Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. VCR193174
NEEDHAM, J.
Jason C. Mitchell appeals from an order placing him on felony probation after he pled no contest to felony false imprisonment in the Solano County Superior Court. (Pen. Code, § 236, see also § 237, subd. (a).) He contends the trial court should have granted his post-plea motion to dismiss the case as one involving multiple prosecutions for the same offense, in violation of section 654 and Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett). We conclude that appellant is barred from making this argument on appeal because he did not obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. (§ 1237.5.)
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning and afternoon of September 3, 2007, appellant physically assaulted and restrained his girlfriend H.A. while they were in an apartment in Contra Costa County. At about 8:00 that same evening, they drove to a laundromat in Benicia, located in Solano County, where appellant slapped H.A. a few times during an argument. Appellant then made H.A. drive to Benicia Middle School, telling her he needed to find a power outlet for his electric razor so he could shave. Instead of shaving himself, he held H.A. by the arm and shaved the hair above her forehead, saying she deserved it for the way she talked to him. They went to another building in the area, where he again found an electrical outlet and shaved off more of her hair as a consequence of her “talking back” to him. After eating dinner, they went to an elementary school in Benicia, where they argued some more and he shaved her head again while holding her and intimidating her.
After driving appellant to his job the following morning, H.A. reported the abuse to the Benicia police. A two-count felony complaint was filed by the Solano County District Attorney on September 6, 2007, charging appellant with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, see also § 237, subd. (a)). On September 17, 2007, appellant entered a no contest plea to the false imprisonment count in exchange for an initial grant of probation and dismissal of the remaining count.
H.A. also reported the events of September 3, 2007 to the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department. Based on the acts that had occurred within Contra Costa, the District Attorney in that county filed a felony complaint on September 12, 2007 charging appellant with two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and one count of false imprisonment by violence (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)).
Although sentencing on the false imprisonment conviction in the Solano County case was originally set for October 18, 2007, the parties and the court agreed that the matter should be coordinated with the prosecution taking place in Contra Costa County. Sentencing in the Solano case was continued.
On March 28, 2008, appellant was placed on probation in the Contra Costa County case after pleading no contest to one count of corporal injury to a spouse or cohabitant and one count of false imprisonment. In April 2008, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the Solano County case on the ground that all of the charges arising from September 3, 2007 should have been prosecuted in the same proceeding pursuant to section 654 and Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d 822. In opposition, the District Attorney argued that multiple prosecutions were permissible because the false imprisonment conviction in Solano County was limited to the head shaving incidents in Benicia, which were not part of the same course of conduct as the separate acts of domestic violence and false imprisonment that occurred in Contra Costa County.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” (Italics added.) In Kellett, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 827, our Supreme Court construed this section to mean that when the prosecution “is or should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is prohibited or severance permitted for good cause. Failure to unite all such offenses will result in a bar to a subsequent prosecution of any offense omitted if the initial proceedings culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.”
On May 9, 2008, the Solano County Superior Court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss and placed appellant on three years’ felony probation. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from this judgment but did not seek a certificate of probable cause.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that under Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d 822, the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the charges in the Solano County case because they arose from the same course of conduct as the charges in the Contra Costa case. The Attorney General contends that appellant is procedurally barred from raising this challenge on appeal because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court as required by section 1237.5.
Section 1237.5, subdivision (a) generally precludes a defendant from appealing a judgment of conviction entered on a plea of guilty or no contest unless he or she has filed a statement with the trial court “showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings,” and has obtained a certificate of probable cause for the appeal. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.) If the appeal is based solely upon grounds occurring after entry of the plea which do not challenge its validity, such as sentencing issues, a certificate of probable cause is not required. (People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379.)
The notice of appeal filed by appellant states that the appeal is “based on the sentence or on other matters occurring after the plea.” But appellant’s claim that the charges against him were barred by the conviction and sentence imposed in Contra Costa County challenges the validity of his plea to the Solano County charges. “It has long been established that issues going to the validity of a plea require compliance with section 1237.5.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 76; see also People v. McEwan (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 173, 178; People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 129 [Kellett issue was cognizable on appeal where defendant obtained certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5].)
Appellant’s failure to secure a certificate of probable cause requires dismissal of the appeal. In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to further consider appellant’s substantive arguments or the Attorney General’s additional claims that appellant waived his right to appeal as a condition of his plea and is estopped from appealing on the grounds articulated.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed for failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5.
We concur. JONES, P. J., SIMONS, J.