We agree with defendant, and the People correctly concede, that defendant's purported waiver of the right to counsel is invalid. "It is well settled that defendants have a statutory right to counsel in SORA proceedings" ( People v. Wilson , 103 A.D.3d 1178, 1179, 960 N.Y.S.2d 276 [4th Dept. 2013] ; seePeople v. David W. , 95 N.Y.2d 130, 138, 711 N.Y.S.2d 134, 733 N.E.2d 206 [2000] ; People v. Middlemiss , 125 A.D.3d 1065, 1066-1067, 3 N.Y.S.3d 771 [3d Dept. 2015] ). In order for a defendant to validly waive his right to counsel, "the court must undertake a ‘searching inquiry ... aimed at [e]nsuring that the defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ " ( Middlemiss , 125 A.D.3d at 1067, 3 N.Y.S.3d 771, quoting People v. Providence , 2 N.Y.3d 579, 582, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 [2004] ; seePeople v. Griffin , 148 A.D.3d 735, 735-736, 47 N.Y.S.3d 739 [2d Dept. 2017] ; Wilson , 103 A.D.3d at 1179, 960 N.Y.S.2d 276 ).
ee People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d 485, 577 N.Y.S.2d 206, 583 N.E.2d 919 ). "A waiver is voluntarily made when the trial court advises the defendant and can be certain that the ‘dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed upon the defendant’ " (Matter of Kathleen K. [Steven K.], 17 N.Y.3d at 385–386, 929 N.Y.S.2d 535, 953 N.E.2d 773, quoting People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d at 491, 577 N.Y.S.2d 206, 583 N.E.2d 919 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). "A ‘searching inquiry’ does not have to be made in a formulaic manner, ... although it is better practice to ask the defendant about [her or] his ‘age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, voluntary waiver’ " (Matter of Kathleen K. [Steven K.], 17 N.Y.3d at 386, 929 N.Y.S.2d 535, 953 N.E.2d 773 [internal citation omitted], quoting People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154 ; see People v. Middlemiss, 125 A.D.3d 1065, 1067, 3 N.Y.S.3d 771 ; People v. Wilson, 103 A.D.3d at 1179, 960 N.Y.S.2d 276 ).Applying that standard here, we conclude that the Supreme Court failed to conduct the requisite searching inquiry to ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligent (see People v. Middlemiss, 125 A.D.3d at 1067, 3 N.Y.S.3d 771 ; People v. Wilson, 103 A.D.3d at 1179–1180, 960 N.Y.S.2d 276 ).
ny complaint against him was first filed" ( People v. Chapman, 69 N.Y.2d 497, 500, 516 N.Y.S.2d 159, 508 N.E.2d 894 [1987] ) and, while he could waive that right and proceed pro se, the waiver would be invalid absent a "searching inquiry" by City Court to discern whether defendant understood and "appreciated the ‘dangers and disadvantages’ of" self-representation ( People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110, 117, 451 N.Y.S.2d 57, 436 N.E.2d 507 [1982], quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 [1975] ; seePeople v. Silburn, 31 N.Y.3d 144, ––––, 74 N.Y.S.3d 781, 98 N.E.3d 696, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op 02286, *2 [2018] ; People v. Myers, 160 A.D.3d 1029, 1032, 74 N.Y.S.3d 394 [2018] ). There was no inquiry conducted here, leaving the record silent as to whether "defendant ‘acted with full knowledge and appreciation of the panoply of constitutional protections that would be adversely affected by counsel's inability to participate’ " so as to constitute a valid waiver ( People v. Middlemiss, 125 A.D.3d 1065, 1067, 3 N.Y.S.3d 771 [2015], quoting People v. Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d 210, 217, 785 N.Y.S.2d 384, 818 N.E.2d 1125 [2004] ). Defendant should therefore not have been permitted to proceed pro se (seePeople v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 481–482, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255 [2011] ; People v. Myers, 160 A.D.3d at 1032–1033, 74 N.Y.S.3d 394 ; People v. Guarnieri, 122 A.D.3d 1078, 1079–1080, 996 N.Y.S.2d 776 [2014] ).
Appeal from an order of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Champagne, J.), entered November 17, 2015, which classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.In 1994, defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of sodomy in the third degree and was sentenced to a prison term of 1 to 3 years stemming from an incident in which he subjected a 13–year–old boy to oral sexual conduct ( People v. Middlemiss, 216 A.D.2d 616, 627 N.Y.S.2d 580[1995], lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 798, 632 N.Y.S.2d 511, 656 N.E.2d 610 [1995] ). Defendant was initially classified as a risk level three sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6–C [hereinafter SORA] ) and, in 2005, after a rehearing (see Doe v. Pataki, 3 F.Supp.2d 456 [1998] ), he was again so classified. Thereafter, this Court reversed two risk level three classifications based upon errors at the SORA hearings and remitted for a new hearing ( People v. Middlemiss, 125 A.D.3d 1065, 3 N.Y.S.3d 771 [2015] ; People v. Middlemiss, 105 A.D.3d 1268, 963 N.Y.S.2d 602 [2013] ).In October 2015, County Court conducted a SORA hearing at which the People adopted the risk assessment instrument (hereinafter RAI) prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, which assessed 160 points and presumptively classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender.
I don't mind if I lose because of my lack of knowledge." Inasmuch as the foregoing reflects that defendant was made "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel" and still desired to proceed pro se, County Court erred in denying his request to do so (People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 582, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 507–508, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235, 626 N.E.2d 51 [1993] ; cf. People v. Middlemiss, 125 A.D.3d 1065, 1067, 3 N.Y.S.3d 771 [2015] ). The refusal to grant a request under these circumstances is not subject to harmless error analysis (see People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 106, 783 N.Y.S.2d 485, 817 N.E.2d 341 [2004] ), and, as such, we are constrained to reverse the judgment and remit for a new trial (see People v. Tafari, 68 A.D.3d 1540, 1541–1542, 891 N.Y.S.2d 711 [2009] ; People v. Williams, 27 A.D.3d 770, 771–772, 811 N.Y.S.2d 150 [2006] ).