) is all that is required. See, e.g., Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 22. Accordingly, this court has held that "[a] trial court need not use the exact language of Rule 605(c), although it must still convey the substance of the rule." People v. Perry, 2014 IL App (1st) 122584, ¶ 15. However, although "the trial court need not recite the rule word-for-word," admonishments are not adequate if they omit "any reference to certain portions of Rule 605(c) altogether." Id. ¶ 16; see also People v. Lloyd, 338 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 (2003) (admonishments inadequate where "it is not the precise wording used that is at issue, but the lack of any wording at all"); People v. Braden, 2018 IL App (1st) 152295, ¶ 25 (trial court need not use exact language of rule, but must not leave out or misrepresent any of rule's substance).
¶ 21 In this case, the State concedes that the trial judge did not address the portion of Rule 605(c) "that any claim of error not raised in the motion to withdraw guilty plea would be deemed waived," but argues that "[n]onetheless, there is no issue on appeal that allegations were left out of defendant's motion as a result of this oversight." The State's argument is essentially an attempt to show that the defendant was not prejudiced by the omission. However, as the Illinois Supreme Court has noted, a defendant is not required to show that the defendant has been prejudiced by admonishments that fail to conform to Rule 605(c). Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 21 n.4 (prejudice showing not required for violations of Rule 605(c)). We conclude that pursuant to the cases cited in the previous paragraph, the trial judge's omission prevented substantial compliance with Rule 605(c) and therefore constituted reversible error.
¶ 22 Moreover, the defendant is correct that the trial judge also omitted admonishments concerning the consequences of a plea being vacated and the nature of the appeal right, and misstated the admonishment concerning free transcripts. The State's response to these problems is again to attempt to show that the defendant was not prejudiced by the problems, an approach which we again reject. In addition, there are factual problems with some of the assertions of the State with regard to these other deficiencies in the trial judge's Rule 605(c) admonishments. For example, the State contends the defendant could have accessed the transcript of the plea proceeding because it was in the court's file, but the record is silent with regard to what kind of access the defendant actually had to the file, and because the defendant was not admonished regarding the transcript, we will not presume that he would have known that he could find it in the file in the first place.
¶ 23 Even if the problems with the admonishments under Rule 605(c) did not require us to vacate the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and to remand for proper admonishments, we would conclude that the problems with the admonishments under Rule 604(d)
would so require. Strict compliance with Rule 604(d) is required. People v. Willis, 2015 IL App (5th) 130020, ¶ 17. When we consider whether compliance has occurred, we do so with the awareness that our supreme court rules have the force of law and are not mere suggestions, which necessitates the presumption that they will be obeyed and enforced as written. Id. ¶ 18. As with Rule 605(c), under Rule 604(d) a defendant is not required to show that the defendant has been prejudiced by the admonishment errors. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 370 (1998) (noting authority "renounc[ing] the prior practice of determining whether errors in failing to comply with Rule 604(d) were harmless or prejudicial").
¶ 24 In this case, as explained above, one of the requirements of Rule 604(d) is that upon receipt of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a trial judge "shall then determine whether the defendant is represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel." Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the State is correct that in certain circumstances a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in earlier proceedings may continue into postplea proceedings without running afoul of Rule 604(d), this case would not constitute one of those circumstances. In this case, as explained above, the trial judge agreed at the defendant's May 30, 2017, sentencing hearing to allow the defendant to proceed pro se on the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the hearing for which would be set on a subsequent date. Near the conclusion of the May 30, 2017, sentencing hearing, after stating that he was going to allow the defendant to represent himself thereafter, the trial judge stated the following to the defendant:
"And I am not appointing anyone in an advisory capacity at this time. That's something, Mr. Moore, if this case continues to persist and you continue to represent yourself and there's still going to be some stuff ongoing, we will discuss at that time if you need *** an
advisory lawyer with you. But we'll talk about that. I know right now you don't want that, and I'm not giving you that."
By this statement, the trial judge made his previous decision to allow the defendant to represent himself contingent upon a further discussion about whether the defendant desired or required advisory counsel. Nevertheless, when the defendant appeared, more than two months later, at the August 3, 2017, postplea hearing—a hearing the existence of which would lead any reasonable person to conclude that "this case continues to persist"—he was afforded no such discussion. Instead, the trial judge began the hearing by stating, "Mr. Moore is present. You're representing—He's representing himself at this point." Immediately thereafter, the trial judge announced who was present for the State, then proceeded to the substance of the hearing. We decline to find strict compliance with Rule 604(d) under this set of circumstances. Equally confusing, no doubt, for the pro se defendant was the fact that near the end of the hearing—at which, as explained above, the defendant did not offer any argument other than his June 17, 2017, affidavit, which he read verbatim into the record—the trial judge sua sponte stated that because he believed the defendant was unsatisfied with the assistance of counsel the defendant had received in other pending cases, the trial judge would deny the defendant's motion in this case, so that the defendant could "immediately" appeal "through an Appellate Public Defender so you've got a lawyer again working for you but not somebody that's affiliated with the Public Defender's Office."
¶ 25 We note that although the case before us involves only the defendant's plea of guilty to the charge of forgery, the trial judge himself recognized that the defendant was facing multiple charges, in both state and federal court, before multiple judges, and that the defendant appeared to be unhappy with the assistance of counsel he received in some of those proceedings. We acknowledge that the trial judge appears to have been attempting to safeguard the defendant's rights in various ways in this confusing, fragmented situation. Nevertheless, we conclude that the
trial judge's deviations from the standard, straightforward admonishments he was required to give in this case made the situation more confusing, not less so. Indeed, as noted above, the State concedes—and we agree—that the admonishments in this case "were not a model of clarity." We note as well that no later than January 6, 2017, the trial judge was made aware of the fact that the defendant was on psychotropic medication. Although this fact, standing alone, does not control our disposition of this case, it further exemplifies why adherence to the rules—rather than deviations from the rules such as those that happened in this case—is required. Because we conclude that in this case there was no substantial compliance with Rule 605(c), or strict compliance with Rule 604(d), we vacate the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings. See, e.g., Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 11 (for Rule 605(c)); Hinton, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 234 (for Rule 604(d)).
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 28 Vacated; cause remanded.