Opinion
No. 2-12-0913
04-03-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA MINNITI, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 02-CF-2047 Honorable Patricia Piper Golden, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Burke and Spence concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The excluded jurisdiction statute does not violate the eighth amendment, the proportionate penalties clause, or due process. Even in light of People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, the defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, the defendant, Joshua A. Minniti, was found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2000)), and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 2000)). The defendant appealed from the third-stage denial of his petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2008)). The defendant argued that the excluded jurisdiction statute (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002)), which requires that juveniles be tried and sentenced as adults, was unconstitutional. The defendant also argued that, under the holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the Illinois statutory sentencing scheme was unconstitutional as applied to him. We found these arguments to be without merit and affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence. Thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court directed this court to vacate and reconsider our judgment in light of People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271. See People v. Minniti, No. 119268 (Nov. 23, 2016). For the reasons that follow, we once again affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On October 8, 2002, the defendant was indicted on four counts of first degree murder, home invasion, and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, based on crimes committed against the victim, Irma Braun, at her residence on October 20 and 21, 2001. The defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offenses and 16 years old at the time of the indictment. ¶ 5 On February 6, 2004, following a bench trial, the trial court found the defendant guilty of one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2000)), and both counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West 2000)). On November 30, 2004, at sentencing, the trial court found the defendant eligible for an extended-term natural life sentence for the first degree murder based on the brutal and heinous nature of the crime. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(b) (West 2002). The trial court also found that the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury on the victim. In weighing the defendant's lack of a prior record and the brutality of the crime, the trial court ultimately sentenced the defendant to 61 years' imprisonment for murder and three consecutive six-year terms of imprisonment for his convictions of home invasion and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2002) (providing range of 6 to 30 years for Class X felonies); see also 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(i) (West 2002) (requiring consecutive sentences if one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury). In total, the defendant was sentenced to 79 years' imprisonment. ¶ 6 On April 30, 2007, on direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Minniti, 373 Ill. App. 3d 55, 74 (2007). On September 5, 2008, the defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition pursuant to the Act. Counsel was subsequently appointed to represent the defendant. On May 11, 2011, the defendant filed an amended post-conviction petition. In the amended petition, the defendant made several allegations concerning the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel. The trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss and the case proceeded to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. On August 14, 2012, following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's petition. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. ¶ 7 On appeal, the defendant argued that, either alone or in combination with the application of mandatory consecutive sentencing and truth-in-sentencing laws, the excluded jurisdiction statute (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002)), which requires that juveniles be tried and sentenced as adults, was unconstitutional. The defendant also argued that, under the holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), the Illinois statutory sentencing scheme was unconstitutional as applied to him. We found these arguments to be without merit and affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence. Thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court directed this court to vacate and reconsider our judgment in light of People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271. See People v. Minniti, No. 119268 (Nov. 23, 2016). On January 6, 2017, this court granted the defendant's motion to file a supplemental appellant's brief, and ordered that supplemental response and reply briefs be filed as well.
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 9 On appeal, the defendant argues that the excluded jurisdiction statute (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002)), which required that 15- and 16-year olds charged with certain crimes be prosecuted and sentenced as adults, is unconstitutional. More specifically, he contends that the excluded jurisdiction statute, either alone or in conjunction with the application of mandatory consecutive sentencing (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 2002)) and truth-in-sentencing laws (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2002) (requiring the defendant to serve 100% of his sentence for first degree murder and 85% of his sentences for home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault)), is unconstitutional because it violates the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), as well as the due process clauses of both the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV) and the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). The defendant further argues that his 79-year term of imprisonment is a de facto natural life term of imprisonment that is unconstitutional pursuant to Miller. The defendant argues that, under Miller, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. ¶ 10 At the outset, we note that the State argues that the defendant has forfeited his claims on appeal because they were not raised in his post-conviction petition. However, it is well settled that a defendant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute at any time. In re M.I., 2013 IL113776, ¶ 39; People v. Harmon, 2013 IL App (2d) 120439, ¶ 45. In arguing that the present claims are forfeited, the State relies on People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 504 (2004). In Jones, our supreme court held that a claim not raised in a post-conviction petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal. Id. at 505. However, the new claims raised in Jones did not challenge the constitutionality of a statute. Accordingly, we find the State's reliance on Jones misplaced and we will address the defendant's arguments. ¶ 11 We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. People v. Luciano, 2013 IL App (2d) 110792, ¶ 43. Further, we presume statutes are constitutional. People v. Vasquez, 2012 IL App (2d) 101132, ¶ 53. Thus, a defendant challenging the constitutionality of a statute must establish its constitutional invalidity. Id. The eighth amendment protects both children and adults from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Miller, 567 U.S. at ___; 132 S. Ct. at 2463. The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. There is conflict regarding whether the proportionate penalties clause is coextensive with the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. See People v. Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶¶ 35-38, and People v. Horte, 2016 IL App (2d) 140714, ¶ 62. However, when dealing with the exact same issue as in this case, specifically, the constitutionality of the excluded jurisdiction statute, our supreme court has held that they are coextensive. People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 106. ¶ 12 The defendant's arguments are based on three United States Supreme Court decisions. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment barred capital punishment for juvenile offenders. In Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), the Supreme Court held that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole violated the eighth amendment when imposed on juvenile offenders for crimes other than homicide. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibited "a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders," even those convicted of homicide offenses. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___; 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Miller did not preclude a sentence of life without parole for homicide offenders; it required only that the trial court first consider the special characteristics of young offenders, such as immaturity, impetuosity, and the failure to appreciate risks and consequences, before imposing such a sentence on a juvenile defendant. Id. at 2468-69. The defendant contends that these cases support the proposition that the excluded jurisdiction statute, which automatically imposes adult sentencing provisions on minors, is unconstitutional. ¶ 13 However, subsequent to the filing of the defendant's briefs in this case, our supreme court issued its decision in Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, which specifically rejected the same arguments raised by the defendant here. In Patterson, our supreme court held that the excluded jurisdiction statute (705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2002)), even when applied with mandatory consecutive sentencing and truth-in-sentencing laws, did not violate the eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause. Id. ¶ 106. The court reasoned that the purpose of the excluded jurisdiction statute was not to punish a defendant; its purpose was to establish the relevant forum for the prosecution of a juvenile charged with one of five serious crimes. Id. ¶ 105. Our supreme court rejected the assertion that the resultant application of mandatory consecutive sentencing and truth-in-sentencing laws rendered the excluded jurisdiction statute a sentencing statute. Id. ¶ 104. The court held that, because the excluded jurisdiction statute failed to impose actual punishment, the defendant's eighth amendment challenge necessarily failed. Id. ¶ 106. The court also rejected the defendant's challenge based on the proportionate penalties clause because that clause was co-extensive with the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. Id. ¶ 14 The defendant here also argues that the excluded jurisdiction statute violates the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. This argument was also rejected in Patterson. In Patterson, the court noted that it had found that the excluded jurisdiction statute did not violate due process in People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 405 (1984), and, later, in People v. M.A., 124 Ill. 2d 135, 147 (1988). Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶¶ 93-95. The court rejected the Patterson defendant's reliance on the eighth amendment analyses in Roper, Graham, and Miller, to support his due process claims, noting that "a constitutional challenge raised under one theory cannot be supported by decisional law based purely on another provision." Id. ¶ 97. The Patterson court held that Roper, Graham, and Miller did not provide a basis to reconsider its holding in J.S. Id. ¶ 98. Thus, the defendant's due process claim fails under Patterson as well. ¶ 15 Finally, the defendant argues that his 79-year aggregate total prison sentence is a de facto natural life term of imprisonment and that, under Miller, his case should be remanded for resentencing. As a preliminary matter, we note that the defendant's conviction, sentence, and direct appeal all occurred prior to the Supreme Court's determination in Miller. The State argues that Miller should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. However, subsequent to the filing of the State's appellee brief, our supreme court, in People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39, rejected this argument and held that because Miller declared a new substantive rule, it applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. See also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (holding that Miller does apply retroactively). ¶ 16 When we addressed this issue the first time, we declined to extend the eighth amendment rationale in Miller to the facts of this case. We noted that, unlike Miller, the defendant did not receive the most severe of all possible penalties, such as the death penalty or life without the possibility of parole. Rather, the defendant received consecutive term-of-year sentences based on multiple convictions. We held that there was no precedent for extending the application of Miller to a de facto life term and thus affirmed the defendant's sentence. ¶ 17 However, our supreme court ordered us to reconsider our judgment in light of Reyes. In Reyes, the 16-year-old defendant, Zachary Reyes, was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder. He was sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, which included the mandatory minimum term of 20 years plus a 25-year firearm add-on (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2008)). In addition, he was sentenced to 26 years' imprisonment for each count of attempted murder, which consisted of the 6-year mandatory minimum term plus a mandatory 20-year firearm add-on (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii) (West 2008)). He was required to serve all the terms consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 97 years' imprisonment. Reyes, 2015 IL App (2d) 120471, ¶¶ 3-6. ¶ 18 On appeal to this court, Reyes argued that his 97-year aggregate prison sentence was a de facto mandatory natural life term of imprisonment and was unconstitutional under Miller. Id. ¶ 16. As in this case, we declined to extend the eighth amendment rationale in Miller to the facts at issue in Reyes. Id. ¶ 23. Unlike the Miller defendants, who were sentenced to life without parole based on single murder convictions, we noted that Reyes received consecutive term-of-years sentences based on multiple counts and multiple victims. We found that there was no precedent at the time that allowed us to extend the rule in Miller to the aggregate life sentence at issue in Reyes. Id. ¶ 25. ¶ 19 Our supreme court reversed. The Reyes court held that, whether it be for a single offense or for offenses committed in a single course of conduct, a mandatory term-of-years sentence that could not be served in one lifetime had the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant's life as a mandatory actual sentence of natural life or life without parole. 2016 IL 119271 ¶ 9. The Reyes court held that a mandatory term-of-years sentence for a juvenile defendant that was the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. Accordingly, the court held that Reyes' term-of-years sentence was a de facto life without parole sentence and vacated it as unconstitutional under Miller. Id. ¶ 10. The Reyes court noted that, on remand, due to statutory changes, the trial court would have the discretion not to apply the firearm-based enhancements. Id. ¶ 12. Without these enhancements, the mandatory minimum sentence was 32 years, which was permissible because it was not a de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 20 In the present case, the defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 79 years' imprisonment. We acknowledge that this is essentially a de facto life sentence. Nonetheless, the decision in Reyes does not require us to remand this case for resentencing. In Reyes, the defendant's de facto life sentence was the result of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, mandatory firearm add-ons, and mandatory consecutive sentencing. The trial court in Reyes did not have discretion to consider the defendant's youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation. Here, by contrast, the defendant's sentence was not entirely based on a mandatory sentencing scheme. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder, home invasion, and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The defendant was eligible for a sentence of 20 years to natural life for the first degree murder conviction. The minimum sentences for home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault were six years' imprisonment. As such, the mandatory minimum sentence was 38 years' imprisonment, which is not a de facto life sentence. However, after weighing the relevant factors, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an extended term of 61 years' imprisonment for murder. Accordingly, while the trial court could have sentenced the defendant to as little as 20 years for first degree murder, it exercised its discretion in imposing a much longer sentence. ¶ 21 We note that Miller did not hold that a juvenile could never be sentenced to life imprisonment. Rather, Miller determined that sentencing a child to life without parole is excessive for all but "'the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.'" Miller, 567 U.S. at —, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573, 125 S. Ct. 1183). Miller held that, before sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison, a trial court must take into account "how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. The court noted that mandatory life without parole sentences precluded a court from considering a juvenile's immaturity, impetuosity, inability to appreciate risks, family and home environment, the circumstances of the crime, peer or familial pressures, the juvenile's inability to deal with police officers or attorneys, and the possibility of rehabilitation. Id. at 2468. ¶ 22 In the present case, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered the mitigating circumstances of the defendant's youth, thus satisfying the requirements of Miller. Before sentencing the defendant, the trial court stated that it would consider many relevant factors including: the defendant's age, mentality, social environment, and the possibility of rehabilitation. In sentencing the defendant, the trial court considered in mitigation that the defendant had little criminal history and a troubled childhood. In aggravation, the trial court considered the exceptionally brutal and heinous circumstances of the murder. ¶ 23 The trial court noted that it was difficult to determine "an appropriate sentence for a person who was a juvenile at the time of [the] offense who had had no prior court intervention and who commits a very brutal, heinous, and violent attack on a woman in her home." With respect to the nature and circumstance of the offense, the trial court noted that the attack on the victim was unprovoked and was intentionally torturous. The trial court found that the victim was terrorized by the defendant and the defendant showed no mercy or compassion. The victim was beaten all over her face and body and had multiple broken bones, including two depressed skull fractures. The trial court noted that the victim's death was not instantaneous and that she was handcuffed during part of the attack. The trial court stated that "words like brutal and heinous sometimes may not adequately describe the degree of depravity here" and that the murder was "one for which natural life imprisonment is warranted." ¶ 24 Accordingly, the trial court's ruling reflects a considered finding that the defendant was "the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption." Miller, 567 U.S. at —, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. When imposing sentence, the trial court acknowledged that, because of the consecutive sentences, the defendant might never be released from prison. However, it further stated that "for the protection of the public, I don't have a real issue with that." Thus, in accord with Miller, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered the defendant's age and the mitigating circumstances of his youth before imposing sentence. Accordingly, we hold that the decision in Reyes does not require a different result in this case.
After briefing in this case was completed, the defendant filed a pro se objection asserting that appellate counsel's failure to raise any of the issues included in his amended postconviction petition would result in procedural default of those issues for purposes of federal habeas corpus or other review. The defendant asks us to take notice of his objection so that he may preserve those issues. While we express no opinion on whether, as the defendant presumes, his objection will indeed preserve any such issues, we do take notice of his objection. --------
¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed. ¶ 27 Affirmed.