Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. SS071117
Premo, J.
Defendant Juan Mendez was convicted by a jury of multiple charges, including attempted murder, arising out of several attacks on his former girlfriend. He was sentenced to a total term of 14 years in prison.
On appeal, Mendez argues that the trial court erroneously precluded him from presenting two witnesses who would have offered testimony challenging the credibility of the victim. He claims the exclusion of these witnesses violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. We disagree and shall affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Mendez was charged by amended information, consolidating three separate cases, with six counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 1-4, 14, 15), two counts of dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); counts 5, 13), two counts of first degree burglary (§ 459; counts 6, 12), one count of aggravated trespass (§ 602.5, subd. (b); count 7), four counts of violating a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); counts 8-10, 18), one count of attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 11), one count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 16), and one count of threat of violence (§ 422; count 17).
The amended information consolidated, for trial purposes only, Monterey County Superior Court case Nos. SS062507A, SS062700A and SS071117A, with case No. SS071117A designated as the lead case.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
A. The prosecution case
Matilda Mireles, a 31-year-old undocumented alien, had been in the United States for approximately 11 years at the time of trial. Prior to coming to the United States from Mexico, Mireles had not completed elementary school. Though she was attending school in this country, she could not read or write in either English or Spanish. While in the United States, Mireles married Joseph Villalobos, with whom she had two daughters. They divorced in 2004, and Mireles testified that there was domestic violence in her relationship with Villalobos. Mireles also admitted that she was abused as a child.
The name initially appears as “Matilde” in the reporter’s transcript.
Mireles met Mendez at a friend’s wedding in 2005, and the two became friends, talking on the phone once a week. At the time, Mireles was dating another man. A few months later, Mendez learned that she had a boyfriend when he came to visit Mireles at her uncle’s house. Mendez slapped her, called her a “whore,” and “many bad things.” Mireles told him she no longer wanted to be his friend after that and stopped answering his phone calls.
About five or six months later, Mireles began speaking to Mendez again after he asked for her forgiveness and promised to never hit her again. Soon afterwards, Mendez accompanied Mireles to the bus stop one day. A passing car honked and Mireles turned to see who it was. Mendez again slapped Mireles and called her a whore and a prostitute. Mireles called the police, who took her home. She remained friends with Mendez, only because he insisted. Mendez also said that Mireles should forgive him, saying it was “[her] fault because [she] was seeing other men.”
Mendez knew that Mireles was undocumented, and he obtained fake identification for her, with the name “Bertha DeLaCruz,” as well as a job at the packing company where he worked. Mendez also helped Mireles get an apartment, filling out the paperwork and allowing her to use his credit. Mireles paid for the credit check, the deposit and the rent, however. Mendez gave Mireles the key to the apartment and helped her move in on June 19, 2006.
Approximately two weeks later, Mendez moved into the apartment as well, though Mireles did not want him to do so. Mireles was home when she heard someone coming in the door. Mendez was carrying his belongings inside and when she protested that the agreement was that she would have the apartment to herself, Mendez laughed at her. Mireles did not complain to anyone because Mendez threatened to tell her ex-husband and her social worker that he was her lover.
This threat was significant because Mireles was seeking to regain custody of her daughters.
On July 15, 2006, a Saturday, one of Mireles’s female friends called and invited her to a party. Although Mireles was afraid that Mendez would get angry at her for going, she decided to go anyway. Mireles went to take a shower, and Mendez came into the bathroom. Mireles was taking off her shirt, and Mendez was upset and asked where she was going. He said that Mireles had a hickey on her neck and arm and called her a whore and a bitch. She denied having any hickeys, but Mendez said she was going to “go out and whore around on the street.” He then punched her in the face.
Mendez hit her with a closed fist many times. He grabbed her by the hair and hit her head twice against the bathroom wall. Mireles got dizzy and fell to the floor, but Mendez picked her up and hit her very hard on the ear. Mireles put her hands up to block his punches, and unintentionally scratched Mendez around his eye. She realized what she had done when she saw blood on Mendez’s face.
Mendez stopped beating Mireles, looked in the mirror and began laughing. He said he was going to call the police and accuse her of domestic violence. Mendez also said he would call her employer and the police, and then Mireles could not get custody of her daughters because she was a violent person. Mireles got very scared, and asked Mendez to forgive her. Mendez hugged and kissed her, and said that he would not say anything, but that she should not say anything about him hitting her.
When Mireles said that she still wanted to go to the party with her friend, Mendez began hitting her again, telling her she could not go and that if she continued to misbehave, he would kill her. Mireles took the threat seriously because Mendez was angry. Mendez threw her to the floor, sat on her and began to choke her with both hands. Though Mireles could breathe, the choking made her cough and want to vomit. Mireles was crying and yelling, and Mendez went to the living room. She asked him to help her, and to call an ambulance.
Mireles called 911 from the bedroom, and Mendez came back into the room and asked what she was doing. She said she was calling the police because she felt bad and her head hurt. Mendez told Mireles it would be bad for her to call the police, and said she should not use her real name. While she was on the phone, Mendez was telling her what to say to the police. The police asked Mireles what the emergency was, and at Mendez’s direction, she said there was a couple fighting in the street. When the police asked Mireles if the couple was still there, Mendez told her to say that they had left.
After Mireles ended the call, Mendez hit her again. He threw her to the ground, took a rolled-up pillow and held it against her throat so she could not breathe. Mireles vomited blood and briefly lost consciousness. Mendez became frightened and started crying. He said that he did not want to kill her, and asked Mireles to forgive him. Mendez told her he would call an ambulance, but she should say whatever he told her to say. Mendez called 911 and gave fake names for himself and Mireles, then said that Mireles had tried to kill herself. Mireles did not tell the police or paramedics what had really happened. Mendez was always standing nearby when she was being treated.
Mireles does not remember leaving the hospital, but remembers waking up in her apartment on Monday. Though her head still hurt and she was very confused, she went to school. After school, Mireles went to her friend Erma’s house and told her what had happened. Mireles then called the police. Officer Heath Johnson, with the Salinas Police Department, arrived to take a report. As Officer Johnson did not speak Spanish, Erma’s younger sister volunteered to translate. Mireles was not comfortable talking to the officer with the younger sister translating, because the girl was young, and did not know what was going on. Mireles also did not think that Officer Johnson understood what she was saying because when she said something about what happened, he accused her of lying. She also felt that Erma’s sister was not translating very well because she was made nervous by Officer Johnson calling Mireles a liar.
Officer Johnson took Mireles and Erma’s sister to the apartment to look for Mendez, where they were met by another Salinas police officer named Rios. Officer Johnson went upstairs to the apartment to speak with Mendez while Officer Rios and the two women remained downstairs. When Officer Johnson returned, he told Officer Rios that Mireles was a liar. After this, Mireles no longer wanted to talk to Officer Johnson since he did not believe her. Mireles stayed at Erma’s place that night, and the next day, Erma helped her obtain a restraining order against Mendez. Mireles returned to the apartment, changed the lock and got two new keys.
Mendez was served with the restraining order on July 28, 2006. After that, he called Mireles many times and threatened her, saying that if she did not remove the restraining order, she would “be sorry.”
On August 12, 2006, Mendez pushed his way into Mireles’s apartment and took one of her apartment keys. Mireles told him to leave, but Mendez sat on the sofa laughing at her. She went to the kitchen to call the police, but Mendez followed her and disconnected the telephone. Mireles got her cell phone from her purse, and again told Mendez to leave or she would call the police. Mendez again laughed and said he was not afraid of going to jail. She began dialing 911, and Mendez ran out.
On one other occasion, Mendez tried to enter the apartment by climbing onto the balcony. He put his face against the sliding glass door and told Mireles to let him in. When Mireles refused, Mendez pulled on the door handle, but it was locked. Mireles called the police, and Mendez left.
On the night of September 18, 2006, Mendez entered Mireles’s apartment while she was asleep. He dropped on top of her, pinning her hands and legs. Without saying a word, Mendez put one hand on her neck, grabbed a cushion with his other hand and placed it over her face. He then pressed down with both hands on the cushion, and Mireles could not breathe or move. She lost consciousness briefly. Mireles recalled Mendez getting up to close the front door which he had left open, and when he did so, she grabbed her cell phone to call the police. Mendez charged over to where she lay on the floor, grabbed the phone and broke it. He told Mireles that he was going to kill her and again put the cushion over her face, pressing down hard. Mireles fainted or lost consciousness a second time.
When she came to, she began screaming loudly for help, as she believed Mendez would kill her. Mendez again told Mireles he was going to kill her and that she would never see her daughters again. He hit her in the face and on the head with his closed fist, giving her a bloody nose. Mireles was able to get up and she ran to the bedroom, opened the window and screamed for help. Mendez grabbed her, covered her mouth and told her to be quiet. He called her a whore and a dog, and accused her of being “with a lot of men.”
Mendez dragged Mireles back into the living room, still covering her mouth. Mireles bit his hand, and Mendez punched her in the face. He threw her to the floor and covered her mouth with his hands. Mireles lost consciousness for a third time. She believes that while she was unconscious this time, Mendez used a wet towel to begin wiping blood from her face.
When she awoke, Mendez was in front of her, telling her that he loved her very much. As he spoke, Mendez was squeezing Mireles’s throat. Mendez stood, went into the kitchen and got a knife. He poked Mireles in the chest with the knife, right beneath her breast. The point of the knife broke the skin and Mireles bled slightly. While still holding the knife in one hand, Mendez began squeezing Mireles’s throat with his other hand, continuing to tell her that he would kill her. Mireles was crying, and then heard someone coming up the stairs. There was a knock on the door, and someone called, “Open up.” Mendez told Mireles to stay quiet. He went to the kitchen, left the knife there, then went to open the door.
Officer Brian Canaday, City of Salinas Police Department, and other officers had responded to a telephone call from one of Mireles’s neighbors. When he arrived at the apartment complex, he could hear a male yelling and a female screaming and crying. As Officer Canaday and the other officers approached Mireles’s apartment, he could still hear a male yelling and a woman crying. He knocked on the door, and it got quiet in the apartment. There was a pause, and Mendez opened the door, breathing very heavily and sweating profusely. Officer Canaday noticed that Mendez’s hands were bloody, and there was blood on his shirt, pants and socks. Officer Canaday saw Mireles on the living room floor, crying and sobbing, with blood on her face. Mendez looked at the officers and said nothing. Officer Canaday pushed Mendez into the apartment and searched him for weapons while the other officers made contact with Mireles.
Mendez was not wearing shoes, and Officer Canaday did not find Mendez’s shoes in the apartment.
Another officer found the knife Mendez had used on Mireles, and Officer Canaday immediately put Mendez in handcuffs. Mendez told Officer Canaday that Mireles has a “condition that makes her bleed.” As the other officers spoke with Mireles, Officer Canaday noticed that Mendez was looking at her in an intimidating way, so he took Mendez outside the apartment. Officer Canaday searched Mendez and found a broken cell phone in his left rear pocket.
Mireles was transported to the hospital, where she told medical personnel what had happened. She had bruises on her arms and throat for two weeks, as well as pain in her jaw and ear.
Christina Gonzalez, who called the police that night, and her brother, Jose Gonzalez, who lived in an adjoining apartment, could hear a woman crying next door. Jose Gonzalez testified that he could hear a woman crying for help and told his sister, Christina, to call 911. Before she called, Christina also heard a woman crying, “Leave me alone, leave me alone. I’m already tired of you hitting me.”
The apartment building’s resident maintenance man, Geronimo Villasenor, heard sounds of people fighting from Mireles’s apartment on at least two occasions and once heard what sounded like someone being thrown into a wall. On another occasion, he heard a male voice yelling “Shut up, bitch, stupid” and “I’m going to kill you.” Villasenor changed the locks on Mireles’s apartment twice, and the first time he did so, he noticed that she had bruises.
Patricia Overburg, executive director of the Crisis Center in Salinas, testified as an expert on Battered Woman’s Syndrome (BWS) and “intimate partner battering.” She explained the general pattern involved in “intimate partner battering,” which begins with a sense of being in love and happy, but then suddenly one partner becomes violent or angry. It can begin with verbal and mental abuse, and progresses to physical violence. She noted that victims develop low self-esteem and sometimes feel at fault for their own abuse. The abuser then apologizes and promises it will not happen again. There is then a “honeymoon period,” during which the abuser is kind to the victim, taking him or her to dinner and movies, and buying flowers for the victim. Eventually, the cycle begins again, and over time, the “honeymoon period gets shorter and shorter.” The abuser sees the victim as “property,” and uses violence as a means of controlling this “property.”
B. The defense case
Bertha DeLaCruz testified that she had lived in a house with Mireles’s former mother-in-law for a few months in 1996. When she moved out, DeLaCruz was unable to find a fake social security card with her name on it, and presumes she left it at the house. DeLaCruz had never worked at the packing company where Mendez and Mireles worked, and she did not know Mendez.
Officer Johnson testified that he responded to the domestic violence call made by Mireles on July 17, 2006. He did not observe any injuries on Mireles’s body or face. Officer Johnson believed that Mireles was untruthful and documented that in his report. He formed that opinion after speaking with Mendez, then reinterviewing Mireles. Mendez told Officer Johnson that Mireles had scratched him and that he was the victim. Officer Johnson felt that Mireles was untruthful because she first said that Mendez slapped her, then said that he punched her, and then that he choked her. The officer believed that Mireles kept escalating what had happened when it appeared that “she wasn’t going to get her way.”
Mendez did not testify.
C. Verdict and sentence
On May 8, 2007, the jury convicted Mendez of six counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 1-4, 14, 15), two counts of dissuading a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); counts 5, 13), one count of aggravated trespass (§ 602.5, subd. (b); count 7), three counts of violating a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); counts 8, 10, 18), one count of attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 11), and one count of threat of violence (§ 422; count 17). Mendez was acquitted of two counts of first degree burglary (§ 459; counts 6, 12) and one count of violating a protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 9). The jury also found Mendez not guilty of one count of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of battery on a cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 16).
Mendez was sentenced to a total term of 14 years, consisting of a middle term of seven years for attempted murder (count 11), two consecutive middle terms of three years on two counts of dissuading a witness (counts 5, 13), and a consecutive term of one year (one-third the middle term) on one of the assault charges (count 1). The trial court imposed concurrent middle terms of three years on the other five counts of assault (counts 2-4, 14, 15), a concurrent term of one year in county jail for aggravated trespass (count 7), concurrent terms of one year in county jail for three counts of violating a protective order (counts 8, 10, 18), a concurrent term of one year in county jail for battery on a cohabitant (count 16) and a concurrent middle term of two years for threat of violence (count 17). The trial court stayed all of the concurrent sentences pursuant to section 654.
II. Discussion
Mendez argues that the court erred in excluding the testimony of two witnesses, Joseph Villalobos and Jessica Moncada, he intended to call at trial. He claims these two witnesses would have directly challenged Mireles’s credibility as they would have testified regarding previous false charges Mireles had made against them in court proceedings. Mendez contends that their exclusion violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
A. Excluded testimony
Mendez brought motions in limine to allow the testimony of Villalobos, Mireles’s ex-husband, and Moncada. Mendez advised the trial court that Villalobos would testify that, during their “family law/child custody case,” Mireles had accused Villalobos of molesting their children and these “accusations... were never proven to be true.”
With respect to Moncada, Mendez stated that Mireles had unsuccessfully sought a restraining order against Moncada for allegedly trying to harm Mireles and/or her children. However, according to her declaration, Moncada was in the hospital at the relevant time.
The People moved to exclude the testimony of both witnesses.
At a pretrial hearing on the parties’ in limine motions, Mendez argued that Villalobos and Moncada would offer impeachment testimony which would be relevant to Mireles’s credibility. Their testimony would also show Mireles’s “willingness to use the Court system in a way to get what she wants.”
With respect to Villalobos’s testimony, the People argued that the children, not Mireles, had accused Villalobos, and since Mireles’s declaration in the dependency proceeding was based on the children’s accusations, it could not be perjury. The People also objected that Villalobos’s testimony would involve hearsay and privileged material from the dependency proceedings. Allowing his testimony would result in a time-consuming foray into a contentious divorce and custody battle possibly necessitating recalling Mireles and the daughters to testify about the accusations of molestation and physical abuse.
As to Moncada’s testimony, the People argued that she was Villalobos’s niece and had nothing significant to offer, other than Mireles’s failed attempt to get a restraining order.
The trial court made a preliminary ruling that Villalobos could not testify as to what court officials may have said, but reserved ruling on his specific testimony. It warned counsel that it did not intend to retry “the family matter or the dependency,” but that the parties, i.e., Villalobos and Mireles, could describe any incidents that occurred between themselves. With respect to Moncada, the trial court indicated that she could not testify as to the outcome of Mireles’s application for a restraining order, as it would be hearsay, but again reserved its ruling as to her specific testimony.
On April 27, 2007, three days before trial commenced, Mendez elaborated on his offer of proof as to Moncada, stating that Mireles had sought a protective order against Moncada, claiming Moncada had “threatened her and used her vehicle in an attempt to ‘run her down.’ ” Moncada would testify that this could not have happened, because on the day in question, Moncada was under a doctor’s orders not to drive.
On the first day of trial Mireles was cross-examined regarding the accusations she made against Moncada. Mireles was asked if she had ever told a judge that Moncada had tried to run her over and had tried to take her children. Mireles responded that she had done so and further said that these accusations were true.
A few days later, the trial court ruled that Villalobos could not testify about his “ongoing family feud,” including the molestation and abuse accusations made against him. His testimony was excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 as “misleading, likely to confuse the jury, and any relevancy by any undue consumption of time [sic].”
The trial court also excluded Moncada’s testimony. In making its ruling the trial court noted that, before trial, it was under “the impression [Moncada] was in the hospital” on the day Mireles claimed she tried to run her over, “and that’s why I was allowing her to testify.” Instead, Moncada “was ordered to be on bed rest which doesn’t necessarily preclude her from being out and about.” Mendez responded that Moncada “had an emergency C-section on June 9th, 2005 and [was] ordered not to drive until June 23, 2005 and did not drive until after that date.” The trial court noted that there was “a big [difference] from being in the hospital” to being under a doctor’s orders not to drive. The court excluded the testimony “under Evidence [Code section] 352, and the fact that there’s not a [sic] clear evidence to show that she was not able to drive as compared to being in the hospital,... we are going to get down in to the plain old he said she said type [of] thing and that will be an undu[e] consumption of time, [and] confuse the jury.”
B. Standard of review
Evidence Code section 352 provides as follows: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Such an exercise of discretion shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that such discretion was exercised in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.) “ ‘[T]he latitude [Evidence Code] section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad. The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.’ ” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 301.)
C. The trial court properly excluded the testimony of Villalobos and Moncada
Mendez’s reliance on People v. Burrell-Hart (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 593 (Burrell-Hart), People v. Wall (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 978 (Wall), People v. Adams (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 10 (Adams), and People v. Randle (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 286 (Randle), is misplaced.
In Burrell-Hart, the defense wanted to prove that the complaining witness had a history of making false allegations of rape or attempted rape. The witness alleged that sometime after she had a disagreement with defendant at the bar where they both worked, defendant went to her home and beat her and raped her. (Burrell-Hart, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 596.) The accusation against the defendant was strikingly similar to an accusation the witness had made to a coworker about another man just a few days or weeks before. (Ibid.) The witness confirmed the substance of the accusation at the time of trial but denied having told the coworker about it. (Id. at p. 598.) The appellate court considered the evidence particularly probative given the similarity between the two allegations. (Id. at p. 599.) In addition, since the coworker would testify to what the witness had told her, the evidence also established a prior inconsistent statement by the witness. (Id. at p. 598.)
In Wall, supra,95 Cal.App.3d 978, defense counsel represented that the victim’s ex-boyfriend would testify that she once threatened to falsely accuse him of rape. (Id. at p. 983.) The court allowed the testimony but later erroneously struck it and advised jurors to disregard it because the court believed that the prior instance of the victim’s conduct was not admissible to impeach her credibility. (Ibid.) On appeal, the court held that in a rape prosecution, specific instances of nonsexual conduct are admissible to impeach credibility if they have a tendency to disprove the truthfulness of a witness’s testimony. (Id. at pp. 984-989.)
In Adams, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 10, the defense sought to establish that the victim agreed to have sex with the defendant in exchange for drugs, but when the defendant reneged on their arrangement, she accused him of rape. (Id. at p. 16.) In support of this theory, the defense proffered evidence that the victim had previously falsely accused someone of rape, but that evidence was excluded. (Ibid.) Because there were no eyewitnesses to the purported rape, resolution of the case hinged upon the jury’s assessment of the credibility of both the victim and the defendant. (Id. at p. 19.) Other defense witnesses had testified that the victim had a “bad reputation” for being truthful. (Id. at p. 15.) The appellate court reversed, finding that the exclusion of the evidence was in error. (Id. at p. 19.)
Finally, in Randle, supra,130 Cal.App.3d 286, the victim testified that she met the defendant at a bar, they danced, and then he dragged her into the men’s room and forced her to orally copulate him. He said the act was consensual and denied using force. (Id. at pp. 290-291.) In a brief discussion that does not reveal defendant’s offer of proof, the appellate court held that “[t]he trial court committed error in excluding testimony that on two prior occasions at the same bar restaurant [the victim] had falsely complained of being a victim of purse snatch and of having been kidnapped. Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a)(1), authorizes the admission of evidence of the alleged victim’s character or trait of character--including evidence of specific acts--if offered by the defendant to show prior conduct of the victim in conformity with such character or trait of character.” (Id. at pp. 295-296.)
In each of the cases described above, there was either no dispute that the prior accusations made by the victim were false, or that the victim had an established, verifiable reputation of being dishonest. Furthermore, the prior accusations at issue in Burrell-Hart, Adams and Wall were so similar to the accusations against the particular defendant in each of those cases that the similarity itself tended to support the contention that the accusations were fabrications. In the instant case, the prior accusations are not similar, and there is at least some dispute about their falsity.
This case is more analogous to People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447 (Tidwell), where the defendant, accused of rape, sought to introduce evidence that the victim had made prior false complaints of rape. The victim had never recanted those prior rape complaints, one of which involved an unidentified assailant. (Id. at pp. 1453-1454.) Defendant was able to locate and secure the presence in court of the alleged assailant from the other incident, but that individual, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, invoked his right to remain silent and was thus unavailable as a witness. (Id. at p. 1454.) After discussing with counsel other means of introducing evidence of the victim’s prior rape complaints, including calling counselors, police officers, and others, the trial court excluded the evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. (Tidwell, supra, at p. 1454.) The appellate court affirmed, stating “inferences could be drawn either way from the circumstances of the prior incidents and [the victim]’s statements concerning the incidents. In addition to the weaknesses in the evidence concerning falsity..., admitting the evidence would have resulted in an undue consumption of time as the defense attempted to bolster its view and the prosecution introduced evidence that [one of the alleged assailants] had raped another female student.” (Id. at p. 1458.)
In this case, Mireles’s accusations against Villalobos and Moncada were not at all similar to that which she claimed had occurred with Mendez. Therefore, the value of the evidence as impeachment would depend entirely upon proof that the accusations against Villalobos and Moncada were false. Villalobos and Moncada taking the witness stand and denying those accusations would not constitute conclusive, let alone compelling, proof of their falsity. Consequently, the focus of the trial would shift to battles over the subsidiary issues raised in the otherwise unrelated family law and dependency proceedings, as well as Mireles’s efforts to obtain a restraining order against Moncada. These battles would necessitate the consumption of considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury. (See People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1097.) Further, the impeachment evidence would be subject to rebuttal by evidence (assuming there was any) that Villalobos and Moncada did the things Mireles accused them of doing. (See People v. Bothuel (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 581, 587-588, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 347-348.)
Even if we were to agree that Villalobos and Moncada should have been permitted to testify, we would conclude the error was harmless. Mendez presented a good deal of other evidence attacking Mireles’s credibility, such as the testimony of Officer Johnson, as well as the ostensibly contradictory testimony elicited from Mireles on cross-examination. Further, the prosecution’s evidence against Mendez was strong and the outcome of the case was not entirely dependent on Mireles’s credibility, since her trial testimony was corroborated by several other witnesses and evidence. On this record, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Mendez would have been reached had the trial court allowed Villalobos and Moncada to testify. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, and the exclusion of the testimony did not deprive Mendez of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J.