Opinion
B300384
06-30-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD MERAZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA111663 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael A. Cowell, Judge. Affirmed. Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2011, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Edward Meraz of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd.(a)); premediated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); and conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 187, 182, subd. (a)(1)). In 2019, following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437), Meraz filed a petition for resentencing under newly-enacted section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, concluding Meraz was ineligible for relief because he was not convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Under section 1170.95, a person who was convicted under theories of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and who could not be convicted of murder following the enactment of SB 1437's changes to sections 188 and 189, may petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) --------
Meraz filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him. On December 2, 2019, appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues and asking us to review the record independently. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We informed Meraz that he could personally submit any contentions or issues for us to consider, and he filed a supplemental brief on January 9, 2020.
In his supplemental brief, Meraz raises several vague arguments apparently challenging various aspects of his 2011 trial rather than the 2019 denial of his section 1170.95 motion. Meraz's appeal of his 2011 trial was resolved by this Court in case number B242496. Meraz is not entitled to appeal the 2011 judgment a second time. (See, e.g., Heck v. Heck Bros. (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 599, 603 ["The law clearly contemplates that but one appeal shall be taken from a judgment."].) The only argument Meraz raises in his supplemental brief that seems to concern the denial of his section 1170.95 motion is his apparent assertion that because the jury in his 2011 case was instructed on aiding and abetting, he is now entitled to section 1170.95 relief. We reject this contention. Meraz is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief because he was not convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. This is true regardless of whether the jury received an aiding and abetting instruction.
In addition to reviewing the issues Meraz has raised in his supplemental brief, we have also independently examined the entire record, and are satisfied no arguable issues exist. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278-279; People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, J. We concur: MANELLA, P.J. WILLHITE, J.