Opinion
F087102
07-31-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL MEJIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Derek K. Kowata, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Dina Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Order file Date August 20, 2024
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. BF171504A. Brian M. McNamara, Judge.
Derek K. Kowata, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Dina Petrushenko, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MODIFICATION OF OPINION AND DENIAL OF REHEARING
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion herein filed on July 31, 2024, be modified as follows: 1. On page 14, in the first full paragraph, the first sentence is deleted and replaced with:
Based on the fact the trial court exercised its discretion and chose to impose a single indeterminate term of 15 years to life, even when it had the authority at defendant's initial sentencing hearing to impose two consecutive indeterminate terms, trial counsel may have reasonably determined that under the circumstances, an objection to imposition of the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)), a request for a more specific record of the court's reasons for declining to strike the enhancement, or a request for an express ruling on the endangerment to public safety would not have been fruitful.
This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
WE CONCUR: SMITH, J. SNAUFFER, J.
OPINION
LEVY, A.P.J.
THE COURT [*]
INTRODUCTION
On November 24, 2017, defendant Daniel Mejia, while driving under the influence of alcohol, collided into a vehicle causing two deaths and significant injuries to a third individual. Defendant was convicted of numerous offenses arising from the collision. The trial court initially sentenced defendant to a determinate term of seven years, with a consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
We discuss in detail below all the offenses and enhancements by which defendant was convicted.
In an unpublished opinion, we vacated defendant's original sentence and remanded for resentencing because defendant was "entitled to the retroactive benefits of Assembly Bill [No.] 518 [(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518)]." (People v Mejia (Nov. 29, 2022, F081568 (Mejia I).) Thereafter, at defendant's resentencing, defense counsel argued for the trial court to impose a sentence for the voluntary manslaughter, rather than the 15-years-to-life term for the murder. The court disagreed and sentenced defendant to the original determinate term of seven years, with a consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
Assembly Bill 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a), to provide: "An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) Previously, "the sentencing court was required to impose the sentence that 'provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment' and stay execution of the other term. ... [S]ection 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence." (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.)
On appeal, defendant contends "[t]he trial court abused its discretion in failing to recognize that it had discretion to dismiss the great bodily injury enhancement under section 1385 and further in failing to decide whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety, and remand for resentencing is required." As both parties agree, trial counsel did not specifically argue for dismissing the great bodily injury enhancement at defendant's resentencing and thus, this claim is forfeited on appeal. However, to avoid the forfeiture rule, defendant alternatively argues he "was denied effective assistance of counsel as there could be no tactical purpose for not requesting that the [trial] court dismiss the [great bodily injury] enhancement."
Because the appellate record does not enable us to conclude defendant's trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, we reject this claim. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On March 2, 2020, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), counts 1 &2); two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter (§ 191.5, subd. (a), counts 3 &4), both with the special allegation he proximately caused death or great bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558); driving under the influence of alcohol causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a), count 5), with the special allegations he proximately caused death or great bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558), he caused great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subds. (a), (d)), and his blood-alcohol content exceeded 0.15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578); driving under the influence of alcohol with a 0.08 percent blood-alcohol content causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count 6), with the special allegations he proximately caused death or great bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558), he caused great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subds. (a), (d)), and his blood-alcohol content exceeded 0.15 percent (Veh. Code, § 23578.)
All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Subsequently, as to count 1, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life. As to count 2, the court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life, to run concurrent with count 1. As to count 5, the court sentenced defendant to the middle term of two years, plus an additional five-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)), for a total term of seven years to be served consecutive to count 1. As to counts 3, 4, and 6, the court sentenced defendant to multiple terms and imposed sentences for several enhancements and allegations, but stayed these sentences pursuant to section 654. The total term imposed was a determinate term of seven years, plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
As to count 5, the trial court stayed the remaining enhancements and allegations pursuant to section 654 and California Rules of Court, rule 4.447.
A timely appeal followed. In his initial appeal, defendant made several contentions, including that "this case should be remanded for resentencing in light of the passage of [Assembly Bill 518]." (Mejia I, supra, F081568.) In an unpublished opinion, we concluded defendant was "entitled to the benefit of Assembly Bill 518" because his "judgment [was] not yet final because his appeal [was] presently before us." (Ibid.) Therefore, we vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing.
Thereafter, on October 6, 2023, the trial court resentenced defendant. The court stated it understood its newfound discretion, but decided to impose the same sentence, which was a total determinate term of seven years, plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 15 years to life. A second timely appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are taken from the statement of facts in our prior opinion in Mejia I, supra, F081568, which is included in the clerk's transcript of the underlying appeal:
"During the afternoon of November 24, 2017, Juan drove a white [SUV] southbound on Highway 99 with his wife, Karla M., and his five-year old son, A.M. and three-year old daughter, Z.M. During this time, Juan pulled over with a flat tire on the left side of the highway. Juan turned on the [SUV]'s hazard lights and stepped out of the vehicle to repair the flat tire, while Karla, A.M., and Z.M. remained inside. As Juan fixed the tire, a black ... truck hit the parked [SUV] from behind causing it to catch fire. Juan ran over to the [SUV] to try and help his family.
"Subsequently, Karla and Z.M. were taken to the hospital. Z.M. suffered a fractured hip and injuries to her left and right leg[s]. A.M. also suffered injuries, but died en route to the hospital. Karla was transported to the hospital with internal injuries, and eventually died at the hospital. [¶] ••• [¶]
"Jaime R. drove southbound on Highway 99 when he observed a black truck speeding close to 80 miles per hour, swerving in and out of two lanes, and driving in the dirt next to the road. He noticed the truck's driver was a Hispanic male with short hair. Jaime eventually called 911.
"Joshua M. drove southbound on Highway 99 when he observed a 'truck that was cutting other cars off, driving on both lanes in the middle, and also swerving.' Joshua estimated the driver was traveling 100 miles per hour and he observed the truck almost collide with two or more other vehicles. Hortencia S., Joshua's wife, was a passenger in the vehicle when she saw a black truck driving on the frontage road of the highway at a 'very, very fast speed-very alarming, fast speed.' She called 911 and observed the truck for approximately one[ ]minute.
"Crystal B. drove southbound on Highway 99 when she observed a black truck pull in front of her and press its brakes causing her to almost hit the truck from behind. The driver then got out of the truck and Crystal's sister said, 'Go. He's drunk.' The driver 'stumbled out of the truck' and 'when he started walking towards [Crystal's] car[,] • he started leaning on the side of his truck to kind of hold on.' At this point, Crystal called 911.
"Emily H. was a passenger in a vehicle traveling southbound on Highway 99 when she heard her mom say there was a truck driving really fast from behind. She called 911 after observing the truck driving back and forth and 'going super, super fast.'
"Tana C. drove southbound on Highway 99 when she observed a black pickup truck drive up behind her and almost hit her vehicle. She described the pickup's driving as '[v]ery reckless' and observed the truck 'go[] from a lane all the way across, all the way back.' Within two or three minutes, Tana saw a 'cloud of smoke, and [they] came up on the accident.' She observed the collision scene and observed a vehicle flipped over and on fire.
"Jason S. drove northbound on Highway 99 when his wife spotted an accident on the southbound side of the highway. He ended up pulling over to render assistance and observed a white vehicle on its side. Jason noticed a female stuck inside the driver's area of the vehicle. Two men eventually pulled the female out of the vehicle. Additionally, six or seven other people attempted to help a 'little girl' get out of the vehicle. Jason then found a boy and offered assistance by performing 'mouth-to-mouth' on the child.
"Rosa Z. was traveling southbound on Highway 99 when her vehicle was 'almost driven off the road by a truck.' The truck was going very fast and swerving between the lanes. Rosa called 911 because the driver 'was driving so fast and so crazy ... that [she] felt like he was going to hit somebody.'
"Sergeant J. Coleman testified he [was] employed with the Kern County Sheriff's Office. Sergeant Coleman was off duty traveling southbound on Highway 99 when he observed a white [SUV] flip over on the center divider. He then observed a male subject chasing the [SUV]. At this point, Sergeant Coleman got out of the car and attempted to help the passengers inside the [SUV]. He and several other bystanders stabilized the [SUV] to allow others to pull out the occupants of the [SUV]. The woman and child were eventually pulled out of the [SUV].
"Subsequently, Sergeant Coleman located a black ... truck further south on the highway and observed [defendant] inside the truck. Sergeant Coleman contacted [defendant] and noticed he had red, watery eyes and his breath smelled of an alcoholic beverage. Moreover, Sergeant Coleman noticed several beer bottles in the back of the truck and one or two beer bottles inside the truck's cabin. [¶] . . . [¶]
"Paramedic Jamie S. testified she was dispatched at approximately 4:16 p.m. to a traffic collision on Highway 99. Jamie arrived on scene and CPR was performed on a five-year-old boy, later identified as A.M. A.M. was declared dead at the scene of the collision due to a broken neck. Moreover, CPR was performed on an unconscious 23-year-old female, later identified as Karla. Lastly, she noticed a little girl, later identified as Z.M., who had an injury to her leg. Critical Care paramedic Jeffrey G. treated Z.M. and loaded her onto the ambulance. He noticed a laceration on Z.M.'s left foot and above her right eye. At this point, Z.M. was transported to the hospital. Z.M. suffered a thighbone fracture and a laceration to her left foot.
"Jamie also called in a medical evacuation helicopter. Subsequently, part-time flight paramedic Nathan K. was dispatched to the intersection of Highway 99 and State Route 119 regarding a traffic collision. The helicopter flew over the scene and Nathan noticed major damage to the white [SUV]. Nathan unloaded Karla from the ambulance and loaded her onto the helicopter. Karla was transported via helicopter to the hospital and was subsequently treated by the hospital staff. However, Karla was pronounced dead at the hospital due to blunt injuries. [¶] ... [¶]
"Officer M. Askins [was] employed as an officer with the California Highway Patrol (CHP). On November 24, 2017, he was monitoring radio traffic when a call came in regarding a black [truck] driving recklessly all over the road. He then observed a white [SUV] on its side and on fire. Officer Askins noticed A.M. laying on the highway and proceeded to assist him. Eventually, the fire department and medical personnel arrived on scene to take over A.M.'s care. Officer Askins then looked inside [defendant]'s vehicle and observed empty and full beer bottles. During an inventory search, officers located three full and two empty beer bottles inside the truck's cab and a beer container and more beer bottles in the truck's bed.
"CHP Officer C. Peyton subsequently arrived on scene to assist with a sketch diagram and measurements of the collision scene. The sketch showed [defendant]'s vehicle strike Juan's stationary vehicle, which was stopped within the center median. [Defendant] was traveling between 94 and 98 miles per hour and the accelerator was depressed all the way to the floor immediately before the collision.
"Officer Askins then contacted CHP Officer N. Petty who had [defendant] seated to the left of his truck on the ground. Officer Askins contacted [defendant] and noticed slurred speech, red, watery eyes, and a distinct odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting from his breath. [Defendant] stated he was driving southbound on Highway 99 when he fell asleep. At this point, Officer Askins asked [defendant] pre-sobriety test questions and [defendant] admitted to drinking two beers before driving. Additionally, Officer Askins had [defendant] perform field sobriety tests, which included the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Officer Askins noticed a lack of smooth pursuit in each eye, which indicated intoxication. He did not have [defendant] perform any other field sobriety tests because [defendant] complained of leg pain. Officer Askins opined [defendant] was unable to safely operate a vehicle due to his intoxication.
"Officer Askins then placed [defendant] under arrest and transported him to a hospital for a blood draw. He observed a nurse extract [defendant]'s blood at 6:53 p.m. Subsequently, forensic lab technician Mahlea A. analyzed the blood and determined the blood alcohol content was [0].251 percent. Criminalist D. Zimmerman testified an individual with a blood alcohol content of [0].251 percent is impaired and cannot safely operate a motor vehicle." (Mejia I, supra, F081568, pp. 4-8, fn. omitted.)
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 81
Defendant contends "the trial court abused its discretion in failing to recognize that it had discretion to strike the great bodily injury enhancement unless dismissal would endanger public safety pursuant to section 1385 as amended by Senate Bill No. 81 [(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81)]." (Capitalization omitted.) The People contend his claim is forfeited because his trial counsel failed to argue for dismissing the great bodily injury enhancement. Alternatively, to avoid the forfeiture rule, defendant contends that "if this court finds that the failure of [trial] counsel [to] apprise the trial court of the full scope of its discretion under section 1385 . . . forfeited this argument, then [defendant] was denied the effective assistance of counsel." Because defense counsel did not raise this argument in the trial court, we conclude defendant forfeited this argument on appeal.
A. Additional Factual Background
Prior to imposing sentence, trial counsel argued the trial court "ha[d] wide discretion to select different terms and isn't required to impose the longest term and then build from there." Specifically, trial counsel argued the following, in relevant part:
"But I think the Court would be justified in looking at the totality of the circumstances and imposing one of the sentences for the-for the voluntary homicide because-because of all the circumstances in this case. And not necessarily imposing the [l]ife sentence. The Court could impose-I mean just looking at it and looking at, you know, all the different counts that he was convicted of, there [are] numerous ways the Court could slice it and have him-sentencing him to a determinate term that could be 14 years or 18 years or so on. Or the Court could choose to stay the additional seven years that the Court imposed that was consecutive onto the 15 to [l]ife term. There [are] many options that the Court has. So I would urge the Court to-to look at all of those factors and consider imposing a lesser sentence than the Court originally did based on all the circumstances in the case."
In response, the trial court stated the following, in relevant part:
"[Trial counsel] is right. The Court does have all of these opportunities to do this. And so I have two thoughts swirling around in my head here. Two thoughts swirling around in my head. But I do-the one thing I want to hit [trial counsel] with, the Court exercised all of these things the legislature[] actually came up with in between, I'm not saying that, and factored it in. When you say his age, [in] fact-I knew his age. And I factored in his parole date and I thought that was fair given his age and given a parole date and beyond his parole date. Do you see what I mean? So that was factored in completely even though it was now addressed in some part of something good. I have no issue with that. The legislature does what they can do. No issue. But it was actually the Court factored it in way beyond having been told to. Do you see what I mean?
"So when you say that, the Court exercised huge discretion previously. And noted again from [p]robation is the fact that [the] Court could do [counts] one, two consecutive simply because of two separate victims and that [is] what[] [the prosecutor] is making the Court very, very well aware of. There [are] two victims here regardless of how the Court sentenced.... [¶] ... [¶]
"One [factor] I'm going to add [is] the vulnerable nature of this situation. The vulnerability here is certainly vulnerable. Is it beyond being vulnerable. A victim in a[n] outside lane. The Court is going to consider that as [an] aggravating factor here at the moment. There is one there. There is one, two, and three listed. Not a problem with that. [The] Court has discretion to do what it can do there.
"So with that in mind the Court is going to follow [p]robation and impose [the] original sentence as stated apart from one thing and so on. It is minor so I'm not trying to impress anyone. So with that in mind, [I] find the factors in aggravation it does allow me here. I'm now required [to impose the] low term if [defendant] was a youth at the time, which he was, unless the Court finds aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [and] would be contrary to the interests of justice.
"It would be contrary to the interest of justice of in this case simply because the situation which the Court factored in before. The Court did look into everything about the [defendant's] age and I'll say out loud I was very impressed with [him]. And if you notice, the way he spoke he was very deliberate in what he said. There was no-there was a lot of thinking in what he said. And I do appreciate that, sir. I award in the sense that that-the thing that swayed me was the fact that-I believe we didn't want to add another life into this by sending him away for two consecutive [sentences]. That was roughly the Court's thought. Send[ing] [defendant] away forever would be silly given what he represented to the Court at the time. [Trial counsel] the way he handled the case, et cetera. So the Court factored all of that in. To do another mitigating factor on top of that, the imposition at a lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. Given the validity-the Court's position, it has entertained interest of justice at all times for this young man. He's responded. He has responded in the way what I've listened today. I was very impressed ._ Living in a prison environment he has made [the] best [of] what he can do on that. I believe he will continue with that in mind."
At this point, the trial court resentenced defendant.
B. Forfeiture " 'A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise "claims involving the trial court's failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices" if the party did not object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to "cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons." '" (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) "Strong policy reasons support this rule: 'It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. [Citations.]' [Citation.] '"' "The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge's attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal." '" [Citation.]' " (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; accord, People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 239-240; People v French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46.)
" '[D]iscretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.'" (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7.) Absent a substantive change in the law that applies retroactively (e.g., People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431-432; People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 698699), or an extenuating circumstance such as the futility of objecting under the then-governing substantive law (e.g., People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7-8; People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92), neither of which are present here, the policy reasons underlying the forfeiture doctrine fully support its application where a defendant remains silent on an issue in the trial court when sentenced and then seeks to obtain appellate relief based on asserted sentencing errors that could have been raised at the time of sentencing.
Defendant concedes "his trial counsel did not specifically argue for dismissing the great bodily enhancement[,]" but argues "[t]his court should consider the claim on its merits because it affects [his] substantial rights." With that being said, the forfeiture rule applies because Senate Bill 81 became effective one year 10 months before defendant's resentencing date of October 6, 2023. It was imperative for trial counsel to alert the trial court that defendant was entitled to dismissal of the great bodily injury enhancement, absent a court finding that dismissal would endanger public safety. Had trial counsel made this argument below, the court could have properly addressed and developed the record as to this specific issue. However, "a party cannot argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct" (People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 208), and strong policy reasons support application of the rule in the situation presented in this case (People v. Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114).
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Nonetheless, to avoid the forfeiture rule, defendant contends he "was denied effective assistance of counsel as there could be no tactical purpose for not requesting that the [trial] court dismiss the enhancement." We disagree.
1. General Principles
A defendant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, overruled on other grounds in People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10.) To establish such a claim, a defendant must show (1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for counsel's error, a different result would have been reasonably probable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (Strickland, at p. 694.)
"Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of counsel's performance], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.) "When a claim of ineffective assistance is made on direct appeal, and the record does not show the reason for counsel's challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation." (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569.) Reversal is permitted" 'only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.'" (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711.) "In light of the deferential standard, appellate courts do not second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight and, for this reason, tactical errors do not generally provide a basis for reversing a conviction." (People v. Clotfelter (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 30, 55; accord, People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.)
2. Applicable Law
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 to add subdivision (c). (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c); Gov. Code, § 9600, subd. (a).) Section 1385, subdivision (c) provides, in part:
"(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.
"(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the [listed] mitigating circumstances ... are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. 'Endanger public safety' means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)-(2).)
The mitigating circumstances listed in subdivision (c) of section 1385 include that "[t]he application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed." (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
3. Analysis
Here, at defendant's sentencing, the trial court had the discretion to impose two consecutive terms of 15 years to life, as to the two separate homicide victims in this case. (See People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 341, fn. 10 ["Section 654 is not applicable where' "one act has two results each of which is an act of violence against the person of a separate individual."' "].) Regardless, trial counsel requested the court "look[] at the totality of the circumstances and impos[e] one of the sentences for the . . . voluntary homicide because . . . of all the circumstances in this case" and "not necessarily impos[e] the [l]ife sentence." The court disagreed, and noted, "The Court did look into everything about the young man's age..... I believe we didn't want to add another life [sentence] into this by sending him away for two consecutive [sentences].... Send[ing] [defendant] away forever would be silly given what he represented to the Court at the time." The court "factored all of that in. To do another mitigating factor on top of that, the imposition at a lower term would be contrary to the interest of justice. Given the validity-the Court's position [is that] it has entertained interest of justice at all times for this young man." Therefore, the court imposed a single indeterminate term of 15 years to life, plus the seven-year determinate term, which included the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)) of five years.
Based on the fact the trial court exercised its discretion and chose to impose a single indeterminate term of 15 years to life, even when it had the authority to impose two consecutive indeterminate terms, trial counsel may have reasonably determined that under the circumstances, an objection to imposition of the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)), a request for a more specific record of the court's reasons for declining to strike the enhancement, or a request for an express ruling on the endangerment to public safety would not have been fruitful. Thus, we must presume trial counsel engaged in that calculus. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690; People v. Clotfelter, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 55.) Therefore, notwithstanding the existence of mitigating circumstances under section 1385, we do not agree with defendant that trial counsel's failure to object or request a more detailed ruling or specific findings was deficient on this record. (Strickland, at p. 690; Clotfelter, at p. 55.)
Finally, we are unpersuaded there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome had it not been for trial counsel's failure to object to the lack of a more specific record of the reasons for declining to dismiss the great bodily injury enhancement. As noted above, the trial court already exercised discretion and chose only to impose one indeterminate term of 15 years to life. The court explained its reasoning that to "[s]end [defendant] away forever would be silly given what he represented to the Court at the time." Therefore, even if trial counsel had objected to the court's imposition of the five-year great bodily injury enhancement, it is not reasonably probable the court would have altered defendant's sentence based on the court's explanation prior to imposition of sentence. Accordingly, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is foreclosed.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
[*] Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.