Opinion
2d Crim. No. B163599.
10-15-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEMETRIUS MILLER, Defendant and Appellant.
Kent Douglas Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Jaime L. Fuster, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Demetrius Miller appeals from the trial courts order committing him to the Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2962.) We conclude that substantial evidence supports the order and affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In 1998, appellant was convicted of attempted kidnap of two infants (§§ 664; 207, subd. (a)) after he grabbed a baby stroller and tried to wrestle it away from the mother. The mother screamed, refusing to let go. Appellant walked away. A security officer found him sitting against a bus station wall, rolling a marijuana cigarette.
After appellant was sentenced to three years state prison and paroled, his parole was revoked for stalking and harassing young school girls. In prison, appellant suffered from hallucinations and claimed that he was conversing with record company executives and college professors.
Appellant was admitted to Atascadero State Hospital and diagnosed as suffering from psychotic disorder NOS (not otherwise specified), polysubstance abuse, and antisocial personality disorder. Appellant responded to auditory and visual hallucinations, leered at female staff, and was heard saying, "Im going to kill and get rid of all the white people."
After the Board of Prison Terms certified appellant as an MDO, he filed a petition to review the certification and waived jury trial. (§ 2966, subd. (b).)
Two mental health experts opined that appellant suffered from a severe mental disorder that was not in remission. Doctor Phillip Kelly, appellants treating psychiatrist, diagnosed appellant as suffering from "schizophrenia simple type" and testified that appellant met all the MDO criteria.
Section 2962, subdivision (d) provides that the following criteria must be met for MDO certification: (1) the prisoner has a severe mental disorder, (2) the disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, (3) the disorder was one of the causes of or was an aggravating factor in the prisoners commission of the underlying crime, (4) the prisoner has been in treatment for the disorder for 90 days or more prior to his parole release date, (5) the prisoner used force or violence or caused serious bodily injury in committing the crime, and (6) by reason of the disorder, the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.
Doctor Richard Blak, a forensic psychologist, diagnosed appellant as suffering from psychosis NOS and antisocial personality disorder. Doctor Blak agreed that appellant was an MDO and could not be effectively and safely treated on an outpatient basis.
Doctor Patricia Kirkish, a psychologist, opined that appellant did not have a serious mental disorder within the meaning of section 2962. Doctor Kirkish, however, warned that the "controlling offenses and his parole violations are unusual behaviors with no obvious, discernable purpose. He would not discuss either instance[] and this is of concern. . . . . [C]aution is encouraged in managing his conditional release."
Appellant denied any wrongdoing with respect to the underlying conviction or parole revocation and said that he was taking his medication. Appellant also stated that he did not hallucinate the conversations with record company executives.
Discussion
Appellant argues that the evidence does not support the finding that he suffered from a severe mental disorder. "In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support MDO findings, an appellate court must determine whether, on the whole record, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant is an MDO beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all the evidence in the light which is most favorable to the People, and drawing all inferences the trier could reasonably have made to support the finding. [Citation.]" (People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082.)
Doctors Kelly and Blak opined that appellant suffered from a severe mental disorder that was not in remission. Doctor Kirkish, however, stated that the psychiatric symptoms did not qualify as a severe mental illness. Appellant requests that we resolve the conflict between the experts, reweigh the evidence, and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. "That is not the function of an appellate court. [Citation.]" (People v. Miller (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 913, 919.)
Appellant asserts that he does not suffer from a severe mental disorder because the doctors could not agree on a diagnostic label to describe his mental condition. He argues that his medical records lack significant information upon which to base a diagnosis. When appellant was admitted to Atascadero State Hospital, the diagnosis was psychosis NOS. Doctor Kelly questioned the diagnosis and stated that appellant suffered from "schizophrenia simple type . . . . [W]hat you see is the impaired socialization, the isolation."
Doctor Kelly stated that appellants mental disorder was difficult "to label" and that it "closely fits schizophrenia simple type." Appellant appeared to be psychotic and walked the hospital hallways talking and "rapping." But "when you interrupt him and talk to him, hes perfectly alert and right on cue. What is remarkable is he doesnt seem to know where he is or care much why hes there. He does not seem to relate at all with other people."
We reject the argument that an MDO commitment requires that the medical experts agree on the diagnostic term that best describes the mental disorder. The MDO statute defines a serious mental disorder as "an illness or disease or condition that substantially impairs the persons thought, perception of reality, emotional process or judgment," or a disorder that "grossly impairs behavior." (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (a).) The Legislature used the widest latitude in drafting the statute. It did not restrict the mental disorders that fall within the statute to a specific list of diseases. (People v. Starr (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1206.)
Doctor Blak evaluated appellant and reported that appellant suffered from a severe mental disorder that caused "modulating impulsive urges" and "significantly disorganized thinking and impaired reality testing." Doctor Blak stated that appellant "continues to be floridly psychotic and only grounded to external realty when prompted or engaged by others."
Appellant suffered from auditory and visual hallucinations, appeared to be "grossly psychotic," and was diagnosed and treated for schizophrenia by his doctor. The trial court did not err in crediting Doctor Kellys testimony that appellant suffered from a severe mental disorder. As the treating psychiatrist, Doctor Kelly was in the best position to know appellants mental condition. (E,g, Gunn v. Employment Development Dept. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 658, fn. 6.)
Substantial evidence supports the finding that appellant suffered a mental disorder within the meaning of the MDO statute.
Substantial Risk of Harm
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the last statutory criterion for an MDO commitment: that by reason of the severe mental disorder, appellant "represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (§ 2962, subd. (d)(1).) Appellant committed no acts of violence as a patient and claims that his bizarre behavior is not a valid predictor of future dangerousness.
The MDO statute, however, does not require proof of an overt act of violence. (Pen. Code, § 2962, subd. (f); People v. Buttes (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 116, 127.) Doctor Kelly testified that appellant "can exhibit some very serious behavior" and posed a substantial risk of harm to others. Because of the mental disorder, appellant suffered from "obvious impaired insight and judgment." Doctor Kelly cited as examples the attempted kidnap of two infants, the parole violation for stalking young girls, appellants sexual preoccupation, and his provocative and bizarre conduct.
Doctor Blak opined that appellant represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others, especially children. In a controlled hospital environment, appellant leered and glared at female staff and threatened to kill white people. When Doctor Blak interviewed appellant, appellant kicked him twice. Doctor Blak reported that appellant was a significant risk of danger to others because of his disorganized cognitive functioning, poor impulse control, lack of insight about his mental disorder, and because of his history of alcohol and drug abuse.
The expert testimony of Doctors Kelly and Blak clearly established that appellant was an MDO. (People v. Ward (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 368, 374-375.) The trial court reasonably concluded that appellant remains a significant risk of danger to others and should not be released.
The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.
We concur: COFFEE, J. and PERREN, J.