Opinion
D073711
05-11-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN JAVIER MEJIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard de la Sota, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SWF1301484) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Patrick F. Magers, Judge. Affirmed with directions. Richard de la Sota, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
At trial, it was undisputed defendant Juan Mejia fatally shot Ivan Carrillo. The jury's primary task was to decide whether the crime was first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. The jury returned a first degree murder verdict, and found true the special circumstance allegation that Mejia intentionally killed Carrillo while lying in wait. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The jury also found Mejia personally and intentionally used a firearm in committing the murder. (Id., §§ 12022.53, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The court found Mejia had one serious felony prior and four strike priors. (Id., §§ 667, subds. (a), (e)(2)(A), 1170.2, subd. (c)(2).)
The court sentenced Mejia to life without the possibility of parole for the murder with special circumstances, plus 25 years for the firearm enhancement and serious felony prior.
As his sole appellate challenge, Mejia contends the court erred in failing to modify the model CALCRIM instructions to clarify the subjective provocation standard applicable to reducing first degree murder to second degree murder. This contention is without merit. The jury was properly instructed and no clarification was needed.
We affirm the judgment. We additionally order the abstract of judgment to be corrected to accurately reflect the sentence imposed by the court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In October 2012, a home invasion robbery occurred at the home of Mejia's half-brother Abraham Palacios, during which the perpetrators made threats of violence against Palacios's pregnant girlfriend and 10-year-old niece. Although the police never apprehended the suspects, Mejia and Palacios believed Palacios's friend Carrillo was responsible for the crime. Shortly after the robbery, Palacios accused Carrillo of committing the crime, and Carrillo threatened Palacios's family. Mejia heard this threat and warned Carrillo not to come near his family again. Palacios's family moved after the robbery.
About eight months after the robbery, on June 6, 2013, Palacios's girlfriend saw Carrillo's car in the neighborhood and called Palacios, who called Mejia. The two brothers (Mejia and Palacios) then armed themselves and went to "go look for" Carrillo.
The evidence showed that Carrillo was in the neighborhood because he was visiting his girlfriend, who was housesitting at her parents' home. Carrillo stayed with his girlfriend for about one hour and then left at about 7:00 p.m. As he was leaving, Carrillo began driving in the opposite direction of Palacios's house, and reached a four-way stop. Palacios and Mejia then drove into the intersection, blocking Carrillo's way.
Several witnesses saw what happened. Mejia and Palacios got out of their car and immediately began firing at Carrillo, who was sitting unarmed in his vehicle and had his hands up. Mejia approached the driver's side window. Carrillo said "I'm sorry -- I'm sorry -- I'm sorry." Mejia said, "didn't I . . . tell you [eight months ago] to fucking get away from my family," and then shot Carrillo twice in the head from about one foot away. Mejia told an evaluating psychologist that he fired those last two shots because Carrillo "was not dying and he wouldn't quit."
Mejia and Palacios fired at least 15 bullets. They hit Carrillo six times, three in the head and three on the left side of his body. Carrillo died at the scene. Mejia and Palacios escaped to Mexico. In 2015, Mejia was apprehended. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Mejia admitted spraying Carrillo's vehicle with bullets and fatally shooting Carrillo in the head. He claimed that Carrillo "deserved it. He's . . . really a piece of shit." At the time of trial, Palacios had not been found.
The People charged Mejia with murder, and alleged a lying-in-wait special circumstance. The People also alleged that Mejia personally and intentionally discharged the firearm, and alleged a prior serious felony and four prior strikes. (See Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).)
Mejia did not testify, but his counsel called witnesses to testify about the October 2012 home invasion robbery, and to the fact that Mejia was notified on the afternoon of June 6, 2013 about Carrillo's presence in the neighborhood. Mejia also presented evidence that he suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder based on his witnessing his father's murder when he was about seven years old.
During closing arguments, defense counsel acknowledged the People proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" that "Carrillo was shot to death by both [Palacios] and [Mejia]," but urged the jury to find the crime was voluntary manslaughter based on theories of "imperfect self defense and/or heat of passion." Defense counsel argued that Mejia believed it was necessary to kill Carrillo because he thought Carrillo was a threat to Palacios's family. Defense counsel also argued that Mejia did not act with "deliberation," although "[t]here may have been premeditation."
After considering the evidence and argument, the jury found the prosecution met its burden to establish Mejia committed first degree murder and personally and intentionally used a firearm, and found true the special circumstance allegation that Mejia intentionally committed the murder while lying in wait. The court found true the prior strike and prior serious felony allegations.
DISCUSSION
I. Instructional Error
Mejia contends the court erred by failing to sua sponte provide clarifying instructions to explain that provocation requires only a subjective belief when considering whether first degree murder should be reduced to second degree murder.
A. Legal Principles
A trial court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on the general principles of law on the issues raised by the evidence. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 866 (Rogers).) We independently review the correctness and adequacy of the trial court's instructions, examining whether the court " 'fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law.' " (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) We consider the instructions as a whole and presume the jurors are capable of understanding and correlating the instructions. (Ibid.)
A trial court has a duty to adequately instruct on the law, but "it has no duty to give clarifying or amplifying instructions absent a request." (People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1331 (Hernandez).) Pinpoint instructions—instructions that relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case—are required to be given on request if there is evidence to support the theory, but are not required to be given sua sponte. (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1119; People v. Hill (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1118-1119.)
B. Instructions Given
The court instructed the jury on the elements of first and second degree murder using the standard CALCRIM instructions. (CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521.) These instructions stated that to establish first or second degree murder, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mejia committed "an act that caused the death of another person," and this act was committed with express malice (intent to kill) or implied malice (conscious disregard for life). (CALCRIM No. 520.) On the premeditation first degree murder theory, the court instructed the jury that the People must prove the defendant "acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation," and explained the meaning of these terms, including that "[a] decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated." (CALCRIM No. 521.) This instruction further stated: "The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and the murder is second degree murder." (Ibid.)
The court also instructed the jury on the provocation concept as applied to both second degree murder and manslaughter:
"Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree and may reduce a murder to manslaughter. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second degree murder. Also, consider the provocation in deciding whether the defendant committed murder or manslaughter." (CALCRIM No. 522).The trial court additionally instructed the jury regarding the particular role of the provocation concept as applied to reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion:
"A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.
"The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if: [¶] 1. The defendant was provoked; [¶] 2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his/her reasoning or judgment; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment. [¶] . . . [¶]
"It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up (his) own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition, in
the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from judgment." (CALCRIM No. 570.)
C. Analysis
Mejia contends these instructions did not adequately inform the jury of the appropriate standards because the instructions made it appear that the objective reasonable-person test applicable to voluntary-manslaughter provocation also applied to reducing first degree to second degree murder. He maintains "the jury could have mistakenly believed that if the . . . reasonable person test was not satisfied to reduce the crime to [voluntary] manslaughter, it was not satisfied in determining whether the crime was first or second-degree murder either."
Mejia forfeited the argument by failing to request clarification at trial. (People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 (Jones).) The argument is also unavailing on its merits.
We agree the provocation concept is different in evaluating second degree murder and manslaughter. " '[P]rovocation which is not "adequate" to reduce the class of the offense [from murder to manslaughter] may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after, deliberation and premeditation.' " (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329, overruled on another ground in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200-201.) "If the provocation would not cause an average person to experience deadly passion but it precludes the defendant from subjectively deliberating or premeditating, the crime is second degree murder." (Hernandez, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332.)
But the jury was adequately instructed on these principles. As described above, the court instructed the jury on the general provocation concept and gave an additional instruction on the meaning of voluntary-manslaughter provocation. (CALCRIM Nos. 522, 570.) In these instructions, the court told the jury that provocation is relevant to evaluating whether Mejia committed the killing with the requisite premeditation and deliberation necessary for first degree murder and whether the crime should be reduced to second degree murder or manslaughter. (CALCRIM No. 522.) In giving the voluntary manslaughter instruction, the court informed the jury of the specific meaning of provocation in the voluntary manslaughter context, including that the provocation must have caused a reasonable person to react in a similar manner. (CALCRIM No. 570.) Based on these instructions, a rational jury would have understood the different role that provocation plays in reducing first degree murder to second degree murder and in reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Four years ago, another Court of Appeal addressed the identical contention and reached the same conclusion. (Jones, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 999-1001.) The Jones court explained: "[T]he instructions are correct. They accurately inform the jury what is required for first degree murder, and that if the defendant's action was in fact the result of provocation, that level of crime was not committed. CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 522, taken together, informed jurors that 'provocation (the arousal of emotions) can give rise to a rash, impulsive decision, and this in turn shows no premeditation and deliberation.' [Citation.] As the jury also was instructed, a reduction of murder to voluntary manslaughter requires more. It is here, and only here, that the jury is instructed that provocation alone is not enough for the reduction; the provocation must be sufficient to cause a person of average disposition in the same situation, knowing the same facts, to have reacted from passion rather than judgment." (Id. at p. 1001.)
We agree with this reasoning and find no instructional error.
Further, even assuming the CALCRIM provocation instructions contain an ambiguity that the trial court should have clarified, reversal is not required because any such clarification would not have resulted in a different outcome under either the Watson or Chapman standard. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Mejia's counsel conceded that Mejia may have premeditated the murder, and the evidence of deliberation was overwhelming. When Mejia heard that Carrillo was in Palacios's neighborhood, he and Palacios armed themselves and went out to find Carrillo. When they saw Carrillo's vehicle, they blocked his vehicle in the middle of an intersection, and immediately got out of their car. Without speaking to Carrillo (who was unarmed, had his hands up, and had been driving in the opposite direction from Palacios's house), they sprayed the vehicle with bullets, and when the bullets did not kill Carrillo, Mejia admitted he walked up to Carrillo, who was saying he was sorry, and shot him twice in the head from one foot away, to make sure he would die.
These undisputed facts establish Mejia committed the murder with premeditation and deliberation, and that even if the jury had been given additional instructions that a first degree murder is reduced to second degree if the defendant subjectively acted out of passion or emotions, the jury would have adhered to its rejection of this defense.
Additionally, the jury was instructed that it could find first degree murder based on a premeditation/deliberation theory or on a lying-in-wait theory, and it found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance. Lying in wait is the " ' "functional equivalent" ' " of proof of premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill. (People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1496.) A showing of lying in wait obviates the necessity of separately proving premeditation and deliberation. (Ibid.) Thus, any lack of clarification on the provocation concept would not have affected the verdict. (See People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 75 ["if the jury found murder by lying in wait, provocation was irrelevant because the murder could not be reduced to second degree murder"].)
II. Abstract of Judgment
The trial court orally sentenced Mejia to life without the possibility of parole for the special-circumstance murder conviction, plus a determinate 25-year term for the firearm enhancement and serious-felony prior. The abstract of judgment reflects only a sentence of 25 years to life, and erroneously omits the life-without-possibility-of-parole portion of the sentence. The Attorney General raised this issue in its respondent's brief, and Mejia did not respond in his reply brief.
As set forth below, this clerical error must be remedied to accurately reflect the sentence imposed by the court.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect Mejia's life-without-the possibility-of-parole sentence, in addition to the determinate 25-year term for the firearm enhancement and serious-felony prior. The trial court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HALLER, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. IRION, J.