People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez

25 Citing cases

  1. People v. Trujillo

    938 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1997)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that issue of custodial interrogation is essentially a factual question and limiting appellate review to determining whether trial court's findings of historical fact are supported by the record and whether the court applied the correct legal standard to these findings in resolving the issue before it

    See id. at 318. We adopted the reasoning of Elstad in People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 814 (Colo. 1990). Like the defendant here, the defendant in Mendoza-Rodriguez agreed to go to the police station to discuss a crime.

  2. People v. Thomas

    839 P.2d 1174 (Colo. 1992)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that an encounter was consensual where the defendant was comfortable during the encounter, chose not to leave, and acquiesced to the officer's request to answer questions

    We first address the written confession. The appropriate analysis to be applied to the written confession is set forth in People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1990), in which we adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, and stated: "Under Elstad, in order to determine the voluntariness of post- Miranda statements, a court must first determine whether the defendant's pre- Miranda statements were given voluntarily. If they were, then the post- Miranda statements would not be rendered involuntary . . . . If the pre- Miranda statements were not made voluntarily, however, the defendant's post- Miranda statements could be admitted only if they were not `tainted' by the prior involuntary statements."

  3. Cardman v. People

    445 P.3d 1071 (Colo. 2019)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that an interrogation tends to be voluntary when the interviewee was not in custody, was free to leave, had the opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else, and the method or style of the interrogation was relaxed

    A statement is voluntary when "it is the product of an individual’s β€˜free and rational choice.’ " People v. Taylor , 41 P.3d 681, 694 (Colo. 2002) (quoting People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez , 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990) ). Courts recognize that "[p]sychological as well as physical pressures may be brought to bear on a suspect to induce his confession." Freeman , 668 P.2d at 1379.

  4. People of Colorado v. Dracon

    884 P.2d 712 (Colo. 1994)   Cited 36 times
    In Dracon, the defendant accompanied an officer to the Denver Police Department to discuss the circumstances of a homicide investigation.

    Similarly, the trial court's order does not state that Dracon's will was overborne by improper state conduct. See People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990). During the custodial interrogations, neither Sergeant Hildebrant nor Sergeant Gordon was in uniform and neither one of them displayed any weapons. The videotaped interrogation reveals that on several occasions during the approximately 100-minute interrogation Sergeant Hildebrant raised his voice, cut off Dracon's comments, demanded "yes" or "no" answers, conveyed disbelief of Dracon's statements, and employed sarcasm when asking leading questions.

  5. People v. Taylor

    41 P.3d 681 (Colo. 2002)   Cited 31 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the "flashing lights and blaring sirens of a police vehicle" implicate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure requirements

    Later that evening while in custody at the jail, Defendant, after being advised of his Miranda rights, made further incriminating statements. The supreme court holds that the doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) and adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1990) governs the admissibility of these statements. Elstad held that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply to confessions obtained after an initial confession that was voluntary but not preceded by Miranda warnings.

  6. People v. Breidenbach

    875 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1994)   Cited 68 times
    Finding that the defendant was in custody, in part, because the officers used a degree of force typically associated with arrest when they stopped and interrogated him with their weapons drawn

    Statements made by a defendant before the police administer a Miranda warning do not automatically render inadmissible subsequent statements which are both voluntary and obtained after a valid Miranda advisement. People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 814 (Colo. 1990). Rather, a court must first determine whether the defendant's pre-Miranda statements were voluntary.

  7. People v. Medina

    25 P.3d 1216 (Colo. 2001)   Cited 45 times
    Finding the confession coerced when police threatened to take the defendant's child from his wife if no one confessed, threatened that his wife would be charged if he did not confess, and told the defendant that the D.A. would be lenient if he confessed

    The ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the individual's will has been overborne. Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211 People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990). Generally, when determining whether a defendant's statements were voluntary, a trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the following factors: (1) whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and aware of his situation; (2) whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights; (3) whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; (4) whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; (5) the method and style employed by the interrogator; and (6) the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately prior to and during the interrogation, as well as his educational background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal justice system.

  8. People v. in Interest of T.C

    898 P.2d 20 (Colo. 1995)   Cited 8 times
    Ruling that "the circumstances of the interrogation, including the length of the interrogation and the fact that it involved an eleven-year-old, would lead a reasonable person in [the defendant's] situation to feel that he had no choice but to stay and listen to the officer"

    In three recent cases, we have confirmed that even though a statement obtained in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statements made after a proper Miranda warning and waiver are not automatically rendered inadmissible by the previous Miranda violation. Mack, slip op. at 7-8; Sutherland, 886 P.2d at 687-88; Dracon, 884 P.2d at 720. Instead, to determine the admissibility of those later statements, the court must make additional findings regarding the voluntariness of the statements involved. If the suspect's initial, suppressed statements were voluntary, then any later Mirandized statements are admissible as long as they were knowingly and voluntarily made. Dracon, 884 P.2d at 720; People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 814-15 (Colo. 1990). A statement is constitutionally voluntary "as long as some form of coercive police activity does not play a significant role in inducing the statement."

  9. People v. Cerda

    2024 CO 49 (Colo. 2024)

    So, a statement is involuntary if (1) the government's conduct was coercive and (2) that coercion "played a significant role in inducing" a confession or an inculpatory statement. Ramadon, ΒΆ 20, 314 P.3d at 842; see also People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo. 1990) ("To be voluntary, a statement 'must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.'" (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970))).

  10. People v. Thompson

    500 P.3d 1075 (Colo. 2021)   Cited 11 times
    Acknowledging that our caselaw "reflects some inconsistency in our approach to jurisdiction in interlocutory appeals," but declining to resolve it without notice to the parties

    See Matheny , 46 P.3d at 457–58 ; People v. A.W. , 982 P.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Colo. 1999) ; People v. MacCallum , 925 P.2d 758, 765–66 (Colo. 1996) ; Mounts , 801 P.2d at 1202 ; People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez , 790 P.2d 810, 813 (Colo. 1990) ; People v. Dist. Ct. , 785 P.2d 141, 144 (Colo. 1990) ; People v. Garner , 736 P.2d 413, 413–14 (Colo. 1987) ; People v. Valdez , 621 P.2d 332, 333 (Colo.