Opinion
NO. 5-14-0600
11-13-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KRAIG A. MONROE, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
Decision filed 11/13/17. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Peti ion for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County.
No. 10-CF-229
Honorable John Baricevic, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and Goldenhersh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that dismissed, at the first stage of proceedings, the defendant's petition for postconviction relief, because the allegations in the defendant's petition are positively rebutted by the facts in the record.
¶ 2 The defendant, Kraig A. Monroe, Jr., appeals the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that dismissed, at the first stage of proceedings, his petition for postconviction relief. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 The facts necessary to our disposition of this appeal follow. On April 30, 2012, before the Honorable John Baricevic, the defendant pled guilty to the offense of aggravated battery of a child. The factual basis presented for the plea by the State established that the defendant struck
the victim, A.R. (who was the daughter of the defendant's girlfriend and at the time was two years old), in the abdomen area, causing great bodily harm to A.R. in the form of a laceration to her liver. The parties disputed whether the blow from the defendant was also the cause of a bowel injury to A.R. Judge Baricevic asked counsel for the defendant if he agreed that the liver injury was "sufficient for great bodily harm," to which counsel replied, "Yes, sir. It required surgery." Judge Baricevic subsequently found that a factual basis existed, and accepted the defendant's plea of guilty.
¶ 5 On September 19, 2012, the defendant was sentenced. Following a hearing at which testimony was received, the State argued that, because of the serious and continuing injury to A.R., the defendant should be sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment he faced, which was 30 years. The defendant argued that he should be sentenced to the minimum term of six years. Judge Baricevic sentenced the defendant to 11 years in prison, followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. In so doing, Judge Baricevic stated that he agreed with "all the factors in aggravation and mitigation that were pointed out by both sides," and stated that he believed a sentence of 30 years would be "unconstitutional."
¶ 6 On October 11, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence in which he contended his sentence was "excessive," and in which he claimed Judge Baricevic did not take an adequate amount of time to "weigh" the evidence the defendant presented in mitigation at the hearing "against the points in aggravation the State presented." He did not claim that Judge Baricevic improperly considered any factors in aggravation. At the March 21, 2013, hearing on the defendant's motion, the defendant's counsel stated that the motion did not seek "to ask the [c]ourt to say 'we made a mistake' or anything like that." Counsel stated that he believed Judge Baricevic took "very deep thought and concentration" when formulating a sentence, and took "factors into consideration." Counsel subsequently stated, "I know [Judge Baricevic] made a
very thoughtful and deep consideration of all the factors during the sentencing," but counsel nevertheless argued that a reduction of the sentence was appropriate in this case.
¶ 7 Also on March 21, 2013, the motion to reconsider sentence was denied. The defendant did not appeal that denial, nor has he at any time moved to withdraw his guilty plea. On October 13, 2014, the defendant filed, pro se, his petition for postconviction relief (the petition), along with accompanying materials that included a motion for the appointment of counsel to assist him. On October 15, 2014, Judge Baricevic dismissed the petition, ruling that the defendant failed "to allege the gist of a constitutional claim." This timely appeal followed. Additional facts will be provided as necessary below.
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 9 On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred because, according to the defendant, he stated the gist of a constitutional claim by alleging that: (1) "the circuit court improperly considered serious harm to the victim as an aggravating factor" at sentencing, and (2) "he received ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel failed to offer evidence that showed some other event caused the victim's serious injuries." We review de novo the dismissal by the trial court, at the first stage of proceedings, of a defendant's petition for postconviction relief. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 19. We may affirm the ruling of the trial court on any basis supported by the record. See, e.g., Evans v. Lima Lima Flight Team, Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 407, 418 (2007); see also, e.g., People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 134 (2003). We may do so because the question before us on appeal is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, rather than the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached. See, e.g., Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 128.
¶ 10 As the defendant notes, because most postconviction petitions are drafted by pro se defendants without legal training, the threshold for a petition to survive the first stage of review
is low. People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 24. However, a petition is properly dismissed at the first stage if the petition has no arguable basis in the law, or in the facts of the case, such as when a petition relies upon a legal theory that is indisputably without merit, or upon a factual allegation that is fanciful. Id. ¶ 25. Meritless legal theories include those that are completely contradicted by the facts in the record, and fanciful factual allegations include those that are deemed to be fantastic or delusional. Id. When the trial court evaluates the allegations in a petition, the court must take the allegations as true and construe them liberally. Id. To determine whether the factual allegations in the petition are positively rebutted by the record, the trial court should review: the trial record, the court file of the proceeding in which the defendant was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such a proceeding, any transcripts of such proceedings, and affidavits or records attached to the petition. See, e.g., People v. Diehl, 335 Ill. App. 3d 693, 700 (2002).
¶ 11 In support of his first contention on appeal, the defendant claims that Judge Baricevic had "no evidence" before him that the defendant caused the injuries to A.R.'s liver and bowels, and that therefore Judge Baricevic "improperly considered serious harm to the victim as an aggravating factor" at sentencing because he "simply assumed" the defendant caused the injuries. This is not true. Our de novo review of the record on appeal demonstrates, as noted above, that Judge Baricevic did not "simply assume[ ]" the defendant caused the laceration to A.R.'s liver. In his guilty plea before Judge Baricevic, although the defendant disputed whether his blow was also the cause of the bowel injury to A.R., the defendant admitted that he caused the laceration to A.R.'s liver, and that the injury constituted great bodily harm: when Judge Baricevic asked counsel for the defendant if he agreed that the liver injury was "sufficient for great bodily harm," counsel replied, "Yes, sir. It required surgery." On that basis, Judge Baricevic subsequently found that a factual basis existed, and accepted the defendant's plea of
guilty. Moreover, the State is correct in its assertion that at sentencing, Judge Baricevic specifically limited the injury he would consider for sentencing to the "terrible liver laceration" the defendant had admitted causing. Although it is true that Judge Baricevic stated at sentencing that he agreed with "all the factors in aggravation and mitigation that were pointed out by both sides," this does not mean, as the defendant contends, that as a factual matter he accepted all the arguments of each party with regard to each factor. He made it clear that he knew the bowel injury was disputed, and referred to only the laceration of the liver when describing A.R.'s injury-which he referred to consistently in singular form, rather than plural-for purposes of sentencing the defendant. Put simply, the allegations in the petition related to this point on appeal were completely contradicted by the record, and Judge Baricevic did not err in his ruling.
¶ 12 In support of his second contention on appeal, the defendant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because at sentencing, his counsel failed to offer testimony and/or a report created by a registered nurse and legal consultant "that showed some other event caused the victim's serious injuries." We note that the report in question provided an opinion only as to the disputed bowel injury, and did not address A.R.'s lacerated liver. Accordingly, it was of no relevance at sentencing, as it would have had no impact on the defendant's admission, when he pled guilty, that he caused the laceration to A.R.'s liver, and that the injury constituted great bodily harm. Again, the allegations in the petition related to this point on appeal were completely contradicted by the record, and Judge Baricevic did not err in his ruling.
¶ 13 CONCLUSION
¶ 14 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it dismissed, at the first stage of proceedings, the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
¶ 15 Affirmed.