Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced CountySuper. Ct. No. 30382, John D. Kirihara, Judge.
Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Harris, Acting P.J.; Levy, J.; and Dawson, J.
OPINION
INTRODUCTION AND FACTS
Around 1:00 a.m. on June 16, 2006, Lisa Lopez was awakened by a banging on the front door of the apartment where she was spending the night. Three women who are related to Lopez’s former boyfriend, Ace Vargas, were standing outside the apartment. They wanted Lopez to come outside. Lopez threatened to call the police and they left. Lopez called the police. A police officer reported to the scene. He told Lopez to lock the apartment doors and to call the police if the women returned. Lopez went back to sleep.
About 4:00 a.m. Lopez was awakened by the sounds of footsteps on the gravel outside the apartment and banging on the front door. Lopez got up, called the police, and returned to the bedroom. Appellant Sheri Ann Medeiros and Catrina Vargas were outside. Lopez spoke to them through the bedroom window. Catrina asked Lopez to come outside and talk. Lopez was afraid and refused. A few seconds later, Lopez heard a loud noise and her locked front door swung open. Catrina and appellant entered the bedroom. Appellant was holding a wooden baseball bat in her right hand. Appellant hit Lopez with the bat on her leg, buttocks and head. Alejandro Sanchez, who was also at the apartment, entered the bedroom. Catrina and appellant ran out of the apartment. They were apprehended by a responding police officer while they were in the driveway. A wooden baseball bat was found lying in the grass.
Appellant testified that she and Catrina went to the apartment to talk with Lopez. Appellant took a bat for her own protection. Appellant believed that Lopez wanted them to enter the apartment. She entered the dwelling through an open screen door. She and Lopez began arguing and they got into a physical altercation. Appellant punched Lopez several times in the arm. After Lopez told her that she recently had surgery, appellant stopped hitting her. She did not hit Lopez with the bat or use it.
Appellant was convicted after jury trial of burglary and assault with a deadly weapon; enhancement allegations that she was armed with and personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the burglary were found true. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022, subds. (a)(1) & (b)(1).)
The probation officer recommended that appellant be granted probation. In relevant part, the probation report states that appellant “claimed she used marijuana to treat ‘post-partum depression’ in 1999 for approximately five months. She claimed she used methamphetamine, once, when she was nineteen years old and cocaine twice when she was approximately twenty-four years of age.” The court accepted the probation officer’s recommendation. It found unusual circumstances and suspended imposition of sentence, placing appellant on probation for a period of 36 months. Over defense counsel’s objection, appellant’s probation conditions included the following: (1) submit to warrantless search of her person, vehicle and home; and (2) attend substance abuse counseling if directed to do so by her probation officer. The court determined that the warrantless search condition was appropriate because appellant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offenses. It decided that it was appropriate for the probation officer “to determine whether [appellant] ought to go to substance abuse counseling and, if so, what kind.”
Appellant challenges these two probation conditions as applied to her, arguing that they are not reasonably related to her crimes or future criminality and that the warrantless search condition infringes her right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree and will affirm.
DISCUSSION
The challenged probation conditions are reasonable and constitutional.
The sentencing court possesses broad discretion to determine whether an eligible defendant is suitable for probation and to set reasonable probation conditions. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120-1121.) “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality ….’ [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. omitted.) “Probation conditions have been upheld even though they restrict a probationer’s exercise of constitutional rights if they are narrowly drawn to serve the important interests of public safety and rehabilitation [citation] and if they are specifically tailored to the individual probationer. [Citations.]” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1084.)
In this case, the warrantless search condition is related to the circumstances of the offenses and it serves the interests of public safety and rehabilitation. Appellant broke into an apartment and assaulted Lopez with a baseball bat. The use of a deadly weapon during the commission of the burglary and assault justifies imposition of the search condition. The possibility of search at any time of appellant’s person, car and residence reduces the risk that appellant will possess a weapon or commit a crime with a weapon during the probationary period. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the warrantless search condition both enhances public safety and assists in appellant’s rehabilitation. Therefore, the search is constitutional and reasonable.
The substance abuse treatment condition is equally reasonable. Obviously, illegal drug usage is connected to criminality and hinders rehabilitation. Appellant admitted to the probation officer prior use of marijuana, methamphetamine and cocaine. Given appellant’s self-admitted use of illegal drugs, it was reasonable for the court to determine that substance abuse counseling might assist her rehabilitation. Yet, because appellant’s crimes were not drug-related and she did not admit to current illegal drug usage, the court wisely left the final decision whether appellant would benefit from substance abuse treatment to the supervising probation officer.
No error appears.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.