Opinion
November 20, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court (Ledina, J.).
Petitioner appeared before the State Board of Parole for the first time in 1996 and was denied parole based on the seriousness of his crimes (murder, attempted murder and robbery in the first degree), his extensive criminal history which demonstrated a propensity for extreme violence and antisocial behavior, and his prison disciplinary record. We affirm Supreme Court's judgment dismissing petitioner's application for judicial review of this determination. Because the Board's reasons for denying parole are supported by the record and satisfy the requirements of Executive Law § 259-i, we decline to disturb its determination. We also find no error in the Board's application of current parole criteria under Executive Law § 259-i rather than the criteria found under the former statutes which were in effect at the time of petitioner's conviction ( see, People ex rel. Gilmore v. New York State Parole Bd., 241 A.D.2d 793, 793-794; Matter of Ristau v. Hammock, 103 A.D.2d 944, lv denied 63 N.Y.2d 608). In any event, we note that petitioner was not disadvantaged thereby; the Board's reliance on the seriousness of petitioner's crimes would have been a sufficient basis upon which to deny parole even under the former statutes ( see, Matter of Ristau v. Hammock, supra). Petitioner's remaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit.
Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, White, Peters and Spain, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.