Opinion
07-27-2017
G. Scott Walling, Schenectady, for appellant. Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Jordan J. Yorke of counsel), for respondent.
G. Scott Walling, Schenectady, for appellant.
Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Jordan J. Yorke of counsel), for respondent.
Before: EGAN JR., J.P., LYNCH, DEVINE, CLARK and AARONS, JJ.
DEVINE, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Buckley, J.), rendered March 16, 2009, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crime of robbery in the third degree.
As the result of an incident wherein defendant and another man forcibly stole property from the victim, defendant was charged in an indictment with robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree (two counts). Defendant thereafter waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to a set of facts wherein he used physical force against the victim and, in concert with another, took various items from him. Defendant did so upon the understanding that County Court would conduct a bench trial, find him guilty of the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree, rather than any count in the indictment, and sentence him to 1 to 3 years in prison. Defendant's expectations were fulfilled to the letter, and he now appeals.
We affirm. The record demonstrates that defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision to forgo a jury trial and stipulate to facts intended to result in a conviction for a lesser included offense, a situation presenting "the functional equivalent of a guilty plea" (People v. Harris, 139 A.D.3d 1244, 1245, 34 N.Y.S.3d 179 [2016], lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 930, 40 N.Y.S.3d 358, 63 N.E.3d 78 [2016] ; accord People v. Brooks, 23 A.D.3d 847, 848, 804 N.Y.S.2d 140 [2005], lvs. denied 6 N.Y.3d 810, 811, 812 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450, 845 N.E.2d 1280, 1281 [2006] ; People v. Harler, 296 A.D.2d 712, 714, 744 N.Y.S.2d 916 [2002] ; cf. People v. Douglas, 24 A.D.3d 1019, 1020, 806 N.Y.S.2d 764 [2005] ). Accordingly, inasmuch as defendant failed to challenge the sufficiency of the stipulated facts prior to the imposition of sentence, his present contention in that regard is unpreserved (compare People v. Harris, 139 A.D.3d at 1246, 34 N.Y.S.3d 179 and People v. Rychel, 284 A.D.2d 662, 663, 728 N.Y.S.2d 211 [2001], with People v. Douglas, 24 A.D.3d at 1020 n., 806 N.Y.S.2d 764 ). In any case, our review confirms that the stipulated facts provided legally sufficient proof to support the conviction, and it follows that reversal in the interest of justice is not warranted (see Penal Law §§ 160.00, 160.05 ; People v. Rychel, 284 A.D.2d at 663, 728 N.Y.S.2d 211 ).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
EGAN JR., J.P., LYNCH, CLARK and AARONS, JJ., concur.