Opinion
November 26, 1984
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Spodek, J.).
Judgment and sentences affirmed.
Criminal Term properly denied suppression of physical evidence, to wit, stolen property recovered from appellant's apartment. The testimony elicited at the suppression hearing discloses that the appellant and codefendant Rhodes resided in the same apartment and that Rhodes consented to the search when he invited a detective and the complainant into his apartment. Once inside the apartment, the stolen property was clearly visible from the vantage point at which they stood. No coercive tactics were used by the police in gaining admission to the apartment (see People v Abrams, 95 A.D.2d 155), and the People have met the burden. of proving that "the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given" (see Bumper v North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548; People v Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389). Upon entering the apartment, the police were justified in seizing the stolen property in open view (see People v Jackson, 41 N.Y.2d 146; People v Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254). Since the codefendant possessed the requisite degree of authority and control over the premises (see People v Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286; People v Wood, 31 N.Y.2d 975; People v Melo, 98 A.D.2d 754), appellant assumed the risk that he might permit the common area to be searched (see United States v Matlock, 415 U.S. 164).
Appellant's challenge to the excessiveness of the sentences imposed has been considered, and has been found to be without merit. There has been no abuse of discretion by the sentencing court nor have any facts been presented which would impel this court to exercise its discretion and reduce the sentences in the interest of justice (see People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Titone, J.P., Lazer, Mangano and Niehoff, JJ., concur.