Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. No. VCF170005B Joseph A. Kalashian, Judge.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Kane, J.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Appellant, Juan Manuel Montenegro, pled no contest on June 26, 2007, to two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)). Montenegro admitted an enhancement for discharging a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Montenegro’s bargain included a stipulated sentence of seven years for one attempted murder count and a consecutive term of two years four months on the second attempted murder count. Montenegro would also receive consecutive terms of 20 years for the firearm enhancement and 10 years for the gang enhancement for a total prison sentence of 39 years four months.
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The court denied Montenegro’s motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to the stipulated term of 39 years four months. In Montenegro’s first appeal in case No. F054015 filed on January 13, 2009, we found the trial court erred in allowing Montenegro to represent himself in propria persona on a motion to withdraw his plea after his defense counsel indicated there were no grounds for Montenegro to do so. One allegation Montenegro had made was that he was not mentally competent to enter into the plea agreement. We conditionally reversed the judgment. We remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether there was a basis for Montenegro to withdraw his plea, and if not, to reinstate the judgment.
On May 21, 2009, the proceedings were suspended pursuant to section 1368 to evaluate Montenegro’s competency. Montenegro had apparently not received medication while in county jail for a psychiatric condition. On June 22, 2009, the court authorized the appointment of a psychologist or psychiatrist to evaluate Montenegro. On August 21, 2009, the court received a report from Dr. Middleton indicating Montenegro was not competent to assist in his defense. There was also a report from Dr. Velosa, a psychiatrist, indicating that Montenegro was competent to assist with his defense. The court found Montenegro incompetent to continue with criminal proceedings. As of September 4, 2009, Montenegro was being housed and treated at Atascadero State Hospital until he regained his competency.
Dr. Middleton concluded Montenegro needed antipsychotic medication to restore his competency. Dr. Middleton found other potential problems, but needed Montenegro’s medical records from prison authorities to assist him in clarifying Montenegro’s other issues.
Dr. Velosa found Montenegro was free of any psychiatric disorder and there was no evidence of bizarre, disorganized, or schizophrenic behaviors. Dr. Velosa found that Montenegro was suffering from auditory hallucinations secondary to brain trauma, but that these symptoms were sporadic and could be treated with an atypical antipsychotic medication.
Dr. Robert Knapp, Medical Director at Atascadero State Hospital, filed a document on December 7, 2009, certifying that Montenegro was mentally competent to continue criminal proceedings. Attached to the certification was the assessment and report of Dr. Brandon Yakush, a forensic psychologist. Dr. Yakush noted Montenegro was unable to offer many specifics about hearing voices. Montenegro told one clinician he heard voices only five or six times during his entire lifetime. He told Dr. Yakush he heard voices twice a week since age 22 after smoking methamphetamine. Montenegro could not describe the gender, frequency, or tone of the voices he claimed to hear. Dr. Yakush described Montenegro’s mental status as overall organized and coherent.
Dr. Yakush explained that Montenegro’s behavior at Atascadero State Hospital was consistent with an antisocial personality, but he did not display any distraction or internal preoccupation by the hallucinations. Dr. Yakush explained that even if Montenegro was hearing voices, they were not impairing him enough to impede his ability to stand trial. Dr. Yakush concluded Montenegro was malingering symptoms of psychosis. Montenegro had shown himself fully capable of engaging in productive and reasonable conversations with others. He was cooperative and alert. Montenegro did not present with any legitimate symptoms that would impede his ability to assist counsel. Dr. Yakush concluded Montenegro was competent to stand trial pursuant to section 1372, subdivision (a)(1).
On March 19, 2010, the court conducted a hearing to determine Montenegro’s competency to continue with the legal proceedings. Montenegro testified that when he was in the hospital, he heard voices two times. Montenegro said he still heard voices that made him crazy and he started kicking the door. Montenegro was taking two medications. Montenegro stated the voices caused him to lose his mind and not know what he was doing. Montenegro only understood the court process a little bit and wanted to know more.
When asked if he could explain whether the voices he heard were male or female, or the volume of the voices, Montenegro could not give an answer. Medication helped Montenegro to think better. Montenegro said he only understood the charges against him a little bit.
Dr. Yakush testified that after evaluating Montenegro, he concluded Montenegro was competent to stand trial. Dr. Yakush explained that there are patients who are so disorganized in their thinking that if one tries to discuss their legal case with them, they talk about something totally different or they will derail the conversation. These patients are incompetent to stand trial. A second group of patients suffer from severe and long standing delusional belief systems. They believe things are true against all factual evidence to the contrary. These patients are also incompetent to stand trial. A third group of patients suffer from hallucinations and cannot even sit in a courtroom without being distracted by the voices. They become too busy responding to internal stimuli.
At no time during his stay at Atascadero State Hospital did Montenegro voice any paranoid or delusional beliefs. According to Dr. Yakush, Montenegro was organized, including during his testimony in the hearing. Montenegro did not go off on tangents or show other signs of disorganization. While in the hospital, Montenegro was never observed responding to internal stimuli like auditory hallucinations. Dr. Yakush explained that even if Montenegro heard voices, he could still be competent if the voices did not speak to him about his criminal proceedings and did not distract him from the court proceedings.
According to Dr. Yakush, Montenegro’s complaint that he heard voices twice in the hospital was not frequent enough or impairing enough to question Montenegro’s ability to understand the court proceedings. Montenegro’s inability to describe the auditory hallucinations in any useful detail was atypical and was a factor indicating that Montenegro was malingering. Dr. Yakush saw no evidence Montenegro was impaired during the court hearing. Some patients struggle to understand whether the auditory hallucinations they hear are real or not. Montenegro told Dr. Velosa that he knew the voices he claimed to hear were not real.
The court noted that while it was not a mental health professional, it had 30 years of experience dealing with genuinely mentally-impaired people. The court found Montenegro was not such a person, but was a classic malingerer. The court noted Montenegro’s malingering was obvious from his own testimony. The court stated Montenegro was trying to commit fraud on the court and that he was definitely mentally competent to stand trial.
On April 30, 2010, the court heard Montenegro’s motion to withdraw his plea. Montenegro testified that he had been hearing voices when he changed his plea to no contest. Montenegro was not taking medication for mental illness, only for pain. Montenegro stated he did not remember the charges and allegations that he admitted. Montenegro did not understand his sentence. If Montenegro had understood the seriousness of the charges and the length of his sentence, he would not have entered into the plea agreement. Montenegro explained that in addition to his mental condition, he suffered from tuberculosis, illness in his liver, and brain damage.
Trial counsel noted that when the court asked Montenegro, prior to accepting his change of plea, whether he was taking medication, Montenegro indicated he was doing so. Counsel argued Montenegro may not have fully understood what was happening during the change of plea hearing because of his mental state.
The court noted it does not always recall all of the cases it hears, especially after the passage of a year or two. The court noted this case was an exception. The court specifically recalled that it made sure Montenegro had enough time to consult with his attorney and Montenegro had requested more time to do so. The court gave Montenegro an extra day to consider the plea bargain and to consult with his attorney. The court stated Montenegro had a pattern of “gaming” the system. The court found Montenegro was as lucid during the current hearing as he was on the day he changed his plea, and denied his motion to withdraw his plea.
On May 6, 2010, the court reinstated the original judgment and recalculated Montenegro’s custody credits. Montenegro’s request for a certificate of probable cause was granted by the trial court.
APPELLATE COURT REVIEW
Montenegro’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an opening brief that summarizes the pertinent facts, raises no issues, and requests this court to review the record independently. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) The opening brief also includes the declaration of appellate counsel indicating that Montenegro was advised he could file his own brief with this court. By letter on December 13, 2010, we invited Montenegro to submit additional briefing. Montenegro replied with a letter rearguing his contention that his psychiatric condition made his plea involuntary. Montenegro complained the hearings were unfair and insisted that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea. Montenegro claimed he suffers from a mental illness and brain damage. Montenegro asserted his innocence, especially of the discharge of a firearm and gang enhancements.
The issue of Montenegro’s mental competence was fully reviewed by mental health professionals and the trial court. If there is evidence to support the trial court’s findings, and here the trial’s court’s findings concerning Montenegro’s competency to stand trial were supported by abundant evidence, an appellate court will not overturn the trial court’s factual findings. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557.)
We also reject Montenegro’s challenge that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. A guilty plea is, for most purposes, the legal equivalent of a jury’s guilty verdict. (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 601.) A guilty plea serves as a stipulation that the People need not introduce proof to support the accusation. The plea ipso facto supplies both evidence and verdict and is deemed to constitute an admission of every element of the charged offense. (People v. Alfaro (1986) 42 Cal.3d 627, 636 [overruled on another ground in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343]; People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748.) A plea of nolo contendere (or no contest) is legally equivalent to a guilty plea and also constitutes an admission of every element of the offense pled. (People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 820-821.)
After independent review of the record, we have concluded there are no reasonably arguable legal or factual issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.