Direct proof of the element of knowledge is not necessary but may be established by proof of circumstances that would induce a belief in a reasonable mind that the property was stolen. People v.Wehrwein (1989), 190 Ill. App.3d 35, 41, 545 N.E.2d 1005; People v. Mijoskov (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 477, 488 N.E.2d 1374. Where possession has been shown, an inference of defendant's knowledge can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances.
However, an inference of guilt arising from stolen property may be rebutted by defendant's reasonable explanation. People v. Mijoskov, 140 Ill.App.3d 473, 478, 95 Ill.Dec. 31, 488 N.E.2d 1374 (1986). ΒΆ 56 In the case at bar, defendant rebutted the State's inference that he knew that the vehicle was stolen by calling witnesses who testified that an employee of defendant had actually purchased the vehicle a few days before Wright observed that it was missing.
Direct proof of this element is not necessary, and where possession has been shown, an inference of defendant's knowledge can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances. ( People v. Malone (1989), 188 Ill. App.3d 1094, 1096-97, 545 N.E.2d 168; People v. Hall (1989), 187 Ill. App.3d 1084, 1087, 543 N.E.2d 1038; People v. Tucker (1989), 186 Ill. App.3d 683, 694, 542 N.E.2d 804; see also People v. Mijoskov (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 477, 488 N.E.2d 1374.) The possession statute provides that the requisite knowledge of the stolen nature of the vehicle may be inferred from a person's exclusive and unexplained possession of it. The inference of knowledge arising from exclusive possession of recently stolen property may be rebutted by defendant's explanation; however, defendant must offer a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities.
Where exclusive possession has been shown and there is no reasonable explanation given for that possession, an inference of defendant's knowledge can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances. People v. Abdullah (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 687, 691, 581 N.E.2d 67; People v. Mijoskov (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 477, 488 N.E.2d 1374. Section 4-103(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-103(a)(1) (now 625 ILCS 5/4-103 (a)(1) (West 1992))) states in pertinent part:
As it was instructed, the jury could infer the defendant's culpable state of mind from his exclusive and unexplained possession of recently stolen property. (See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 13.21 (2d ed. 1981); People v. Ferguson (1990), 204 Ill. App.3d 146, 151; People v. Mijoskov (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 477.) Although a defendant may rebut this inference with an explanation, the defendant must offer a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities.
625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1). Where possession of the vehicle has been shown, an inference of the defendant's knowledge can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances. People v. Mijoskov, 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 477 (1st Dist. 1986). At trial, police officer Patrick Quinn testified that he pulled over a car that defendant was driving and noticed that the car's ignition had been tampered with and the engine was running without the use of a key. Officer Quinn also testified that the steering column was damaged because the ignition was "punched" or removed, and that there was a screwdriver in the front seat of the car.
We cannot reverse the trial court's judgment where the evidence is not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt. See e.g., People v. Mijoskov, 140 Ill. App. 3d 473, 478 (1986) (finding the defendant knew a car was stolen where defendant co-owned a vehicle repair shop and the vehicle was brought into the defendant's shop for break-in damage by a person who left no identification or contact information, and no work order was prepared for the vehicle). ΒΆ 22 Defendant cites People v. Watson, 17 Ill. App. 3d 505 (1974), as an analogous case, however that case is distinguishable because that case involved a single incident in which the defendant's father owned a junk yard and defendant's friend called him to tow a vehicle.
The element of knowledge may be established by proof of circumstances that would cause a reasonable man to believe that the property had been stolen ( People v. Williams (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 143, 147, 358 N.E.2d 58), and where possession has been shown, an inference of defendant's knowledge can be drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances. ( People v. Mijoskov (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 477, 488 N.E.2d 1374.) The trier of fact need not accept the defendant's explanation, but may consider its probability or impossibility in light of the surrounding circumstances.
In the case at bar, the court did not set out any specific findings of fact in announcing its decision; but as indicated in the brief synopsis above, the court twice rejected defendant's assertions regarding the identity matter and finally concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of the offense. We agree that there is ample evidence in the record to show that defendant was well aware of the stolen nature of the vehicle in Ms. Basye's garage (see People v. Mijoskov (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 488 N.E.2d 1374; People v. Williams (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 143, 358 N.E.2d 58) to establish the element of knowledge, and also that defendant at least shared "joint possession" of the vehicle with the others who played a more direct role in the enterprise. ( People v. Santana, 161 Ill. App.3d 833, 515 N.E.2d 715.)
The conviction may be predicated upon possession by the defendant of a vehicle stolen by a third person or a vehicle stolen by the defendant himself. ( People v. Washington (1989), 184 Ill. App.3d 703, 708, 540 N.E.2d 1014; People v. Mijoskov (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 473, 479-80, 488 N.E.2d 1374.) In the instant case, defendant's conviction was predicated upon possession of a vehicle that he allegedly stole.