Opinion
F041069.
7-1-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRANCISCO JAVIER MENDOZA, Defendant and Appellant.
R. Bruce Finch, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, John G. McLean and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following denial of his Penal Code section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence, Francisco Javier Mendoza pled guilty to Penal Code section 182 , subdivision (a)(1) (conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance) and Health and Safety Code section 11350 (possession of a controlled substance). He appeals contending the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion because the record shows that the search of his vehicle trunk was constitutionally infirm in that the searching officers followed no established procedure for impounding vehicles and the consequent "inventory" search became a mere pretext for a criminal investigation. We will affirm.
FACTS
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 9, 2002, California Highway Patrol Officers John Nevarez and Anthony Ingram were on patrol on Interstate 5 near Lebec when they observed a dark-colored sedan traveling at approximately 90 miles per hour. They paced the speed of the vehicle for one and a half miles and determined that it was traveling 92 miles per hour and passing all other vehicles. The officers activated the patrol cars red lights and initiated a traffic stop. Appellant was the driver and sole occupant. Speaking fluent Spanish, Officer Nevarez contacted appellant. Appellant said he did not have a California drivers license or a passport, but he produced for the officers a Mexican drivers license and what he represented as an expired international drivers license. An international license is not recognized in California as providing a license to drive an automobile; it is similar to a check-cashing card. Appellants address as listed on the international license was a residence on Jackson Avenue in San Jose, California, and appellant confirmed that he still lived at that address. When asked for the vehicles registration, appellant provided a Department of Motor Vehicles temporary identification for the vehicle. The document indicated that the vehicle was registered to Jesus Nava in San Jose, California. The Department of Motor Vehicles had a record of appellant as an unlicensed driver with an address listed on Ezie Street in San Jose. Kern County Sheriffs records confirmed that appellant had been cited on March 4, 2000, for driving without a license, a violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, and his address was listed as being on Ezie Street in San Jose. When questioned by Officer Nevarez about the different addresses, appellant again said he lived on Jackson Avenue. He stated he was a resident of California.
Officer Nevarez determined that they would impound and tow the car after issuing appellant a citation for speeding and driving without a license. Officer Ingram began an inventory of the car after the tow truck was requested. Officer Nevarez asked appellant if there was anything in the car that could harm Officer Ingram, and appellant admitted there was some marijuana in the front seat.
Officer Ingram began the inventory of the passenger compartment. As the officer was approaching the trunk, appellant said that his friends in Los Angeles had loaded something in the trunk but he did not know what it was. Officer Ingram opened the trunk to determine if anything of value should be listed on the inventory form. The trunk was loaded with equipment and precursor chemicals-including Freon, iodine, caustic soda, and red phosphorus-used in the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, appellant raises the single issue of whether the trial court erroneously denied his motion to exclude evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5.
The standard of appellate review of trial court rulings on motions to suppress is well established. We defer to the express or implied factual determinations of the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718, 195 Cal. Rptr. 503, 669 P.2d 1278.) We then independently review whether these findings support the legal conclusion that the search was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. (People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 496.) In evaluating the reasonableness of the challenged search, the court looks to the "totality of the circumstances." (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230, 885 P.2d 982.)
"Inventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 107 S. Ct. 738.) Appellant acknowledges that Officers Nevarez and Ingram had probable cause to stop him for driving at excessive speed as well as citing him for speeding and unlicensed driving. Appellant contends, however, there was an inadequate showing at the suppression hearing of any established, formal, written or standardized impound procedure. Respondent argues that police officers have the right, and often the duty, to impound a motor vehicle. (People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 372.) "An officer may exercise discretion in deciding when to impound an automobile "so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity...." [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 372-373, quoting People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 324.) The officers testimony at the suppression hearing was that their primary reason for impounding and towing the car was that appellant was an unlicensed driver. Their second reason was that appellant had been driving at 92 miles per hour, a very high rate of speed, creating a dangerous situation. Officer Nevarez understood that, under these circumstances, he had the authority to impound the car that appellant was driving, as set forth in Vehicle Code section 22651. Nothing in the officers report or testimony indicates they were using the authorized impound procedure as a pretext for engaging in a search for criminal activity. The fact that the statute gives an officer the discretion to decide whether to impound or to otherwise secure the vehicle does not mean that the procedure is unreasonable in Fourth Amendment terms. (People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal. App. 3d 887, 892, 258 Cal. Rptr. 699.) Further, nothing in the record supports appellants claim that the inventory of the vehicle was being used as a "ruse" to conduct an investigatory search of the car. The decision to tow the car was made before the officers began their inventory.
The judgment is affirmed. --------------- Notes: Judge Humphrey denied the motion to suppress; Judge Stuart presided at the change of plea and sentencing.