People v. Mimes

17 Citing cases

  1. People v. Momtyce H

    2011 Ill. App. 101788 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 7 times

    Respondent concedes that the Illinois Appellate Court has considered several times whether this exact same statute violates this exact same right and has held that it does not, every time. People v. Dawson, 403 Ill.App.3d 499, 510, 343 Ill.Dec. 274, 934 N.E.2d 598 (2010); People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 142–150, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011); People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 82, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55, 77 (2011) ( “defendant's AUUW conviction must stand because the challenged statutory provisions do not violate either the second amendment or the Illinois Constitution”). However, he asks us to find that our precedent was wrongly decided.

  2. People v. Alvarado

    2011 Ill. App. 82957 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 4 times

    This court has already addressed and rejected similar arguments in People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011), appeal allowed, No. 112116, ––– Ill.2d ––––, 351 Ill.Dec. 4, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. May 25, 2011), and People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55, pet. for leave to appeal filed, No. 112728 (Ill. July 25, 2011). In upholding a law-abiding citizen's right to possess an operable handgun “in defense of hearth and home,” the Supreme Court stated that the second amendment's guarantee of an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, like the first amendment's right of free speech, is not unlimited.

  3. Moore v. Madigan

    842 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (C.D. Ill. 2012)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that Heller and McDonald do not “recognize a Second Amendment right to bear arms outside of the home”

    Little v. United States, 989 A.2d 1096, 1101 (D.C.2010) (holding that because the appellant was not in his home, he was “outside of the bounds identified in Heller, i.e., the possession of a firearm in one's private residence for self-defense purposes”); Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1236 (D.C.2010) (stating that “Heller did not endorse a right to carry weapons outside the home. Nor has the Court done so in its more recent decision in McDonald.”);State v. Knight, 42 Kan.App.2d 893, 218 P.3d 1177, 1189 (2009) (reasoning that a statute which criminalized the possession of a concealed firearm in public was outside the province of the Second Amendment, because the Supreme Court's decision in Heller “turned solely on the issue of handgun possession in the home”); but see People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55, 73 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (finding that the Second Amendment right is not limited to the home because the “inherent right to self-defense” that is central to the Heller decision “does not disappear outside the home” but, nonetheless, holding that the challenged Illinois AUUW statute survives intermediate scrutiny and does not violate the Second Amendment). In addition to emphasizing that the core of the Second Amendment right is the right to bear arms in the home for the purpose of self-defense, the Supreme Court in Heller clearly affirmed the government's power to regulate and restrict possession of firearms outside of the home.

  4. People v. Williams

    2011 Ill. App. 93350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 2 times

    This level was employed by this court in People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 145–56, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011), appeal allowed, No. 112116, ––– Ill.2d ––––, 351 Ill.Dec. 4, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. May 25, 2011), and in People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55. ¶ 54 In Aguilar and in Mimes, this court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard to review the defendants' second amendment challenge to their AUUW convictions, which were based on them carrying loaded firearms at a time when they were not in their own homes or places of business.

  5. People v. Black

    2012 Ill. App. 110055 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 12 times
    Holding armed habitual criminal statute could prohibit the defendant-felon from possessing a firearm in his own home

    Accordingly, our appellate courts have applied an intermediate scrutiny standard in determining whether a statute violates the second amendment right to keep and bear arms. See People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 939, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011); People v. Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d 136, 146, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816 (2011); and People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55. Intermediate scrutiny review determines whether the challenged statute serves a significant, substantial, or important government interest, and, if so, whether there is a reasonable fit between the statute and the governmental interest. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55. Reasonable fit does not necessarily mean perfect fit, but rather it is the “[fit] whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served.’ ”

  6. Harper v. Alvarez

    No. 13 C 2110 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 16, 2013)

    People v. Alvarado, 964 N.E.2d 532, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) ("[W]e hold that the provision of the AUUW statute at issue in this case does not violate the constitutional protection of the right to bear arms."); People v. Mimes, 953 N.E.2d 55, 70, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) ("[D]efendant's AUUW conviction must stand because the challenged statutory provisions do not violate either the second amendment or the Illinois constitution."); People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (Illinois' UUW "statute does not violate the defendant's Second Amendment rights because it is substantially related to this important governmental objective and the fit between the [UUW] statute and the governmental objective was reasonable.") ; People v. Williams, 940 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) ("[W]e agree with and adopt the holding of [Dawson], that this Illinois statute limiting the right of citizens to carry, outside of their homes and on their persons or in their vehicles, loaded and accessible firearms does not violate the second amendment."); People v. Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) ("The AUUW statute specifically excludes possession of a firearm in one's abode from its proscriptions ... and therefore does not implicate the fundamental

  7. People v. Brisco

    2012 Ill. App. 101612 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 51 times
    In Brisco, this court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for new posttrial proceedings where the trial court erred in denying his motion to substitute counsel for posttrial proceedings.

    112116, 351 Ill.Dec. 4, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. May 25, 2011); People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55;People v. Robinson, 2011 IL App (1st) 100078, ¶ 18, 357 Ill.Dec. 872, 875, 964 N.E.2d 551, 554. Nevertheless, defendant urges us to apply strict scrutiny, which entails an examination of the law to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

  8. People v. Spencer

    2012 Ill. App. 102094 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 158 times
    Finding even if the defendant had made a procedurally proper as-applied constitutional challenge to the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute, the court would still reject his claims where the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute does not include an exception for persons convicted of nonviolent felonies and neither Heller nor McDonald recognized such an exception

    Therefore, we find that the intermediate level of scrutiny applies. See People v. Robinson, 2011 IL App (1st) 100078, ¶ 18, 357 Ill.Dec. 872, 964 N.E.2d 551; People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 74, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55 (and cases cited therein); People v. Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d 931, 939, 349 Ill.Dec. 762, 947 N.E.2d 776 (2011) (and cases cited therein); Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 146, 348 Ill.Dec. 575, 944 N.E.2d 816. To satisfy the intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny, the challenged statutory provision must serve a significant, substantial or important governmental interest, and the fit between the challenged law and the asserted objective must be reasonable.

  9. Moore v. Madigan

    702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012)   Cited 251 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding Illinois licensing scheme for open carry unconstitutional

    Nor could the State ensure that guns in public are discharged only, accurately, and reasonably in instances of self-defense. See People v. Mimes, 352 Ill.Dec. 119, 953 N.E.2d 55, 77 (Ill.App.Ct.2011) (“The extensive training law enforcement officers undergo concerning the use of firearms attests to the degree of difficulty and level of skill necessary to competently assess potential threats in public situations and moderate the use of force.”). The Supreme Court has “long recognized the role of the States as laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems,” and courts “should not diminish that role absent impelling reason to do so.”

  10. Madej v. Robert

    No. 07 C 3549 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2013)

    Any term-of-years sentence imposed thereafter thus cannot exceed the statutory maximum, rendering the heightened standard of proof required under Apprendi and section 111-3(c-5) inapplicable. This conclusion is supported by several other Illinois Appellate Court decisions. See, e.g., People v. Mimes, 953 N.E.2d 55, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); People v. Crutchfield, 820 N.E.2d 507, 515-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); People v. Smith, 798 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) ("Section 111-3(c-5) provides for the procedural safeguards of Apprendi requires where the prosecution seeks to use a fact to increase the range of penalties for the offense beyond the normal statutory maximum."). --------