Opinion
B189453
12-11-2006
Barbara Michel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant, Jose Luis Mejia, appeals from his convictions for: methamphetamine possession (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); cocaine base possession (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor providing false identifying information to a police officer. (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a).) Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied his section 1538.5 suppression of evidence motion. We affirm.
We apply the following standard of review: "`"An appellate courts review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] `The [trial] courts resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review. [Citations.] [¶] The courts resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent review."" (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140, quoting People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182; see also, People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255; People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 ["In determining whether, on the [trial courts factual findings], the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment."]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301.) We view the record in a light favorable to the trial courts ruling. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969; People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 182; Guidi v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 1, 10, fn. 7; People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [appellate court is bound to "view the evidence in the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence"].) The trial courts application of the law to the facts is subject to independent review. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 969; People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 182.)
At the section 1538.5 motion hearing, the prosecution presented evidence regarding defendants detention, search, and arrest. At approximately 3:40 a.m. on January 20, 2005, Los Angeles Police Officer Dax Martin responded to a call concerning a possible burglary of a parked car at a Holiday Inn hotel. Officer Martin was met by three hotel security guards. The security guards directed Officer Martin to a maroon Jeep Cherokee automobile. Officer Martin noticed: the car drivers side door was open; the interior light was lit; and the inside appeared to be ransacked. A security guard said the car belonged to the occupant of room 204 of the hotel. Accompanied by a partner, Officer Martin went to room 204 to conduct a further investigation of the auto burglary. When defendant answered the door, he was told his car may have broken into. Officer Martin asked defendant to come downstairs to check the car and determine whether it had been burglarized.
Defendant got inside the car and looked around. Defendant stated he did not believe anything was missing. Defendant said that, although he had control of the car, it was not his. Officer Martin had not yet conducted a computer search of registration information. However, a license plate check determined the car was not stolen. In order to complete the investigation, defendant was asked his name and birth date. Defendant looked to the ground and hesitated for approximately 10 seconds before responding. Officer Martin found the delay unusual, testifying, "Because your average citizen doesnt need to think about who they are or when they were born." Officer Martin was unable to verify the information given by defendant through the Department of Motor Vehicles records. Officer Martin again asked defendants name and birth date. Defendant then changed his date of birth. Officer Martin found that unusual. Officer Martin was unable to find a match with the new information provided by defendant. Defendant was asked if he might have outstanding warrants. Defendant responded, "`Yes, I might have a couple." Defendant gave two or three different names and birth date combinations. Ultimately, the computer indicated seven outstanding arrest warrants under defendants name and birth date. Thereafter, defendant was placed under arrest. A search of defendants person followed his arrest.
In denying the suppression motion, the trial court noted: "Well, the officer went there in good faith looking for a victim and just wanted to have the car secured. And, as taxpayers, I think that everyone is certainly entitled to have that type of thing done, whether it is 4:00 a.m. or not. [¶] The defendant indicated that it wasnt his car. Something could have been missing that belonged to the car, to the owner, that later would be claimed. [¶] There had to be a report made for the call. So I think the officer—I looked at the clock, and 10 seconds is a long time to think of your name—even at 4:00 a.m. [¶] So I am going to deny the 1538.5. I think that the officers acted as one would expect a professional to act."
The Supreme Court explained: "The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 353.) Its purpose is to `safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528.)" People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384.) The Supreme Court has also held: "When an arrest is made it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . In addition it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction." (Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763; see also United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235; People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742; People v. Ingham (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 326, 330-331; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Illegally Obtained Evidence, §§ 143-193, pp. 768-827.)
Citing to Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497-498 and Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27, defendant argues that he was unjustifiably detained and searched. In the alternative, defendant argues that he was detained when he hesitated in giving his name.
His willing agreement to accompany the officers to his car means that no seizure of the person for Fourth Amendment purposes occurred. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328; Ford v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 112, 116, 126; People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1251, 1253-1254; In re Gilbert R. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1124-1125; People v. Capps (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1116, 1120-1121; People v. Profit (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 849, 856-857, 863-877.) Officer Martins request for identifying information likewise did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt County (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 185 ["a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment"]; INS v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216 ["interrogation relating to ones identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure."].) Viewed objectively, when defendant failed to correctly provide his name, the officers suspicions reasonably could have been aroused so as to permit them to temporarily detain him. (Hayes v. Florida (1985) 470 U.S. 811, 816; Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 146.) Defendants subsequent providing false information justified his arrest. (§ 148.9, subd. (a); People v. Christopher (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418, 428-429, 433-434; In re Ivan J. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 27, 32.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
ARMSTRONG, J.
KRIEGLER, J. --------------- Notes: All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.