Opinion
4-22-0031
06-03-2022
In re A.V., a Minor The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael R., Respondent-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ogle County No. 19JA22 Honorable John Benjamin Roe IV, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HARRIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Respondent failed to establish the trial court erred in finding him unfit.
¶ 2 Respondent, Michael R., appeals from the trial court's order finding him to be an unfit parent and terminating his parental rights as to his minor child, A.V. (born May 28, 2019). On appeal, respondent challenges only the court's fitness determination. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In July 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of A.V. The State alleged A.V. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) because, in part, she was born with cannabis in her system. None of the allegations in the five-count petition related to respondent. A.V.'s mother is not a party to the instant appeal. On October 22, 2019, the trial court entered an order adjudging respondent to be A.V.'s father based on the results of DNA testing.
¶ 5 On December 10, 2019, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding A.V. was neglected. In January 2020, the court entered a dispositional order making A.V. a ward of the court and placing custody and guardianship with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 6 In February 2021, the State filed a petition seeking a finding of unfitness and termination of respondent's parental rights. The State alleged respondent was unfit within the meaning of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (m)(i)-(ii) (West 2018)) because he failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to A.V.'s welfare (count I); (2) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to A.V.'s removal within nine months of the adjudication of neglect (count II); and (3) "failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child *** within *** nine months after the adjudication of neglect on December 10, 2019 [(count III)]."
¶ 7 The trial court conducted a fitness hearing on September 7, 2021. The State presented the testimony of A.V.'s caseworker, Richard Leavy, and introduced the service plans into evidence without objection. Respondent also testified at the fitness hearing.
¶ 8 Richard Leavy, a child welfare specialist with DCFS, had been A.V.'s caseworker since the case's inception. Leavy testified DCFS opened the case because of the mother's substance abuse issues. Leavy testified that respondent's service plan required him to complete a substance abuse assessment, a mental health assessment, and parenting classes. Respondent was also required to regularly attend visitation with A.V. and complete requested drug screens. Leavy stated respondent completed the substance abuse assessment and the mental health assessment, neither of which recommended respondent for further treatment. Respondent also completed the required parenting classes. However, according to Leavy, respondent failed to incorporate the lessons from those classes into his visits with A. V. Leavy testified that the classes taught the "importance of floor time, the importance of talking to your child, the importance of singing, the importance of *** bonding," yet respondent appeared to be more concerned with getting A.V. to fall asleep rather than engaging with her. Leavy further testified that respondent repeatedly told him that he (respondent) did not agree with what was being taught in the parenting classes and he did not think it was necessary to employ those lessons when raising A.V.
¶ 9 Leavy testified the visits occurred in the DCFS office located in DeKalb, which was approximately a 90-minute drive from respondent's home. Respondent was entitled to weekly, hour-long visits with A.V. Of the 52 visits respondent could have attended in 2020, he attended 20. Leavy believed that respondent had attended approximately 3 of A.V.'s 10 doctor appointments. As for the drug testing requirement, Leavy testified that respondent had completed 7 of 51 required screenings. All of the completed tests were negative for drugs, but two were positive for alcohol. Respondent went to some of the screenings but was unable to provide a sample, and he failed to show up for the remaining screenings. Leavy agreed that respondent had informed him that he (respondent) had been molested in a bathroom as a child and had difficulty going to the bathroom in front of others as a result of that trauma. However, Leavy stated respondent never provided anything to prove this.
¶ 10 Respondent testified that, shortly after A.V.'s birth, A.V.'s maternal grandfather contacted him to tell him about the birth and that respondent might be the child's father. Shortly thereafter, respondent agreed to submit to DNA testing. Once the DNA testing confirmed he was the father, respondent, who was living in Iowa at the time, was prepared to have A.V. live with him. Respondent testified that DCFS informed him that he had to live in Illinois if he wanted A.V. to live with him, so he moved to Chadwick, Illinois. Respondent further testified that his 15-year-old son had been living with him for approximately two years at the time of the fitness hearing.
¶ 11 According to respondent, he had difficulty completing the drug screens because he had been molested multiple times as a child, most often in a church bathroom. Respondent testified he was previously married and the trauma from his childhood prevented him from being able to use the bathroom even in the presence of his then-wife. Respondent claimed the alleged perpetrator had been convicted and sentenced to approximately 10 years' imprisonment in Iowa. Respondent acknowledged he had been convicted in 2013 for writing "a bunch of bad checks to pay for crack cocaine due to addiction ***." As part of his sentence, respondent served a five-year term of probation. In order to complete the required drug screens, respondent's probation officer allowed him to strip in front of him before going into a bathroom to provide a sample. Respondent testified he had been sober since 2013 and he did not know how some of the drug screens produced positive results for alcohol. On cross-examination, respondent acknowledged that he had previously told the court he did not show up to drug screens because of transportation issues and because he did not take them seriously, as he was not the reason A.V. had been taken into care.
¶ 12 Respondent testified he initially had difficulty attending the visits with A.V. for financial reasons and had spent a significant amount of money on the move from Iowa to Illinois. He also testified he was "not a morning person" so he had difficulty attending the morning visits. Respondent further testified that at least two of the visits were cancelled by DCFS and he missed an additional visit due to complications caused by certain COVID-19 procedures.
¶ 13 On November 10, 2021, the trial court entered a written order finding respondent unfit on the grounds he failed to (1) "maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare (count 1)," (2) "make reasonable progress towards the return of the child *** within nine months after an adjudication of neglect (count 2)," and (3) "make reasonable progress towards the return of the child *** during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (count 3)." The court provided the following reasoning for determining respondent had failed to make reasonable progress:
"The father missed visits and missed drug tests. The minor child has special needs. The [f]ather missed [d]octor appointments for the minor child. He has not properly engaged with the minor child to form an appropriate, meaningful bond. [He] [d]id not obtain appropriate counseling to parent the minor child. The father refused to properly address the root of why [the] minor child was brought into care. The issues at the outset of this matter of honesty, showing up for visits to develop a meaningful bond as a parent, and cooperating with drug drops remain relevant today. Although, the [f]ather made some efforts to correct the conditions that brought the minor into care, the Court finds the efforts were minimal, and as a result, reasonable progress was never attained."
On January 4, 2022, following a best-interest hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights.
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in finding him to be an unfit parent within the meaning of the Adoption Act.
¶ 17 Before proceeding to the merits, we must first address respondent's failure to file an appellant's brief in compliance with Rule 341. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341 (eff Oct. 1, 2020). Rule 341 sets forth the specific requirements of an appellant's brief. Notably, an appellant's brief shall be structured such that it includes (1) a table of contents, (2) an introductory paragraph stating the nature of the action and whether any question is raised on the pleadings, (3) a statement of the issues presented for review, (4) a statement of jurisdiction, (5) a section outlining the pertinent parts of statutes involved, (6) a statement of facts, (7) an argument section with citation of the relevant authorities and pages of the record, (8) a short conclusion stating the relief sought, and (9) an appendix. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(1)-(9) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 18 Here, respondent failed to file a compliant appellant's brief. Instead, he filed a "memorandum" which omits most of the required contents and clearly fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 341. Under the circumstances, we would be justified in striking respondent's submission and dismissing this appeal based upon a lack of compliance with the rules. However, because we are able to discern respondent's argument and determine counsel's submission does not otherwise materially impede our ability to address the merits of respondent's appeal, we will proceed to decide the issues presented. However, we strongly advise counsel to consult and comply with the rules in submitting briefs to this court in the future.
¶ 19 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244, 850 N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). In making such a determination, the court considers whether the parent's conduct falls within one or more of the unfitness grounds described in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d 405, 417, 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (2001). "A parent's rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence." In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 349, 830 N.E.2d 508, 514 (2005).
¶ 20 In the present case, the trial court found respondent unfit because he failed to (1) "maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare (count 1)," (2) "make reasonable progress towards the return of the child *** within nine months after an adjudication of neglect (count 2)," and (3) "make reasonable progress towards the return of the child *** during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (count 3)." Respondent challenges the decision finding him unfit by addressing some, but not all, of the grounds specified by the court in its order. Importantly, respondent does not challenge the court's determination that he was unfit on the ground that he failed to make reasonable progress towards A.V.'s return within nine months of the adjudication of neglect. By failing to address this ground, respondent effectively concedes his unfitness by failing to present any reasoned argument that the court's determination was in error. Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); see also In re D.L., 326 Ill.App.3d 262, 268, 760 N.E.2d 542, 547 (2001) (holding that by failing to challenge all of the grounds on which the trial court determined them unfit, the respondents conceded unfitness based on the unchallenged ground and it was unnecessary to address their additional arguments). In light of the above, we find it unnecessary to address respondent's arguments relating to the other grounds specified by the court. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill.App.3d 1052, 1064, 859 N.E.2d 123, 135 (2006) ("A finding of unfitness will stand if supported by any one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act.").
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 23 Affirmed.