Opinion
357631
05-26-2022
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENNIFER ANN MONROE, Defendant-Appellant
UNPUBLISHED
Shiawassee Circuit Court LC No. 19-004471-FH
Before: Gleicher, C.J., and K. F. Kelly and Patel, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Jennifer Ann Monroe was interrogated for two hours by two detectives while confined to a bed in the trauma intensive care unit of a hospital. Monroe was not read her Miranda rights, was not told that she could refuse to speak with the detectives, and was not advised that the detectives would leave her hospital room at her request. During the interrogation Monroe was under the influence of morphine, which a medical expert testified would have impaired her comprehension and judgment. In addition, medical professionals assessed Monroe as "[o]verwhelmed and/or unable to participate in decision-making."
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 S.Ct. 1602; 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; 86 S.Ct. 1602; 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Monroe's statements were not voluntary and the detectives should have read Monroe her Miranda rights prior to the commencement of the custodial interrogation. We reverse the trial court's order denying Monroe's motion to suppress her hospital statements.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 16, 2019, Monroe was found unconscious in her home with stab wounds to her thighs and chest, as well as a neck laceration. Her boyfriend was deceased in the bedroom. Monroe arrived at Owosso Memorial Hospital by ambulance at approximately 7:55 p.m. At that time, her Glasgow Coma Scale score was assessed as an 8 out of 15. She was administered several medications, including at least 2 doses of fentanyl within the first two hours of her hospitalization. Doctors surgically placed a chest tube to re-inflate her collapsed lung. Due to the nature of her injuries, she was transferred to Sparrow Hospital for further treatment, receiving two units of blood during her transport.
The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) is scored between 3 and 15, with 3 being the worst and 15 the best. It is composed of 3 parameters: eye opening response, verbal response and motor response. A score of 13 or higher correlates with mild brain injury, a score of 9 to 12 correlates with moderate injury, and a score of 8 or less, such as Monroe's, represents severe brain injury. See https://www.cdc.gov/masstrauma/resources/gcs.pdf
Monroe arrived at Sparrow Hospital's emergency room at approximately 10:17 p.m. on October 16, 2019. Shortly thereafter, she was transferred to the trauma intensive care unit. She underwent surgery to close her wounds a few hours later.
Medical professionals assessed Monroe's mental state multiple times on October 17, 2019. For example, a registered nurse completed a Utilization Review at 8:38 a.m. on October 17, 2019, and noted that Monroe was "a poor historian, distressed and incoherent, stating that she stabbed herself but also that she does not remember what happened." Suicide precautions were implemented and a sitter was placed at her bedside. In addition, the medical staff noted that Monroe "[o]verestimates/[f]orgets [l]imitations" and consistently assessed her as "[o]verwhelmed and/or unable to participate in decision-making." Her medical history was noted to include diagnoses of bipolar 1 disorder and depression.
Sparrow's medical staff further indicated that Monroe was in severe pain, tachycardic, "bedfast" (bedridden), and required "nurse assist" for ambulation. She received five doses of intravenous morphine between 12:20 a.m. and 11:08 a.m. on October 17, 2019. When she received her fifth does at 11:08 a.m., her pain level was assessed as a 7 out of 10. Her pain remained at a 7 out of 10 nearly an hour later at 12:00 p.m. At that time, Monroe's mobility was "[s]lightly limited," her gait and transferring were "weak," and her fall risk was assessed as "high." Her sensory perceptions were also noted to be "slightly limited," her level of consciousness was described as "alert" but "restless," and her breathing was abnormally rapid and shallow with bilateral diminished breath sounds and inspiratory wheezes.
Just two hours after Monroe's fifth dose of morphine, two detectives interrogated her. The interrogation, which continued for two hours, was recorded. The detectives flanked Monroe's hospital bed, with one seated next to her and one seated at the foot of her bed. The recording began with one of the detectives calling out Monroe's name and appearing to rouse her from a state of sleep. During the first 25 minutes of the interrogation, Monroe can be heard groaning, loudly sobbing, coughing, and struggling to breathe. At one point, one of the detectives told Monroe that the monitor reflected that her oxygen level was decreasing. Monroe was encouraged to keep the nasal cannula in place to maintain a steady flow of oxygen. A little over an hour into the interrogation, a nurse entered the room and interrupted the interrogation to administer medication to Monroe to reduce her pain and "take the edge off." Throughout the interrogation, Monroe repeatedly stated that she could not recall any specifics of the events or a timeline. Despite her inability to recall the events, the detectives continued to press Monroe for specifics. After nearly two hours of interrogating questions, she responded "I have never been so unsure about anything ever before in my life. I don't know what to say."
It is undisputed that the detectives did not advise Monroe of her Miranda rights before the two-hour interrogation. It is further undisputed that the detectives did not tell her that she could refuse to speak with them, or that they would leave if she wanted them to leave.
Ultimately, Monroe was arrested and charged with open murder pursuant to MCL 750.316. Monroe filed a motion to suppress her hospital statements, arguing that they were not voluntary and that she had not been advised of her Miranda rights. The trial court held a Walker hearing and reviewed the audio recording of the hospital interrogation.
People v Walker, 374 Mich. 331; 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965).
At the hearing, one of the detectives testified that Monroe appeared to be sleeping when they entered her room - she was lying in bed with her eyes closed and opened her eyes only after he called out her name. He admitted that she was hooked up to medical apparatus during the interrogation. He stated that she cried throughout the interrogation and appeared to be gasping for air at times. He did not ask the medical personnel what type of medication Monroe had been administered. He acknowledged that he did not know if she was on any medications that could affect her comprehension. The detective conceded that did not know whether she was able to get out of bed, nor did he ask the medical staff whether she could. He further admitted that the detectives were dressed in plain clothes and their guns and badges were concealed.
The Walker hearing included testimony from defendant's expert, Dr. Norman Miller, who is board certified in neurology, psychiatry, addiction psychiatry, and forensic psychiatry. The trial court determined that Dr. Miller was qualified as an expert in general psychiatry. Dr. Miller testified that fentanyl is a sedative that suppresses brain function, sedates behavior, and can cause sleep and confusion. He testified that fentanyl is 100 times more potent than morphine, which is also a sedative that suppresses consciousness and can cause sleep and confusion. He opined that it would have been difficult for Monroe to ambulate due to the medications and her injuries. He stated that a person under the influence of fentanyl and morphine would have difficulty comprehending:
[T]hey would have difficulty comprehending . . . their surroundings, comprehending people talking to them, comprehending the purpose, comprehending - recalling, being able to make judgment, sensible judgments. Their . . . judgment would be impaired. . . . They really wouldn't be in touch with their surroundings. Their recall would be impaired.
Dr. Miller noted that a person impaired by opioids may recall some things and may not recall others because the impairment "can wax and wane." He also testified that the effects of opioids can accumulate with repetitive doses in a hospital setting. Dr. Miller's opinion was based on his review of the medical records, two interviews of Monroe, and his education and experience. He conceded that he did not recall listening to the audio recording of the two-hour interrogation or reviewing the police summary of the interrogation.
The trial court denied Monroe's motion to suppress her hospital statements. At the outset, the trial court concluded that the detectives interrogated Monroe within the meaning of Miranda. However, the trial court determined that, for Miranda purposes, Monroe was not in custody. The trial court acknowledged, "[f]rom a medical perspective, defendant would have had difficulty leaving her hospital room during questioning." But the trial court dismissed the notion that the hospital environment was more coercive than a police interview room, concluding that the detectives were courteous and respectful.
The trial court rejected Monroe's arguments that her thought-process was impaired by the opioids, concluding that she was articulate and able to recall certain details during the interrogation. Notably, the trial court disagreed with the medical opinions offered by the only expert witness who testified at the hearing, as well as the opinions of the medical professionals who documented that Monroe was a poor historian, distressed, and incoherent. Instead, the trial court substituted its own, non-medical assessment of Monroe's mental state, concluding:
[D]efendant's medical condition did not meaningfully diminish her judgment. The environment was less coercive than that of a station house, and a reasonable person in her position would have felt free to terminate the interview.
Based on the same factual analysis, the trial court also held that Monroe's statements were voluntary.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's ultimate decision on a motion to suppress de novo, but we review any factual findings for clear error. People v Elliott, 494 Mich. 292, 301; 833 N.W.2d 284 (2013). A finding is clearly erroneous if, after an examination of the entire record, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. People v Givans, 227 Mich.App. 113, 119; 575 N.W.2d 84 (1997). Underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo. People v Daoud, 462 Mich. 621, 629-630; 614 N.W.2d 152 (2000).
III. INVOLUNTARY STATEMENTS
Monroe argues that the trial court erred in holding that her statements during the two-hour hospital interrogation were voluntary. We agree.
The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee a right against self-incrimination and afford due process of law. U.S. Const, Ams V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. If a statement was not freely and voluntarily made, its use offends due process. Mincey v Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398; 98 S.Ct. 2408; 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).
Our Supreme Court has articulated factors to guide courts in assessing whether a defendant's statements were voluntary:
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the trial court should consider, among other things, the following factors: the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [People v Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 334; 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988) (citations omitted).]
"The absence or presence of any one of these factors is not necessarily conclusive on the issue of voluntariness. The ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made." Id.
In Mincey, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a defendant's statements obtained from his hospital bed in the intensive care unit were not voluntary and, therefore, inadmissible in the criminal trial. The Court explained the circumstances surrounding the interrogation:
Mincey was brought to the hospital after the shooting and taken immediately to the emergency room where he was examined and treated. He had sustained a wound in his hip, resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep him from vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder. He received various drugs, and a device was attached to his arm so that he could be fed intravenously. He was then taken to the intensive care unit.
At about eight o'clock that evening, [the detective] came to the intensive care unit to interrogate him. Mincey was unable to talk because of the tube in his mouth, and so he responded to [the detective]'s questions by writing answers on pieces of paper provided by the hospital. [The detective] told Mincey he was under arrest for the murder of a police officer, gave him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, and began to ask questions about the events that had taken place in Mincey's apartment a few hours earlier. Although Mincey asked repeatedly that the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, [the detective] continued to question him until almost midnight. [437 U.S. at 396 (citation omitted).]
The Supreme Court declared that it was "hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of a rational intellect and a free will than Mincey's." Id. at 398 (quotation marks omitted). The Court emphasized the following factors: (1) Mincey was seriously wounded; (2) the interrogation was just a few hours after the injuries were inflicted; (3) he was in the intensive care unit at the time of the interrogation; (4) he described his leg pain as "unbearable;" (5) he was "confused and unable to think clearly about either the events of that afternoon;" (6) he asked for the interrogation to end; and, (7) "he was lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus . . . at the complete mercy of [the detective], unable to escape or resist the thrust of [the] interrogation." Id. at 398-399 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Monroe, like Mincey, was seriously wounded and confined to a bed in the hospital's trauma intensive care unit. She was attached to an IV, oxygen and other medical apparatus while flanked by two detectives during a two-hour interrogation. The detectives woke her from a sleep state and immediately started grilling her. During the first ten minutes of questioning, she groaned, sobbed, coughed, and struggled to breathe while the alarms on her medical monitors went off. The detectives informed Monroe that the monitors were signaling that her oxygen level was decreasing. Rather than terminate the interrogation or ask her if she wanted to speak with them, the detectives replaced Monroe's nasal canula and continued to press her for answers. Her pain was significant enough that a dose of morphine just two hours before the interrogation did not decrease her pain level, which remained constant. A little over an hour into the interrogation, a nurse interrupted to give her additional pain medication. Again, the detectives did not terminate the interrogation or ask her if she wanted to speak with them. Monroe had no prior experience with the police and, given her condition, it is unlikely that she would have known that she did not have to speak with the detectives or that they would leave her hospital room if she asked them to leave.
We respectfully disagree with the dissent that the facts of this case are similar to People v Posey, 334 Mich.App. 338; 964 N.W.2d 862 (2020), wherein this Court concluded that a defendant's statements made to the police during a hospital interview following surgery for a gunshot wound were voluntary. The Posey Court made the following findings: the defendant's "status as a third-offense habitual offender indicates that he had prior experience with the police;" "[t]he questioning lasted less than 25 minutes, of which, more than six minutes were dedicated to discussing [his] personal information and obtaining a Miranda waiver;" the defendant was "alert and articulate;" there was "no sign that he was impaired by any medication during the interview;" "his physical condition was nowhere near as severe as the defendant's condition in Mincey;" and there was "no evidence that [his] mental condition was significantly compromised or diminished." Conversely, Monroe had never been involved with the police before the interrogation, her interrogation was nearly five times longer than the one at issue in Posey, she exhibited signs of pain throughout the interrogation, she was attached to various medical apparatus throughout the interrogation, medical professionals determined that she was "[o]verwhelmed and/or unable to participate in decision-making," and there was medical expert testimony that the pain medication administered to Monroe suppresses consciousness and impairs a person's ability to make sensible judgments. There is no indication that the defendant in Posey presented any medical records or expert testimony to support his arguments.
While deference is given to the trial court's credibility assessments and the weight accorded to evidence during a Walker hearing, the trial court clearly erred by relying on its own non-medical opinion as opposed to the medical opinions of the only testifying expert witness and the record statements of the hospital medical professionals. Despite the medical expert's testimony that morphine suppresses consciousness and impairs a person's ability to make sensible judgments, the trial court concluded that Monroe's thought process was not impaired by medication. The trial court opined that Monroe knew she could terminate the interview based on the fact that she had declined to speak with the first officer who attempted to get a statement from her. However, the first interview attempt was approximately 15 hours earlier and, more importantly, it occurred before Monroe was administered her first of five doses of morphine over an 11-hour period. The trial court's conclusion is also inconsistent with the medical professionals' determination that Monroe was "[o]verwhelmed and/or unable to participate in decision-making," and unsupported by evidence other than the trial court's erroneous inference that Monroe was in that same condition at the time of the first interview request as she was for the second.
People v Ryan, 295 Mich.App. 388, 396; 819 N.W.2d 55 (2012).
An officer testified that he was instructed to attempt to get a statement from defendant when she was transferred to Sparrow Hospital. He drove the ambulance during the transfer, but had to wait for the Sparrow medical personnel to stabilize her before he could speak with her. The officer conceded that defendant was not physically able to get up and move. Unlike the two detectives who interrogated defendant, the officer asked defendant if she wanted to talk about what happened. The officer terminated the interview when the defendant declined to speak with him.
The trial court also disagreed with the registered nurse's assessment that Monroe was a poor historian, distressed and incoherent. The trial court deemed that assessment incorrect because she was able to recall and articulate certain events during the two-hour interrogation. The trial court's non-medical opinion is not only inconsistent with the medical records, it also ignores the expert's testimony that a person impaired by opioids may recall some things and may not recall others because the impairment "can wax and wane."
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Monroe's capacity for self-determination was critically impaired and her hospital statements were not the product of a free and unconstrained choice. Givans, 227 Mich.App. at 121. As such, the trial court clearly erred in finding Monroe's statements were voluntary.
III. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The fact that Monroe's statements were not voluntary is enough to warrant suppression of the statements that she made during the two-hour hospital interrogation. However, Monroe also argues that the statements should be suppressed because she was "in custody" and entitled to Miranda warnings before the questioning began. We agree and find that suppression is warranted on this separate ground as well.
Miranda dictates that, prior to any police questioning, a person must be warned of his or her constitutional rights in situations involving a custodial interrogation. People v Barritt, 325 Mich.App. 556, 562; 926 N.W.2d 811 (2018). Specifically, the person must be informed: "(1) that he has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says can and will be used against him in court, (3) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney during any questioning, and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him." Daoud, 462 Mich. at 625 n 1. Statements made during a custodial interrogation are not admissible unless the defendant "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" waived his or her constitutional right against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
"Custodial interrogation" has been defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. The United States Supreme Court has set forth the following constitutional standards to determine whether a person was in "custody" at the time of the interrogation:
As used in our Miranda case law, "custody" is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. And in order to determine how a suspect would have gauge[d] his freedom of movement, courts must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning. [Howes v Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-509; 132 S.Ct. 1181; 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
The Supreme Court has concluded that an interview that lasted two hours weighed in favor of a finding that a suspect was in custody. Yarborough v Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665; 124 S.Ct. 2140; 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). Under Yarborough, the failure to tell a suspect that he or she is free to leave is another factor that can contribute to a finding that a suspect was in custody. Id.
Here, Monroe was awakened from a sleep-state shortly after receiving her fifth dose of morphine over an 11-hour period. She was attached to various medical devices and confined to a hospital bed. The detectives flanked her bed, pressing her for answers while she groaned, sobbed, coughed, and struggled to breathe. Despite Monroe's medical condition and emotional state, the detectives did not terminate their questioning or give her an option to not speak with them. Instead, the detectives replaced her nasal canula, watched as the nurse administered additional pain medication, and pressured her to provide them with answers for over two hours. A reasonable person in Monroe's position would perceive that she was the target of the police investigation, that she was not free to terminate the interrogation, and that she was not free to leave. And no evidence supports that Monroe could leave her hospital room even if she wanted to.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, Monroe was in custody at the time that her statements were made and she was entitled to Miranda warnings. The trial court erred in failing to suppress her statements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly erred in finding Monroe's statements were voluntary. Accordingly, the statements Monroe made during the two-hour hospital interrogation must be suppressed.
Additionally, the trial court clearly erred in holding that Monroe was not in custody during the interrogation. The detective's failure to provide Miranda warnings before the custodial interrogation supply a second ground for suppressing Monroe's hospital statements.
We reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings.
K. F. Kelly, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the questioning of defendant in her hospital room violated Miranda.1 Because defendant's statements were voluntary and not made while in custody, I would affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress.
"When reviewing a trial court's determination of the voluntariness of inculpatory statements, this Court must examine the entire record and make an independent determination, but will not disturb the trial court's factual findings absent clear error." People v Shipley, 256 Mich.App. 367, 372-373; 662 N.W.2d 856 (2003); see also People v McPherson, 263 Mich.App. 124, 137; 687 N.W.2d 370 (2004) ("The totality of the circumstances surrounding both statements indicates that they were made voluntarily."). A clear error occurs if the finding "leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." Shipley, 256 Mich.App. at 373.
"The ultimate question whether a person was 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda warnings is a mixed question of fact and law, which must be answered independently by the reviewing court after review de novo of the record." People v Barritt, 325 Mich.App. 556, 561; 926 N.W.2d 811 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "the trial court's factual findings concerning the circumstances surrounding statements to the police" are reviewed for clear error. Id.
Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee that criminal defendant receive due process of law. U.S. Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 16. "[T]he use of an involuntary statement in a criminal trial, either for impeachment purposes or in the prosecution's case in chief, violates due process." People v Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 331; 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988). "Whether a statement was voluntary is determined by examining the conduct of the police." Shipley, 256 Mich.App. at 373. In Cipriano, the Michigan Supreme Court articulated the following factors to guide courts in assessing whether a statement was given voluntarily:
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the trial court should consider, among other things, the following factors: the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.
The absence or presence of any one of these factors is not necessarily conclusive on the issue of voluntariness. The ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made. [Cipriano, 431 Mich. at 334 (citations omitted).]
For a confession to be involuntary, "there must be a substantial element of coercive police conduct" because "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." People v Wells, 238 Mich.App. 383, 388; 605 N.W.2d 374 (1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also People v Posey, 334 Mich.App. 338, 368; 964 N.W.2d 862 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted) ("Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.").
In reversing the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress, the majority relies on Mincey v Arizona, 437 U.S. 385; 98 S.Ct. 2408; 57 L Ed2d 290 (1978). In that case, the United States Supreme Court explained the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of the defendant:
Mincey was brought to the hospital after the shooting and taken immediately to the emergency room where he was examined and treated. He had sustained a wound in his hip, resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep him from vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder. He received various drugs, and a device was attached to
his arm so that he could be fed intravenously. He was then taken to the intensive care unit.
At about eight o'clock that evening, Detective Hust of the Tucson Police Department came to the intensive care unit to interrogate him. Mincey was unable to talk because of the tube in his mouth, and so he responded to Detective Hust's questions by writing answers on pieces of paper provided by the hospital. Hust told Mincey he was under arrest for the murder of a police officer, gave him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, and began to ask questions about the events that had taken place in Mincey's apartment a few hours earlier. Although Mincey asked repeatedly that the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, Hust continued to question him until almost midnight. [Id. at 396 (citation omitted).]
The United States Supreme Court stated that it was "hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of a rational intellect and a free will than Mincey's." Id. at 398 (quotation marks omitted). The Court emphasized that Mincey was nearly in a coma; the questioning took place only a few hours after the injuries were inflicted; he described his leg pain as "unbearable;" he was confused and provided incoherent answers; his body was "encumbered by tubes, needles, and [a] breathing apparatus;" and he asked for the interrogation to end and requested a lawyer. Id. at 398-401.
Unlike the defendant in Mincey, defendant in this case never requested a lawyer or indicated any desire to end the officers' questioning. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 396. Defendant did not complain of pain, was coherent, and provided logical responses to the detectives' questions. There was no evidence that defendant was threatened, abused, or promised anything in exchange for her statement. See People v Ryan, 295 Mich.App. 388, 396-397; 819 N.W.2d 55 (2012) (explaining that voluntariness depends, in part, on "whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse."). Defendant was only one day removed from suffering serious injuries and undergoing surgery, and Dr. Miller testified that she was sleep-deprived; however, this was attributable to the events that occurred at her home as well as her treatment at the hospital, but and not to any police misconduct. See People v Daoud, 462 Mich. 621, 635; 614 N.W.2d 152 (2000) ("[W]hether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary depends on the absence of police coercion.").
In Posey, 334 Mich.App. at 367, this Court recently addressed a similar issue to that presented here. There, we concluded that a defendant's hospitalization with serious injuries and use of pain medication alone is not sufficient to render a statement involuntary. The defendant was interviewed by police the day after he was hospitalized and operated on for a gunshot wound; similarly to the present case, the defendant relied on Mincey for the proposition that his statements were involuntary. Id. at 364, 366. The defendant argued that the statements were involuntary because he "was experiencing some pain from his injuries and was affected by his pain medication," but we concluded nonetheless that there was "no indication that his condition was so debilitating as to make him lose his free will." Id. at 366. We emphasized that the defendant was "alert and articulate;" there was "no sign that he was impaired by any medication during the interview;" he never requested to end the interview; "he was alert and conscious the whole time;" and there was "no evidence that [his] mental condition was significantly compromised or diminished." Id. at 366-367.
Like the defendant in Posey, defendant was interviewed the day after she had surgery to treat serious injuries she sustained during the altercation. Posey, 334 Mich.App. at 367. And similar to Posey, there was "no indication that [her] condition was so debilitating as to make [her] lose [her] free will." Id. at 366. Defendant was alert and articulate, and there was no sign that her mental condition was compromised. Similar to Posey, there was no evidence that defendant was negatively affected by the pain medication. Id. Indeed, while Dr. Miller testified about the effects morphine and fentanyl could have on a person, he could not say how the medication did in fact affect defendant.
I would, therefore, conclude the trial court did not commit clear error when it concluded defendant's statements were voluntarily given. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress.
I also believe the trial court did not clearly err when it found that defendant was not in "custody" at the time of her questioning. The Unites States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution both protect the right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445; 86 S.Ct. 1602; 16 L Ed2d 694 (1966), "the police must warn a defendant of his or her constitutional rights if the defendant is taken into custody for interrogation." Barritt, 325 Mich.App. at 562. "Custody must be determined on the basis of how a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive his or her circumstances and whether the reasonable person would believe that he or she was free to leave." People v Roberts, 292 Mich.App. 492, 504; 808 N.W.2d 290 (2011), lv den 490 Mich. 893 (2011). However, in circumstances in which the individual interrogated cannot leave for reasons unrelated to police conduct, "the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Florida v Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436; 111 S.Ct. 2382; 115 L Ed2d 389 (1991). Relevant factors in this analysis include: "(1) the location of the questioning, (2) the duration of the questioning, (3) statements made during the interview, (4) the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and (5) the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning." Barritt, 325 Mich.App. at 562-563 (citations omitted). "Whether an individual is effectively 'in custody' is based on the totality of the circumstances." Roberts, 292 Mich.App. at 505. "[T]he fact that the defendant was in the hospital does not automatically imply that the environment was coercive." People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich.App. 8, 25; 620 N.W.2d 537 (2000).
In this case, the trial court's finding that defendant was not in custody was not clearly erroneous. Defendant was questioned in her hospital room as opposed to a crime scene or a police interrogation room. The questioning lasted only two hours, at which point the detectives left. The detectives never told her that she was under arrest, that she had done something wrong, or that she would be going to jail, and defendant never requested an attorney or attempted to end the interview. Detective Lamay testified that defendant was not arrested before, during, or immediately after the interview. Defendant would not have been able to physically leave the room because she was attached to medical equipment, but this equipment was set up by medical personnel, and there is no evidence that the purpose of this equipment was to restrain her movement. Moreover, Detective Lamay testified that an officer was not posted at defendant's room until "some hours" later or "maybe even the next day," and defendant was not formally arrested until she was released from the hospital the following week. In other words, there is nothing in the record that supports defendant's assertion that she was in custody at the time of the interview.
The majority's reliance on Yarborough v Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665; 124 S.Ct. 2140; 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004), is, in my opinion, misplaced. While in that case the United States Supreme Court stated that police questioning that lasts two hours may indicate a custodial environment, the Court, by no means, stated that such a fact necessitates a finding of custody. See id. (concluding the state court's application of the federal standard for custody was "reasonable"). Moreover, unlike defendant here, the defendant in Yarborough was questioned at the police station and was denied when he asked if his parents could be present during the questioning. Id.
In my view, the trial court's finding that defendant was not in custody during the questioning was not clear error. I would, therefore, affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress.