Opinion
5889-5890
March 7, 2002.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jeffrey Atlas, J. at hearing; Alfred Donati, J. at jury trial and sentence), rendered December 31, 1996, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed. Judgment, same court (Budd Goodman, J.), rendered January 10, 1997, convicting defendant of violation of probation and resentencing him to a concurrent term of 2½ to 7½ years, unanimously affirmed.
Barbara Jane Hutter for respondent.
Alison J. Winick for defendant-appellant.
Before: Williams, J.P., Tom, Rosenberger, Wallach, Marlow, JJ.
In this prosecution for possession of a pistol found under a seat in a livery cab, the trial court properly admitted the codefendant's command to defendant, as overheard by the livery cab driver, "Put it under the seat." The People properly offered this statement to prove defendant was guilty of jointly possessing the weapon with his codefendant; it was not hearsay because it was not offered for its truthfulness (see, Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409). This direction "was not intended to communicate any assertions of fact and was incapable, by its terms, of being true or false." (People v. Sawyer, A.D.2d 733 N.Y.S.2d 28). Instead, it was a "direction given by one participant in the crime to another, from which an inference of accessorial conduct could be drawn." (People v. Ayala, 273 A.D.2d 40, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 863). In any event, the court correctly admitted this statement against the codefendant, who was being tried jointly with defendant, and defendant raised no claim either at trial or on appeal that the court should have given a jury instruction limiting the admissibility of the codefendant's statement. Defendant's claim, that the reference to "it" was ambiguous, presented a jury question as to the weight the statement should be accorded (Prince, Richardson on Evidence §§ 8-201, 8-212 [Farrell 11th ed]).
The trial court properly denied defendant's request for a circumstantial evidence charge because defendant's guilt was established, in part, through such direct evidence as the officers' recovery of the pistol from the cab in close proximity to defendant's seat (see, People v. Perez, 259 A.D.2d 274, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 976;compare, People v. Brian, 84 N.Y.2d 887, 889).
The suppression court properly declined to reopen the Mapp hearing based upon trial testimony by the livery cab driver that allegedly conflicted with hearing testimony by the police. Since the prosecutor had offered the defense an opportunity to interview the driver and had disclosed his Grand Jury testimony, the driver's account did not constitute new information that defendant could not have discovered with reasonable diligence (CPL 710.40; People v. Washington, 238 A.D.2d 43, 49, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 1014). In any event, the driver's testimony would not have changed the hearing's outcome.
Defendant's applications pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky ( 476 U.S. 79) were properly denied. The record supports the court's rulings and fails to support defendant's assertion that the court prevented him from fully articulating his claims.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.