The prosecutor furthermore repeatedly questioned another defense witness about lying. The cumulative effect of this misconduct ( see People v. Calabria, 94 N.Y.2d 519, 523, 706 N.Y.S.2d 691, 727 N.E.2d 1245; People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 383 N.Y.S.2d 204, 347 N.E.2d 564; People v. Brown, 26 A.D.3d 392, 393, 812 N.Y.S.2d 561; People v. Jamal, 307 A.D.2d 267, 268, 761 N.Y.S.2d 874; People v. Tolbert, 198 A.D.2d 132, 133โ134, 603 N.Y.S.2d 844; People v. Ruiz, 181 A.D.2d 417, 580 N.Y.S.2d 342; People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901, 903, 571 N.Y.S.2d 597; People v. Ivey, 83 A.D.2d 788, 789, 443 N.Y.S.2d 452) unfairly deprived the defendant of the ability to present his defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the charge of murder in the second degree ( see People v. Calabria, 94 N.Y.2d at 523, 706 N.Y.S.2d 691, 727 N.E.2d 1245; see also People v. Riback, 13 N.Y.3d 416, 423, 892 N.Y.S.2d 832, 920 N.E.2d 939; People v. Casanova, 119 A.D.3d 976, 988 N.Y.S.2d 713; People v. Mehmood, 112 A.D.3d 850, 853, 977 N.Y.S.2d 78; People v. Mattocks, 100 A.D.3d 930, 954 N.Y.S.2d 210; People v. Hicks, 100 A.D.3d 1379, 953 N.Y.S.2d 770; People v. Jamal, 307 A.D.2d at 268, 761 N.Y.S.2d 874; People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d at 903, 571 N.Y.S.2d 597). Therefore, we reverse the defendant's conviction of the charge of murder in the second degree, and grant a new trial on that count ( see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787).
The prosecutor furthermore repeatedly questioned another defense witness about lying. The cumulative effect of this misconduct (see People v. Calabria, 94 N.Y.2d 519, 523, 706 N.Y.S.2d 691, 727 N.E.2d 1245 ; People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 383 N.Y.S.2d 204, 347 N.E.2d 564 ; People v. Brown, 26 A.D.3d 392, 393, 812 N.Y.S.2d 561 ; People v. Jamal, 307 A.D.2d 267, 268, 761 N.Y.S.2d 874 ; People v. Tolbert, 198 A.D.2d 132, 133โ134, 603 N.Y.S.2d 844 ; People v. Ruiz, 181 A.D.2d 417, 580 N.Y.S.2d 342 ; People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901, 903, 571 N.Y.S.2d 597 ; People v. Ivey, 83 A.D.2d 788, 789, 443 N.Y.S.2d 452 ) unfairly deprived the defendant of the ability to present his defense of extreme emotional disturbance to the charge of murder in the second degree (see People v. Calabria, 94 N.Y.2d at 523, 706 N.Y.S.2d 691, 727 N.E.2d 1245 ; see also People v. Riback, 13 N.Y.3d 416, 423, 892 N.Y.S.2d 832, 920 N.E.2d 939 ; People v. Casanova, 119 A.D.3d 976, 988 N.Y.S.2d 713 ; People v. Mehmood, 112 A.D.3d 850, 853, 977 N.Y.S.2d 78 ; People v. Mattocks, 100 A.D.3d 930, 954 N.Y.S.2d 210 ; People v. Hicks, 100 A.D.3d 1379, 953 N.Y.S.2d 770 ; People v. Jamal, 307 A.D.2d at 268, 761 N.Y.S.2d 874 ; People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d at 903, 571 N.Y.S.2d 597 ).Therefore, we reverse the defendant's conviction of the charge of murder in the second degree, and grant a new trial on that count (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ).
In New York, it is generally improper for a prosecutor to refer to a defendant or defense witnesses as liars. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901, 903, 571 N.Y.S.2d 597, 599 (3d Dep't 1991); People v. Martin, 172 A.D.2d 268, 270, 568 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93 (1st Dep't 1991) (prejudicial question as to whether defendant sold crack "was compounded by the Assistant's repeated use of the word liar in summation, a practice which has been condemned"); People v. Negron, 161 A.D.2d 537, 538, 556 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (1st Dep't 1990) ("While the tactic of branding defendant a liar in a criminal trial has been condemned the prejudicial impact was palliated" by curative instruction) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, such improper conduct does not necessarily deprive the defendant of a fair trial as a matter of New York state law see, e.g., People v. Dunn, 158 A.D.2d 941, 942, 551 N.Y.S.2d 432, 432 (4th Dep't) ("although the prosecutor was overzealous and improperly . . . called defendant a liar, we cannot say under all the circumstances that defendant was deprived of a fair trial" where, inter alia, trial court gave a curative instruction), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 734, 558 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1990);
We agree with defendant that the prosecutor improperly speculated on why the baseball cap that was found did not have blood on it by discussing blood splatter patterning, a topic that generally calls for expert testimony (see e.g. People v Lewis, 199 A.D.3d 1441, 1442 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1034 [2022], cert denied - U.S. -, 143 S.Ct. 262 [2022]; People v Murray, 147 A.D.2d 925, 925 [4th Dept 1989], lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 1019 [1989]). We further agree with defendant that it was improper for the prosecutor to characterize certain witnesses as liars (see People v Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901, 903 [3d Dept 1991]; People v Stewart, 92 A.D.2d 226, 230 [2d Dept 1983]; see also People v Walker, 119 A.D.3d 1402, 1404 [4th Dept 2014]). We conclude, however, that those improper remarks by the prosecutor were not so pervasive or egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial (see Freeman, 206 A.D.3d at 1695; People v Wilson, 197 A.D.3d 962, 963 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1100 [2021]).
We agree with defendant that the prosecutor improperly speculated on why the baseball cap that was found did not have blood on it by discussing blood splatter patterning, a topic that generally calls for expert testimony (see e.g.People v. Lewis , 199 A.D.3d 1441, 1442, 154 N.Y.S.3d 603 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1034, 169 N.Y.S.3d 219, 189 N.E.3d 326 [2022], cert denied โโโ U.S. โโโโ, 143 S.Ct. 262, 214 L.Ed.2d 114 [2022] ; People v. Murray , 147 A.D.2d 925, 925, 537 N.Y.S.2d 399 [4th Dept. 1989], lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 1019, 541 N.Y.S.2d 773, 539 N.E.2d 601 [1989] ). We further agree with defendant that it was improper for the prosecutor to characterize certain witnesses as liars (seePeople v. Miller , 174 A.D.2d 901, 903, 571 N.Y.S.2d 597 [3d Dept. 1991] ; People v. Stewart , 92 A.D.2d 226, 230, 459 N.Y.S.2d 853 [2d Dept. 1983] ; see alsoPeople v. Walker , 119 A.D.3d 1402, 1404, 989 N.Y.S.2d 756 [4th Dept. 2014] ). We conclude, however, that those improper remarks by the prosecutor were not so pervasive or egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial (seeFreeman , 206 A.D.3d at 1695, 170 N.Y.S.3d 445 ; People v. Wilson , 197 A.D.3d 962, 963, 152 N.Y.S.3d 759 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1100, 156 N.Y.S.3d 781, 178 N.E.3d 428 [2021] ).
We further agree with defendant that remarks in the prosecutor's summation were inflammatory and prejudicial. The prosecutor referred to defendant's witnesses as "liars," compounding the prejudicial effect of his improper cross-examination (seePeople v. Fiori, 262 A.D.2d 1081, 1081, 693 N.Y.S.2d 357 [4th Dept. 1999] ; People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901, 903, 571 N.Y.S.2d 597 [3d Dept. 1991] ). More egregiously, the prosecutor referred to defendant as a "monster" four times. Such name-calling was improper and served no purpose other than to suggest to the jurors that defendant was inhuman and dangerous (seePeople v. Jones, 134 A.D.3d 1588, 1589, 22 N.Y.S.3d 755 [4th Dept. 2015] ; People v. Almethoky, 9 A.D.3d 882, 882, 779 N.Y.S.2d 709 [4th Dept. 2004] ; People v. Connette, 101 A.D.2d 699, 700, 475 N.Y.S.2d 682 [4th Dept. 1984] ).
We further agree with defendant that remarks in the prosecutor's summation were inflammatory and prejudicial. The prosecutor referred to defendant's witnesses as "liars," compounding the prejudicial effect of his improper cross-examination (see People v Fiori, 262 AD2d 1081, 1081 [4th Dept 1999]; People v Miller, 174 AD2d 901, 903 [3d Dept 1991]). More egregiously, the prosecutor referred to defendant as a "monster" four times.
Under such circumstances, we agree with defendant's argument that the chain of custody was not adequately established and the packet should not have been received into evidence. Accordingly, the conviction on counts four and eight, which arose from this alleged transaction, must be reversed (see People v. Rivera, 184 A.D.2d 153, 155-156; People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901, 902-903). Defendant next contends that reversible error occurred when the prosecutor, during his summation and in an apparent effort to infer that defendant had earned substantial income from selling drugs, drew the jury's attention to the fact that defendant had two lawyers.
In this regard, the jury could only speculate that the six glassine envelopes in evidence were those that defendant had possessed. (See, e.g., People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901.) Given this insufficiency of proof, the indictment must be dismissed. In light of this determination, we need not reach defendant's other contentions.
Other testimony from those who removed the bags from the safe, transported them to the lab, tested the contents, returned the bags to the evidence safe and transported them to the prosecutor's office was also presented. We find the chain of custody evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of identity and unchanged condition (see, People v. Brown, 169 A.D.2d 934, 936, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 958). Nor was the jury left to speculate as to whether the cocaine in evidence was purchased from defendant (see, People v. Miller, 174 A.D.2d 901, 902). Defendant contends that the prosecutor's remarks in his summation about the two bags of cocaine were prejudicial, but in our view the statements constituted nothing more than a fair response to comments made by defense counsel during summation (see, People v. Engler, 150 A.D.2d 827, 830, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 770). Nor do we see any abuse of discretion in the prison sentence of 7 to 21 years, which is within the statutory guidelines for a class B felony (see, Penal Law ยง 70.00 [b]; [3] [b]) and which we do not view as harsh and excessive in these circumstances.