Initially, we note that the State is given wide latitude in closing arguments. People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487, 495 (1998). Also, the State may comment on the evidence, draw inferences therefrom, and comment on the accused's credibility.
The testimony of these two witnesses was based on their personal observations and not merely "act[ing] on TT's lie." ¶ 103 Next, while it is true that "[i]t is generally improper for a prosecutor to argue that in order to believe the defendant or to acquit the defendant the jury must believe that the State's witnesses are lying" (People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487, 497 (1998)), that is not what occurred here. The State made the challenged comments in rebuttal, after the defense's closing argument was focused on discrediting T.T. As an example of the type of argument made by the defense, the defense began its closing argument with the following comment:
Prior consistent statements have the potential to unfairly bolster a witness's credibility, because jurors tend to believe a statement that is repeated. People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487, 492 (1998). Therefore, prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible.
Reversal is warranted only if the prosecutor's remarks created "substantial prejudice." Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 123; Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 64; People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 332 (1992) ("The remarks by the prosecutor, while improper, do not amount to substantial prejudice."). ¶ 216 Defendant relies on People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487 (1998), in which the court held that "[f]or the prosecution to argue that in order to acquit the defendant the jury must believe that the State's witnesses are lying is a misstatement of law and a serious error which shifts the burden of proof." Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 497 (citing People v. Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d 792, 797 (1990)).
The State has wide latitude in closing arguments and may comment on and draw inferences from the evidence. People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487, 495 (1998). But the State may not tell the jury that the presumption has been stripped away during its closing argument.
¶ 25 It is well-settled in Illinois that witnesses' prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible. People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487 (1998). This rule applies because the "[a]dmission of such testimony would 'unfairly enhance a witness' credibility because a jury is more apt to believe something that is repeated.
In re Commitment of Fields, 2012 IL App (1st) 112191, ¶ 75, 367 Ill.Dec. 59, 981 N.E.2d 384. The State has wide latitude in closing arguments, and may comment on and draw inferences from the evidence. People v. Miller, 302 Ill.App.3d 487, 495, 236 Ill.Dec. 73, 706 N.E.2d 947 (1998). But the State may not tell the jury that the presumption has been stripped away during its closing argument.
It does not show any improper shift of the burden of proof to defendant, and we reject this argument. Cameron, ¶29. ¶ 19 In reaching this conclusion, we find defendant's reliance on People v. Virella, 256 Ill. App. 3d 635 (1993), People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487 (1998), and People v. Wilson, 199 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1990), misplaced. In Virella, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 638, the trial court stated that the standard of proof was clear and convincing, instead of beyond a reasonable doubt, four times.
We must next determine whether the improper admission of these out-of-court statements constituted reversible error. People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487, 493 (1998). To determine whether an ordinary trial error, such as the improper admission of hearsay evidence, was harmless, we must ask whether the verdict would have been different if the evidence had not been admitted.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor misstated the law and distorted the State's burden of proof in closing arguments when he said, "if you believe the [d]efense, [defendant] is the unluckiest man in the world" because the State's witnesses came to court to "lie against him." Defendant relies on People v. Miller, 302 Ill. App. 3d 487, 706 N.E.2d 947 (1998), where the defendant was granted a new trial because the prosecutor repeatedly argued that to believe the defendant, the jury had to believe that the State's witnesses "`all got together and they are making things up, they are adding things, they are lying, trying to put a case on [the defendant].'" (Emphasis omitted.)