See id. at 318. We adopted the reasoning of Elstad in People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 814 (Colo. 1990). Like the defendant here, the defendant in Mendoza-Rodriguez agreed to go to the police station to discuss a crime.
We first address the written confession. The appropriate analysis to be applied to the written confession is set forth in People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1990), in which we adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, and stated: "Under Elstad, in order to determine the voluntariness of post- Miranda statements, a court must first determine whether the defendant's pre- Miranda statements were given voluntarily. If they were, then the post- Miranda statements would not be rendered involuntary . . . . If the pre- Miranda statements were not made voluntarily, however, the defendant's post- Miranda statements could be admitted only if they were not `tainted' by the prior involuntary statements."
A statement is voluntary when "it is the product of an individualβs βfree and rational choice.β " People v. Taylor , 41 P.3d 681, 694 (Colo. 2002) (quoting People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez , 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990) ). Courts recognize that "[p]sychological as well as physical pressures may be brought to bear on a suspect to induce his confession." Freeman , 668 P.2d at 1379.
Similarly, the trial court's order does not state that Dracon's will was overborne by improper state conduct. See People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990). During the custodial interrogations, neither Sergeant Hildebrant nor Sergeant Gordon was in uniform and neither one of them displayed any weapons. The videotaped interrogation reveals that on several occasions during the approximately 100-minute interrogation Sergeant Hildebrant raised his voice, cut off Dracon's comments, demanded "yes" or "no" answers, conveyed disbelief of Dracon's statements, and employed sarcasm when asking leading questions.
Later that evening while in custody at the jail, Defendant, after being advised of his Miranda rights, made further incriminating statements. The supreme court holds that the doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1990) governs the admissibility of these statements. Elstad held that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to confessions obtained after an initial confession that was voluntary but not preceded by Miranda warnings.
Statements made by a defendant before the police administer a Miranda warning do not automatically render inadmissible subsequent statements which are both voluntary and obtained after a valid Miranda advisement. People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 814 (Colo. 1990). Rather, a court must first determine whether the defendant's pre-Miranda statements were voluntary.
The ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the individual's will has been overborne. Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211 People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990). Generally, when determining whether a defendant's statements were voluntary, a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the following factors: (1) whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and aware of his situation; (2) whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights; (3) whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; (4) whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; (5) the method and style employed by the interrogator; and (6) the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately prior to and during the interrogation, as well as his educational background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal justice system.
In three recent cases, we have confirmed that even though a statement obtained in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statements made after a proper Miranda warning and waiver are not automatically rendered inadmissible by the previous Miranda violation. Mack, slip op. at 7-8; Sutherland, 886 P.2d at 687-88; Dracon, 884 P.2d at 720. Instead, to determine the admissibility of those later statements, the court must make additional findings regarding the voluntariness of the statements involved. If the suspect's initial, suppressed statements were voluntary, then any later Mirandized statements are admissible as long as they were knowingly and voluntarily made. Dracon, 884 P.2d at 720; People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 814-15 (Colo. 1990). A statement is constitutionally voluntary "as long as some form of coercive police activity does not play a significant role in inducing the statement."
So, a statement is involuntary if (1) the government's conduct was coercive and (2) that coercion "played a significant role in inducing" a confession or an inculpatory statement. Ramadon, ΒΆ 20, 314 P.3d at 842; see also People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990) ("To be voluntary, a statement 'must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.'" (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970))).
See Matheny , 46 P.3d at 457β58 ; People v. A.W. , 982 P.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Colo. 1999) ; People v. MacCallum , 925 P.2d 758, 765β66 (Colo. 1996) ; Mounts , 801 P.2d at 1202 ; People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez , 790 P.2d 810, 813 (Colo. 1990) ; People v. Dist. Ct. , 785 P.2d 141, 144 (Colo. 1990) ; People v. Garner , 736 P.2d 413, 413β14 (Colo. 1987) ; People v. Valdez , 621 P.2d 332, 333 (Colo.