Opinion
October 26, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Kuffner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that the complainant's statement identifying the defendant as the person who shot him was admissible as an excited utterance. The "statement was made spontaneously, under the stress of a starting event, and `not made under the impetus of studied reflection'" ( People v. Masas, 244 A.D.2d 433; see also, People v. Edwards, 47 N.Y.2d 493; People v. Faucett, 185 A.D.2d 942).
The defendant's contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction is unpreserved for appellate review since he made only a general motion to dismiss before the trial court and did not raise the issues now pursued on appeal ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 20; People v. Clausell, 223 A.D.2d 598). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( see, People v. Faucett, supra; People v. Osborne, 238 A.D.2d 445, affd 91 N.Y.2d 827).
Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).
O'Brien, J. P., Joy, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.