Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Bruce A. Clark, Judge Superior Court County No. 2008030297 of Ventura County
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, E. Carlos Dominguez, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COFFEE, J.
Matthew Montijo appeals from the judgment following his entry of a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit first degree robbery and felony assault with a deadly weapon and his admission that he served a prior prison term. (Pen. Code, §§ 182, 211; 245, subd. (a)(1); and 667.5, subd. (b).) The court sentenced appellant to a five-year prison term, imposed restitution fines and ordered him to pay victim restitution.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Appellant contends that the court erred by accepting his guilty plea to conspire to commit robbery because there was no factual basis to support the plea, and that the court abused its discretion in denying his section 1018 motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lauren Dunphy and her ex-boyfriend, Quinn McRoden, lived in an apartment prior to July 23, 2008. After their break up, she moved and left some of her furniture in the apartment. Quinn owed Lauren $800.
On July 23, 2008, just before midnight, Lauren called Quinn's apartment and screamed that she was going to come over to "beat and rob" Quinn and Kathryn Swartz, his current girlfriend. Lauren threatened to "have people beat [Quinn's] ass" and "put them all in the hospital." Quinn initially agreed to meet Lauren the next day but later agreed to let her come over that night.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 24, appellant, Brian Tinsley, Cary Collins, Kaitlin Sonne and Christopher Carbrey accompanied Lauren to Quinn's apartment to help her move her property, beat up Quinn, and recover the debt that he owed her. Quinn's father, Ronald McRhoden, confronted Lauren, appellant, and their companions and tried to prevent their entering the apartment. Lauren, appellant, and their companions then attacked Ronald and Quinn.
Before appellant entered his plea, the parties stipulated that the court could consider the police report and the probation report to find a factual basis for his plea. During the sentencing hearing, the court stated: "I read the probation report. I do find a factual basis for the plea."
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea to conspire to commit robbery because there was no factual basis for that plea. We disagree.
When the court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it must "satisfy itself... that there is a factual basis for the plea." (§ 1192.5.) It "must garner information regarding the factual basis either from the defendant or defense counsel.... If the trial court inquires of defense counsel regarding the factual basis, counsel may stipulate to a particular document that provides an adequate factual basis, such as a complaint, police report, preliminary hearing transcript, probation report, grand jury transcript, or written plea agreement." (People v. Holmes (2004) 32 Cal.4th 432, 442.) Here, the court satisfied the requirements of section 1192.5 and Holmes by finding a factual basis for the plea based on the probation report.
Appellant argues that his plea lacks a factual basis because he and Lauren did not conspire to rob Quinn where they merely intended to recover her property and assault Quinn. The probation report indicates that appellant and Lauren also sought to recover an $800 debt. He argues that a "mere taking of property which belongs to the perpetrator or for which the perpetrator holds a good-faith belief of a rightful claim of ownership is a defense to the charge of robbery," and relies upon People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 949-950. A claim-of-right defense can negate the requisite intent for robbery under some circumstances. That defense does not, however, apply to robberies perpetrated to collect a debt because public policy discourages the use of forcible self-help in those circumstances. (Id. at pp. 950, 956.)
We also reject appellant's claim that the court abused its discretion by denying his section 1018 motion to withdraw his plea for good cause. A showing of good cause is required to justify the withdrawal of a guilty plea. (§ 1018.) We will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1561.)
''Mistake, ignorance or any other factor overcoming the exercise of free judgment is good cause for the withdrawal of a guilty plea." (People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566.) Here, appellant sought to withdraw his plea because he would not have agreed to plead guilty if he had understood that the convictions to which he pled guilty would each constitute a strike under the Three Strikes law. He does not complain that the court failed to advise him properly of the consequences of his plea. Instead, he argues that his misunderstanding concerned a "material matter with which [he] was confronted and as to which he made erroneous assumptions when he entered a guilty plea." (People v. Superior Court (Giron)(1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 797.)
"Guilty pleas resulting from a bargain should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged. [Citations.]" (People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103. The "trial court is not bound by uncontradicted statements of the defendant" in determining the facts. (Ibid.) Here, appellant contradicted his own statement regarding his understanding of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty: He testified not only that "[he] didn't know [that he] was going to receive a strike," but also that he "knew they were strikeable offenses." The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., PERREN, J.