Opinion
B190797
5-4-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HOVANES MELIKSETIAN, Defendant and Appellant.
Gerald Peters, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar, Jason C. Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appellant Hovanes Meliksetian appeals his conviction, after a nonjury trial, of stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and first degree burglary (§ 459). He was sentenced to the middle term of four years in prison for the burglary conviction, with a concurrent two-year term for the stalking conviction and a stayed three-year term for the assault conviction. Contrary to appellants contentions, the stalking charge was filed before the statute of limitations ran and is supported by substantial evidence.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS
In 1993, appellant and Raisa Gevorkyan became friends and then began dating. When she learned several months later that appellant was married, she wanted to end their relationship. However, appellant kept pursuing her, and she continued seeing him. Appellant constantly followed her and put her in embarrassing situations. For "many years" appellant came by Gevorkyans residence and yelled obscenities, standing outside her residence from morning to night. Appellant also threatened to damage any car she might purchase without his assistance.
On seven or eight occasions, appellant struck Gevorkyan on her face and head, using either his open hand or a closed fist. On one such occasion, five years after they began dating, appellants assault left a large bruise on her left cheek. She also sustained bruises on her upper arms from appellants grabbing and shaking her. Gevorkyan continued seeing appellant because he threatened "all the time" to kill her if she decided to "even try to drop" him. She did not contact the police because she was ashamed, and because appellant threatened to kill her children by blowing up their cars with some "liquid" in the gas tanks. Gevorkyan feared for the safety of her family.
At some point in 2001 or 2002, appellant displayed an 18-inch knife and threatened to kill Gevorkyan with it if she stopped seeing him. Because of appellants actions, Gevorkyan moved and changed her telephone number four times over a period of approximately nine years. However, appellant always managed to find her.
In the weeks preceding October 13, 2005, Gevorkyan and appellant had disputes concerning his fixing her car. At approximately 2:00 p.m. on October 13, appellant entered her apartment through an unlocked door. He approached her from behind, started yelling and screaming, and repeatedly struck her on the head and back with a heavy object. Appellant threatened Gevorkyan, called her a "whore," and said "fuck your family," and "fuck your whole clan." Appellant ran away, and Gevorkyan blacked out for several minutes.
Gevorkyan felt weak and dizzy but managed to drive to the nearby home of relatives. Appellant drove up next to her, gestured, and yelled at her. As Gevorkyan then drove home, she realized her back was bleeding. Her neighbors contacted the paramedics and the police. Gevorkyan was taken to a hospital, where she received approximately 10 stitches for puncture wounds on her back. She also had several swells on her head. Subsequently, appellant telephoned her approximately six times in attempt to dissuade her from coming to court.
Gevorkyans daughter, Stella, testified that appellant and her mother had "more or less" a good relationship for "a couple of years." But then Stella observed them "fighting all the time." Her mother became upset whenever appellant came over and implored him not to call her anymore and not to "show up here anymore." In 1996, Gevorkyan told Stella that appellant was "a very dangerous man and Im afraid of him." Appellant would persistently call Gevorkyan and come to see her against her wishes. Several times, he simply stood outside her residence. In 2003 or 2004, Stella noticed bruises on Gevorkyans upper left arm and left cheek. Gevorkyan said that appellant had inflicted those injuries by pushing her. Gevorkyan also attributed the wounds she suffered on October 13, 2005, to appellant.
Stella did not attempt to obtain a restraining order against appellant to protect her mother because "even though hes a bad person, [we thought] he could change and we felt somewhat sorry for him." As Stella explained, "We told him many times that youre not a little boy anymore. Youre a grown up man and we simply feel sorry for you." However, Stella later realized that not seeking a restraining order "was our great mistake." Stella acknowledged that although she consistently told her mother to break up with appellant, she "sort of grew to live with" the relationship between appellant and her mother.
Appellant testified in his defense at trial. He denied attacking Gevorkyan on October 13, 2005, owning an 18-inch knife, and threatening her with the knife. Appellant suggested Gevorkyans puncture wounds were self-inflicted, possibly as a form of treatment for asthma. Appellant denied ever coming to Gevorkyans apartment and yelling obscenities, though they often had weekly arguments and he telephoned Gevorkyan after she told him not to. Appellant admitted on occasion waiting near Gevorkyans residence, but asserted he did so at her suggestion to conceal their meetings from Stella. According to appellant, Gevorkyan hit him and threw things at him, causing him to defend himself. Appellant further claimed that on October 12, 2005, he was arrested after Gevorkyans relatives attacked him and thus was supposedly in jail the next day—the day Gevorkyan was attacked in her apartment.
DISCUSSION
Contrary to appellants contentions, the stalking charge was filed before the statute of limitations ran, and his conviction of that offense is supported by substantial evidence.
Statute of limitations
With some exceptions inapplicable here, "prosecution for an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison shall be commenced within three years after commission of the offense." (§ 801.) Ordinarily, the statute of limitations continues to run until an indictment or information is filed. (§§ 803, 804; see People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 764.)
The crime of stalking, which is punishable by imprisonment, "is self-defined to require a course of conduct." (People v. Zavala (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 758, 769.) As indicated by its statutory definition, stalking may be established by evidence of harassment, entailing a "course of conduct" consisting of "two or more acts occurring over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose," coupled with a "credible threat," meaning "a threat implied by a pattern of conduct" intended to place the victim in fear for her or her familys safety. (§ 646.9, subds. (a), (e)-(g).)
In the present case, the evidence at trial established that after 1993 appellant continuously harassed Gevorkyan for many years. That period of stalking included appellants infliction of injuries upon Gevorkyan in 2003 or 2004 (as indicated by Stellas testimony), and did not conclude until October 13, 2005, when appellant attacked Gevorkyan and then pursued her by car. Less than two months later, on December 6, 2005, the information was filed charging appellant with stalking and other offenses.
The evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, established that after December 6, 2002, appellant both repeatedly harassed Gevorkyan and made a credible threat with the intent to place her or her family in reasonable fear for their safety. Accordingly, since the requisite elements of the offense occurred within three years prior to the filing of the information, which occurred just months after appellants pattern of criminal conduct ended, appellant was properly prosecuted within the required three-year limitations period.
Substantial evidence
Equally unavailing is appellants contention that his stalking conviction should be reversed because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred during the time frame alleged in the information, November 1, 2002, and October 13, 2005. Appellant properly concedes that "there is abundant evidence that, in general, [he] followed or harassed Gevorkyan." However, he claims there is no evidence he did so, or made a credible threat to Gevorkyan or her family, between the dates alleged in the information and that his conviction thus denied him due process.
To the contrary, the record establishes substantial evidence—"`evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value" (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129)—that appellant stalked Gevorkyan "[o]n or between November 1, 2002, and October 13, 2005," as alleged in the information. Gevorkyan testified that appellants harassment of her included repeated acts of violence that resulted in bruises on her cheek and arms. Her daughter observed such bruises on Gevorkyan in 2003 or 2004. Moreover, testimony by both women established that on October 13, 2005, appellant assaulted Gevorkyan and threatened to kill her. He then continued the stalking by following her in his car and gesturing and yelling at her. The facts thus provide substantial evidence that appellant stalked Gevorkyan during the period of time charged in the information.
Finally, since we have addressed appellants two contentions on the merits, it is unnecessary to discuss his alternative claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise those issues at trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.