Graffeo1st Dept.: 115 A.D.3d 603, 982 N.Y.S.2d 128 (NY) Graffeo, J.Denied.

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining arguments relating to the court's ruling. The court also providently exercised its discretion in declining defendant's request to expand upon the Criminal Jury Instructions in defining intent under its burglary charge (seePeople v. Midgette, 115 A.D.3d 603, 605, 982 N.Y.S.2d 128 [1st Dept. 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 965, 988 N.Y.S.2d 572, 11 N.E.3d 722 [2014] ). The CJI charge adequately conveyed the principle addressed in the additional language requested by defendant.

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining arguments relating to the court's ruling. The court also providently exercised its discretion in declining defendant's request to expand upon the Criminal Jury Instructions in defining intent under its burglary charge (see People v Midgette, 115 A.D.3d 603, 605 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 965 [2014]). The CJI charge adequately conveyed the principle addressed in the additional language requested by defendant.

The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the statements he made to the detective following his lawful arrest. Although the arresting officer did not testify, the testimony of the detective who issued the I-card mandated the inference that defendant was arrested with probable cause by another officer, based on the issuance of that I–Card (see generallyPeople v. Ellis , 161 A.D.3d 539, 73 N.Y.S.3d 751 [1st Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1003, 86 N.Y.S.3d 761, 111 N.E.3d 1117 [2018] ; People v. Midgette , 115 A.D.3d 603, 605, 982 N.Y.S.2d 128 [1st Dept. 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 965, 988 N.Y.S.2d 572, 11 N.E.3d 722 [2014] ; People v. Johnson , 281 A.D.2d 183, 721 N.Y.S.2d 521 [1st Dept. 2001], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 903, 730 N.Y.S.2d 800, 756 N.E.2d 88 [2001] ). Defendant offered no evidence to support his speculation that he was randomly seized without cause and brought to the same precinct that was investigating his involvement in the subject robbery.

There is no basis for disturbing the court's credibility determinations. Defendant's lack of a license to enter the basement area of the house owned by members of his extended family, and defendant's knowledge that his entry was unlawful, were established by the testimony of both the owner of the house and the occupant of the first floor residence that defendant did not have permission to be in the house (seePeople v. Singer , 121 AD3d 455, 455–456 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1089 [2014] ); as well as the totality of the circumstances (seePeople v. Jackson , 118 AD3d 635 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1044 [2014] ; People v. Midgette , 115 AD3d 603, 604 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 965 [2014] ), including that defendant had been escorted off the property by police one day earlier, was not given permission to return, and that he gained entry by damaging the locked basement door with a stick (seePeople Dela Cruz , 162 AD2d 312, 313 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 892 [1990] ). Likewise, the credited evidence established that defendant had no right to damage the basement door "nor any reasonable ground to believe that he ... ha[d] such right" ( Penal Law § 145.00 ; People v. Jones , 39 Misc 3d 135[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50588[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1005 [2013] ).

ourt, New York County (Laura A. Ward, J.), rendered July 15, 2015, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of burglary in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of three to six years, unanimously affirmed.The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). Regardless of whether the evidence established that defendant unlawfully entered an office building as a whole, or the portion of the building constituting a private school, the evidence clearly established that defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter a teachers' lounge, where he was found rummaging through a teacher's bag. A witness testified, with a sufficient degree of certainty, that the room was marked by a sign indicating that it was for faculty only, and the evidence supports the conclusion that the room was not open to the public (see e. g. People v. Midgette, 115 A.D.3d 603, 604, 982 N.Y.S.2d 128 [1st Dept 2014], lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 965, 988 N.Y.S.2d 572, 11 N.E.3d 722 [2014] ; People v. Jenkins, 213 A.D.2d 279, 624 N.Y.S.2d 141 [1st Dept.1995], lv. denied 85 N.Y.2d 974, 629 N.Y.S.2d 734, 653 N.E.2d 630 [1995] ). This theory was encompassed in the charge set forth in the indictment.

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). Regardless of whether the evidence established that defendant unlawfully entered an office building as a whole, or the portion of the building constituting a private school, the evidence clearly established that defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter a teachers' lounge, where he was found rummaging through a teacher's bag. A witness testified, with a sufficient degree of certainty, that the room was marked by a sign indicating that it was for faculty only, and the evidence supports the conclusion that the room was not open to the public (see e.g. People v Midgette, 115 AD3d 603, 604 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 965 [2014]; People v Jenkins, 213 AD2d 279 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 974 [1995]). This theory was encompassed in the charge set forth in the indictment.

There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. Defendant's lack of a license to enter the apartment where her estranged niece resided, and defendant's knowledge that her entry was unlawful, were established by both the niece's testimony that she never gave defendant permission to enter and by the totality of the circumstances (see People v Jackson, 118 AD3d 635 [1st Dept 2014]; People v Midgette, 115 AD3d 603, 604 [1st Dept 2014], lvdenied 23 NY3d 965 [2014]).

There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. Defendant's lack of a license to enter the apartment where her estranged niece resided, and defendant's knowledge that her entry was unlawful, were established by both the niece's testimony that she never gave defendant permission to enter and by the totality of the circumstances ( see People v. Jackson, 118 A.D.3d 635, 988 N.Y.S.2d 184 [1st Dept.2014]; People v. Midgette, 115 A.D.3d 603, 604, 982 N.Y.S.2d 128 [1st Dept.2014], lv. denied23 N.Y.3d 965, 988 N.Y.S.2d 572, 11 N.E.3d 722 [2014] ). These circumstances included defendant's estrangement from her niece ( see People v. Schneiderman, 295 A.D.2d 137, 139, 743 N.Y.S.2d 437 [1st Dept.2002], lv. dismissed98 N.Y.2d 702, 747 N.Y.S.2d 421, 776 N.E.2d 10 [2002] ), the deception defendant used to gain access by conveying the impression to building personnel that she was a resident of the apartment ( see People v. Aaron, 233 A.D.2d 231, 650 N.Y.S.2d 535 [1st Dept.1996], lv. denied89 N.Y.2d 983, 656 N.Y.S.2d 742, 678 N.E.2d 1358 [1997] ), the unusual hour and egregious circumstances of the entry ( see People v. White, 276 A.D.2d 287, 713 N.Y.S.2d 874 [1st Dept.2000], lv. denied96 N.Y.2d 740, 722 N.Y.S.2d 807, 745 N.E.2d 1030 [2001] ) and defendant's statements evincing her knowledge that her entry was unlawful and her consciousness of guilt ( see Jackson, 118 A.D.3d at 636, 988 N.Y.S.2d 184).

We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining arguments relating to the court's ruling. The court also providently exercised its discretion in declining defendant's request to expand upon the Criminal Jury Instructions in defining intent under its burglary charge (see People v Midgette, 115 A.D.3d 603, 605 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 965 [2014]). The CJI charge adequately conveyed the principle addressed in the additional language requested by defendant.