Opinion
F086663
09-16-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SCOTT ALLEN MITCHELL-MENDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Hannah Janigian-Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Order Filed Date 9/18/24
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. No. CF93485197 Jonathan M. Skiles, Judge.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Hannah Janigian-Chavez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MODIFICATION OF OPINION
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 16, 2024, be modified as follows:
1. On page one of the opinion, in the caption, delete the words "MENDEZ- MITCHELL" and replace them with "MITCHELL-MENDEZ."
2. On page 2, the first sentence of the first paragraph of the INTRODUCTION, add footnote 1 after appellant's name, which will require renumbering of subsequent footnotes. The first sentence will now read as follows:
"In 1993, appellant Scott Allen Mitchell-Mendez was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, former subd. (b))."
The record interchangeably refers to Mendez-Mitchell as Mitchell-Mendez. We refer to appellant as Mitchell-Mendez throughout this opinion for the sake of consistency with our prior opinions that have referred to him by this designation.
All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
There is no change in the judgment.
OPINION
THE COURT[*]
INTRODUCTION
In 1993, appellant Scott Allen Mitchell-Mendez was convicted by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, former subd. (b)). In addition, the jury found true a special circumstance alleging the murder occurred during the commission of the robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Mitchell-Mendez was sentenced to state prison for life without the possibility of parole.
All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
In 2023, following the filing of a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6) and other proceedings not herein relevant, Mitchell-Mendez's conviction for murder was vacated and he was resentenced to a five-year prison term for second degree robbery. In addition, the trial court imposed a $1,500 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) and imposed and stayed a matching $1,500 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45).
On appeal, Mitchell-Mendez contends that the minute order dated July 25, 2023 must be corrected to reflect that he was resentenced to second degree robbery, and that both this minute order and the abstract of judgment filed November 8, 2023, must be corrected to reflect that the $1,500 restitution fine was imposed and is deemed satisfied. The Attorney General agrees. We will order the trial court to correct the minute order to reflect that Mitchell-Mendez's conviction is for second degree robbery and that a $1,500 restitution fine imposed was imposed and has been satisfied pursuant to section 2900.5. We will also order the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the $1,500 restitution fine was imposed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 5, 1993, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an information charging Mitchell-Mendez, Demetrius Dixon, and Valunt Lindi Montgomery with first degree murder (§ 187) and second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, former subd. (b).) The information further alleged that the murder occurred during the course of the robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and that Mitchell-Mendez and Dixon personally used a knife in the commission of these offenses.
On October 14, 1993, a jury found Mitchell-Mendez guilty on both counts. The jury also found true the special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), but found not true the enhancement alleging Mitchell-Mendez had personally used a knife in the commission of the offenses.
On November 19, 1993, Mitchell-Mendez was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of parole.
On April 10, 1996, this court affirmed Mitchell-Mendez's judgment of conviction following his direct appeal in People v. Mendez et. al. (Apr. 10, 1996, F020673) [nonpub. opn.]).
On January 25, 2019, Mitchell-Mendez filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. His petition was denied for failing to include a signed declaration.
On May 29, 2019, Mitchell-Mendez filed a renewed petition for resentencing.
On March 17, 2020, the superior court issued a written order denying Mitchell-Mendez's petition. In its order, the court observed that Mitchell-Mendez had been convicted of a special circumstance based on the fact that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury's true finding on the special circumstance necessarily required the jury to find Mitchell-Mendez was a major participant in the robbery and that he had acted with reckless indifference to human life. The superior court concluded that the jury's true finding on the special circumstance excluded Mitchell-Mendez from resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
On November 15, 2021, this court affirmed the trial court's order denying Mitchell-Mendez's petition for resentencing. (People v. Mitchell-Mendez, supra, F081193.)
On October 26, 2022, our Supreme Court granted review of Mitchell-Mendez's case and transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our prior decision and to reconsider the matter in light of People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698.
On remand, we concluded that the jury's finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance, which occurred pre-Banks and Clark, is no longer sufficient to conclude that Mitchell-Mendez is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710 ["We now conclude ... [felony-murder special-circumstance] [f]indings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437"].) (See People v. Mendez (Dec. 7, 2022, F081193) [nonpub. opn.].)
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788.
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.
On July 25, 2023, the superior court granted Mitchell-Mendez's petition for resentencing, vacated his murder conviction, and sentenced him to five years for second degree robbery. The trial court also imposed a $1,500 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, and a matching stayed $1,500 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45).
On November 8, 2023, the trial court filed a second corrected minute order and second amended abstract of judgment in which it updated Mitchell-Mendez's good time work time credits from 1,680 days to 5,601 days. The trial court deleted the $1,500 restitution fine and $1,500 parole revocation fine. Finally, the court corrected the abstract of judgment to reflect that Mitchell-Mendez was sentenced to second degree robbery pursuant to sections 211 and 212.5, subdivision (c).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts underlying Mitchell-Mendez's conviction are not relevant to this appeal. We therefore dispense with a recitation of the facts.
DISCUSSION
I. The July 25, 2023 Minute Order Must be Corrected to Show that Mitchell-Mendez Was Convicted of Second Degree Robbery
After Mitchell-Mendez's petition for resentencing was granted, and his conviction for murder was vacated, he was resentenced to a prison term of five years for second degree robbery. However, the amended minute order from his July 25, 2023 sentencing hearing incorrectly describes Mitchell-Mendez's conviction as "First Degree Automated Teller Machine Robbery." We will order this minute order corrected to reflect the fact that Mitchell-Mendez was convicted of second degree robbery.
II. The Minute Order Must be Corrected to Reflect that a $1,500 Restitution Fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) Was Imposed and Has Been Satisfied; the Abstract of Judgment Must be Corrected to Reflect that a $1,500 Restitution Fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) Was Imposed
Next, Mitchell-Mendez contends that the minute order from his sentencing hearing and the abstract of judgment should be modified to reflect that his $1,500 restitution fine is satisfied from his excess custody credits. We agree that the trial court must modify the minute order dated July 25, 2023 to reflect that a $1,500 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) was imposed and has been satisfied. We further agree that the abstract of judgment must be modified to reflect that a $1,500 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) was imposed.
The parties further contend that the abstract of judgment must also be amended to reflect that the restitution fine has been satisfied. However, an abstract of judgment does not generally reflect the satisfaction of fines and fees. Form CR-290.1, the form used by the trial court here, does include a section numbered "8" for "Other orders (specify):" If deemed appropriate by the trial court, it may also amend the abstract of judgment to indicate that the $1,500 restitution fine has been satisfied by including a notation in this section. However, the trial court is not required to do so.
A. Background
On July 25, 2023, at Mitchell-Mendez's sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a $1,500 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) and a matching stayed $1,500 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45). The trial court did not impose any other fines or fees, finding that Mitchell-Mendez lacked the ability to pay.
Trial counsel argued that the restitution fine should be converted to custody credits under section 2900.5. Mitchell-Mendez represented that he had paid $3,000 towards his original $10,000 restitution fine. The abstract of judgment from the sentencing hearing originally reflected the imposition of a $1,500 restitution fine but did not state whether it was deemed satisfied.
In an ex parte motion that was not made part of the record on appeal, trial counsel argued that the court had erred by imposing and staying the $1,500 parole revocation fine since section 1202.45 was not in effect at the time of Mitchell-Mendez's original conviction. Thereafter, the trial court prepared a second corrected minute order and second amended abstract of judgment; however, neither document reflects that any fines were imposed and deemed satisfied.
B. Analysis
Following Mitchell-Mendez's July 25, 2023 sentencing hearing, the trial court removed the section 1202.45 parole revocation fine from the abstract of judgment and minute order from the resentencing hearing; however, it appears that the trial court mistakenly removed the section 1202.4 restitution fine as well. The parties agree that the section 1202.4 restitution fine should have remained on the minute order and abstract of judgment, irrespective of whether the fine was still outstanding or had been satisfied.
At the time of Mitchell-Mendez's original conviction, section 2900.5, subdivision (a) provided that custody credits could be applied to base and restitution fines at a rate of $30 per day. (See former § 2900.5, subd. (a); Stats. 1991, ch. 437, § 9.) At resentencing, the trial court reduced Mitchell-Mendez's restitution fine from $10,000 to $1,500.
Mitchell-Mendez was awarded a total of 16,803 days of custody credit, which far exceeds his five-year sentence for second degree robbery. Further, at an accrual rate of $30 per day, Mitchell-Mendez's custody credits amply offset the $1,500 restitution fine imposed by the trial court. Based upon the foregoing, we will order the second corrected minute order, dated July 25, 2023, amended to show that a $1,500 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) was imposed and is satisfied pursuant to section 2900.5.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to correct the minute order dated July 25, 2023, to reflect that Mitchell-Mendez's conviction is for second degree robbery, and that a $1,500 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) was imposed and has been satisfied pursuant to section 2900.5. The trial court is further directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that a $1,500 restitution fine was imposed, and to forward a certified copy of the abstract of judgment to the appropriate authorities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
[*]Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.