Opinion
Case No. 23-198691
09-18-2024
The People of the State of New York v. Robert Mendell
For the People: Sandra Doorley, Monroe County District Attorney, By Kaleigh Wurz, Asst. District Attorney For the Defense: Julie Cianca, Monroe County Public Defender By Rachel Davis, Asst. Public Defender
Unpublished Opinion
For the People: Sandra Doorley, Monroe County District Attorney,
By Kaleigh Wurz, Asst. District Attorney
For the Defense: Julie Cianca, Monroe County Public Defender
By Rachel Davis, Asst. Public Defender
ROBERT L. COOK HENRIETTA TOWN JUSTICE
Defendant Robert Mendell was arrested on November 12, 2023 and charged with Driving While Ability Impaired by a Drug in violation of VTL §1192(4), Moving from a Lane Unsafely in violation of VTL §1128(A), Driving with Driver's View Obstructed in violation of VTL 1213(A), and an Insufficient Turn Signal in violation of VTL §1163(B). He was arraigned on January 4, 2024, at which time he entered pleas of not guilty to all charges.
Following motion practice, probable cause and suppression hearings concerning seized evidence, statements made to law enforcement, and the blood draw were held on August 28, 2024. Testimony was received from Monroe County Sheriff's Deputy John Minster.
This decision and order constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At 5:36 PM on November 12, 2023, Deputy Minster observed Defendant's northbound vehicle drift into the oncoming southbound lane several times and make a swerving right-hand turn with an insufficient turn signal. He then effected a traffic stop, but Defendant did not stop right away; he took 3 to 5 seconds longer than normal to stop.
Upon stopping, Defendant immediately exited his vehicle. He was irate and shouting at the Deputy, who also exited his vehicle. Deputy Minster testified that as he approached Defendant he had his hand on his undrawn weapon, called for backup, and ordered Defendant to get back in his car to which he complied. He further testified that upon the traffic stop due to observed traffic violations, Defendant was not free to leave.
Upon approaching Defendant's vehicle, Deputy Minster noticed multiple signs of possible impairment. Defendant was very sweaty; his eyes were glassy and bloodshot; his speech, though understandable, was slow and raspy. His mood varied from irate and combative to emotional and crying. Defendant explained where he was going and why he believed his driving was impacted: picking up girlfriend, talking on phone, mechanical issues with his tire rims, and having a bad day. The Deputy questioned Defendant about whether he was intoxicated. He observed what he believed to be a crack pipe in plain view in the vehicle, which was later confirmed in a search of Defendant's vehicle.
At 5:54 PM, Deputy Minster asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle for field sobriety tests. Defendant agreed to do so. Defendant failed three tests: Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Walk and Turn, and the One Leg Stand. Defendant also consented to and took a prescreen breath test, which displayed a Blood Alcohol Count of.00%. Deputy Minster concluded that Defendant was impaired by a drug and placed him under arrest at 6:05 PM.
He was then taken to the Sheriff's B Zone Station for further processing. He was Mirandized at 7:02 PM, waived his rights (People's Exhibit 1), and admitted to having taken narcotics earlier in the day. He was evaluated by the Drug Recognition Evaluator, who determined that Defendant was unable to operate a vehicle safely due to drug impairment. He was then transported to Strong Memorial Hospital for a blood draw, which took place at 9:25 PM, upon his consent (People's Exhibit 2). It confirmed his impairment.
PROBABLE CAUSE AND SUPPRESSION OF TANGIBLE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that Deputy Minster lacked probable cause for the traffic stop and subsequent arrest. The People maintain otherwise.
Deputy Minster's observation of Defendant's vehicle drifting several times into the oncoming traffic lane, making a swerving right turn with inadequate signaling provided reasonable cause to stop his vehicle for traffic violations. The Deputy's subsequent observations provided a reasonable basis to briefly detain the Defendant for questioning. (People v Bennett, 70 N.Y.2d 891, 893, 519 N.E.2d 289, 524 N.Y.S.2d 378 [1987]). Defendant was somewhat slower to stop his vehicle than normal when directed to pull over. After stopping he exhibited numerous signs of possible substance impairment: very sweaty; glassy and bloodshot eyes; slow and raspy speech; and erratic emotions. A presumed crack pipe was observed in plain view. Defendant's failure of the field sobriety tests provided probable cause for Defendant's arrest and the search of his automobile incident to that arrest. All tangible evidence, including the crack pipe, discovered upon the search is admissible at trial. (Id.)
SUPPRESSION OF STATEMENTS
The Defendant argues that his statements to law enforcement should be suppressed from entry at trial. He claims that he was effectively in custody upon the traffic stop at 5:36 PM and should have been advised of his Miranda rights at that time rather than at 7:02 PM. The People counter that Defendant was not detained before being placed under arrest at 6:05 PM and that any questioning of Defendant prior to receiving his rights was investigatory only, not custodial interrogation.
"To ascertain custodial status, we must consider 'whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing could have believed that he or she was not free to leave' (People v Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 129, 933 N.E.2d 239, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96 [2005]), and whether there has been a 'forcible seizure which curtails a person's freedom of action to the degree associated with a formal arrest' (People v Morales, 65 N.Y.2d 997, 998, 484 N.E.2d 124, 494 N.Y.S.2d 95 [1985], citing Berkemer v McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L E.2d 317 [1984]; see also People v Bennett, 70 N.Y.2d 891, 894, 519 N.E.2d 289, 524 N.Y.S.2d 378 [1987] ['When a seizure of a person does not constitute a restraint on his or her freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest, Miranda warnings need not be given']." People v. Cabrera, 41 N.Y.3d 35, 52, 230 N.E.3d 1082, 207 N.Y.S.3d 18 [2023]).
Upon the traffic stop, Deputy Minster approached the Defendant who had exited his vehicle with his hand on his undrawn weapon, called for backup, and ordered the Defendant back into his vehicle. Precisely when backup arrived is not clear from the record or testimony, but at some point, one or more additional officers arrived at the scene. Most telling, Deputy Minster testified that from the time Defendant was stopped, he was not free to leave. The implication is that Deputy Minster viewed the detention of Defendant to be for more than routine investigatory questioning. That implication, would not have been lost on the Defendant. Under the totality of these circumstances, any reasonable person would have concluded that he was under arrest. Defendant's freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with an arrest. He should have been Mirandized upon the traffic stop at 5:36 PM.
The Court finds that all Defendant's statements made to law enforcement prior to waiving his Miranda rights at 7:02 PM should be suppressed.
Despite the suppression of his pre- Miranda statements, his post- Miranda statements are not suppressed. "[W]e would note that the Supreme Court has held that this [suppressed statements made prior to issuance of Miranda warnings] would not bar admission of a statement made after the required warnings are administered (Oregon v Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285 )." (People v. Witherspoon, 66 N.Y.2d 973, 974-975, 489 N.E.2d 758, 498 N.Y.S.2d 789 [1985]).
SUPPRESSION OF THE BLOOD DRAW RESULTS
The Defendant argues that the results of the blood analysis should be suppressed as an unconstitutional search and seizure because the blood draw failed to comport with the requirements of VTL §1194. Defendant wasn't given the required refusal warnings, and the blood was not drawn within 2 hours of his arrest. The People oppose suppression arguing that Defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw.
Defendant signed the consent to the blood draw at 9:25 PM. His blood was drawn immediately thereafter, more than 2 hours after both his custodial detention at 5:36 PM and the indicated time of arrest of 6:05 PM. In either case, the time of the blood draw exceeds the statutory limit of 2 hours post-arrest contained in VTL §1194(2)(a)(1). However, the 2-hour limit is not relevant if his consent to the blood draw was given "expressly and voluntarily." (People v Odum, 31 N.Y.3d 344, 350, 102 NE 3d 1034, 78 NYS 3d 252 [2018]; People v Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1009, 654 N.E.2d 1213, 630 N.Y.S. 965 [1995]).
In Atkins, the Court found Defendant's consent to be express and voluntary. Although the Defendant's blood was drawn more than 2 hours after arrest, he consented to the draw within 2 hours of his arrest. Atkins, supra at 1008. The Odum Court found the Defendant's consent to the blood draw was involuntary, when it was made after the 2-hour limit had expired and the required refusal warnings provided prior to his consent were inaccurate. Odum, supra at 351.
The People bear the heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of a consent . (People v Skardinski, 24 A.D.3d 1207, 1208, 807 N.Y.S.2d 232 [4th Dept, 2005]; People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 128, 347 N.E.2d 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215 [1976]). The Skardinski Court found the People failed to meet their burden. Defendant failed to respond to a State Trooper's warnings. Consent was then obtained on a hospital form by a nurse. There was no indication on the record that the Defendant understood that she could refuse consent. Skardinski, supra. In a remarkably similar case, "the defendant was never advised as to his right to refuse to permit the blood draw. In addition, it was the nurse and not the officer that discussed the purpose of the test," resulting in the Court ruling that the People had not met "their burden proving the voluntariness of the purported consent." (People v Amos, 46 Misc.3d 1205[A], 9 N.Y.S.3d 594, 2015 NY Slip Op 50002 [U] [Webster Just Ct, 2015]; cf. People v Burns, 13 Misc.3d 1208[A], 824 N.Y.S.2d 756, 2006 NY Slip Op 51731 [Nassau Dist Ct, 2006]) [blood draw consent deemed voluntary unless coerced].
In the instant case, Deputy Minster obtained Defendant's consent more than 2 hours after his arrest. There is no indication in the record or in Deputy Minster's testimony that refusal warnings were given to the Defendant, that the purpose of the blood draw was explained to him, or that he understood that he could refuse the blood draw. Accordingly, it cannot be said that his signed consent was express and voluntary.
Defendant's motion to suppress the results of and any reference to the blood draw is granted.