Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 06F04970.
BUTZ , J.
Pursuant to a negotiated settlement, defendant Marco Moncada pleaded no contest to conspiracy to sell methamphetamine and admitted a prior strike conviction. Following the denial of his request for the trial court to strike the prior conviction, the court sentenced him to state prison for four years.
On appeal, defendant contends the court’s refusal to strike the prior conviction was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
The facts relevant to defendant’s argument are included in the discussion that follows.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, the trial court may, in the interest of justice (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (a)), strike a prior strike conviction (Romero, at pp. 530-531). “[In] ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, ‘in furtherance of justice’..., or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
Defendant’s prior record consists of the following: On December 21, 1995, he was granted informal probation for receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor. On January 22, 1999, in two separate cases, he was placed on five years’ probation for spousal abuse and assault, both felonies. On August 8, 2001, he was sentenced to state prison for two years for another felony assault. On August 10, 2001, he was ordered to serve 92 days in jail for being under the influence of a controlled substance and an alcohol-related driving conviction, both misdemeanors. He was released on parole on June 26, 2002, and discharged from parole on June 26, 2005.
As to the present case, defendant admitted being involved in a conspiracy to sell methamphetamine between May 1 and June 2, 2006. As overt acts furthering the conspiracy, he admitted that on May 14 he switched vehicles with Andrew Moncada, his brother, for the purpose of assisting Andrew in evading detection by law enforcement officers; and he admitted that on May 24 he received a telephone call from Andrew Moncada, who was at that time in jail, and the two discussed how to cut and weigh methamphetamine for resale.
Against the foregoing, defendant presented several letters from parole officers, family, employers, friends, and coworkers attesting to many positive aspects of his character, including his attempts to turn his life around, his reliability, dedication to raising his family, and his successful completion of parole. Defendant also claimed his participation in the conspiracy was minor, consisting only of committing the nonviolent acts of switching cars and taking part in a telephone conversation with his brother Andrew regarding “selling some drugs and disposing [of] some drugs because Andrew Moncada owed money to these other individuals” and needed to be protected.
In denying the Romero motion, the trial court pointed out that it was aware of defendant’s letters of support and his statement of mitigating factors. The court observed that notwithstanding the numerous and impressive letters of support, it did not believe defendant had been rehabilitated. That this was so, according to the court, was demonstrated by his prior felony convictions involving violence, they were “not that remote,” and it was but a short period of time following his discharge from parole (June 26, 2005) that he became involved with his brother in the distribution of methamphetamine.
Defendant argues the court abused its discretion in denying the Romero motion because it placed undue emphasis on his past record, failed to appreciate the minor role he played in the conspiracy by committing two nonviolent acts to aid his brother, and failed to properly consider his progress since having been released from prison.
To the contrary, the court accurately analyzed and weighed the factors favoring and disfavoring the granting of the Romero request. Indeed, the record shows that defendant does have impressive letters of support. However, the record also supports the trial court’s conclusion that despite these letters, defendant had not been rehabilitated.
While remoteness of a prior conviction tends to lessen its value as a predictive factor of a defendant’s behavior, this is not necessarily so when the conviction has not been followed by a blameless life. (People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 925-926.) Here, defendant’s prior convictions were in 1999 and 2001, and each involved violence. He was sentenced to prison on August 8, 2001, paroled June 26, 2002, and discharged from parole on June 26, 2005. He committed the overt acts in furtherance of the instant conspiracy conviction in May of 2006, less than one year after his discharge from parole. Since the record utterly fails to demonstrate any substantial period of a blameless life between the felony assaults in 1999 and 2001 and the commission of the instant offenses, the prior convictions should not be considered remote.
The record also does not support defendant’s position that he played a minor role in the conspiracy. Defendant’s brother Andrew was involved in a large-scale, criminal methamphetamine distribution enterprise, which was the object of “a long[-]term narcotics investigation.” Defendant assisted his brother in evading law enforcement officers who were attempting to conduct surveillance of Andrew by switching cars with Andrew. After Andrew’s arrest, Andrew telephoned defendant and, in a recorded conversation, the two discussed how defendant was to cut the methamphetamine and its distribution.
On this record, the trial court properly concluded that defendant was within the spirit of the three strikes law and properly refused to strike the prior strike conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., HULL, J.