• 1, 2 It is well settled that when addressing challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, the statute is presumed constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of upholding the statute's validity. ( People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 774, 382 N.E.2d 858, 860; see also People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill.2d 482, 499, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352; People v. Ortega (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1018, 1023, 436 N.E.2d 606, 610.) A court's primary consideration in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent by examining not only the language used in the statute, but also the reason for the law and the evil intended to be remedied. ( La Pointe, 88 Ill.2d at 499, 431 N.E.2d at 352; McPherson, 65 Ill. App.3d at 774, 382 N.E.2d at 860.

"Any recipient, and any person not a recipient who participates in a federal commodity or food stamp program as authorized by Section 12-4.13 of Article XII, who receives surplus foods, food stamps, or other commodities made available by the Federal Government for distribution to needy persons and who sells such foods, food stamps, or other commodities or exchanges them with some other person for another article shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor." A statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. ( People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 356 N.E.2d 8, cert. denied (1977), 429 U.S. 1098, 51 L.Ed.2d 545, 97 S.Ct. 1116; People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 382 N.E.2d 858.) All reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of upholding the validity of the statute. ( Fitzpatrick v. City of Springfield (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 317, 293 N.E.2d 712; People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 382 N.E.2d 858.)

A statute is presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of upholding the statute's validity. ( People v. Ortega (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1018, 1023, 436 N.E.2d 606, 610; People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 774-75, 382 N.E.2d 858, 860; see also People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill.2d 482, 499, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352.) One challenging the statute has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged constitutional violation.

Defendant provides examples of Illinois statutes that have been invalidated for vague terminology. While our appellate court has struck down statutes that made it a crime to have "small quantities" of drugs ( People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772), or to "visit" a gambling house ( City of Peoria v. McMorrow (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 524), the statute being challenged in the case at bar is far more specific. Section 28-1.1 does not prohibit "small quantities" of bets, but provides a threshold level of five bets totaling more than $2,000.

"[A] law fails to meet the requirements of due process if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is or is not prohibited in any given case." People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 775, 382 N.E.2d 858. In applying this principle to the antisolicitation statute, we find that the McPherson standard has been met. Specifically, this statute clearly puts a corporation on notice of what it is prohibited from doing, by providing that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or corporation * * * [t]o solicit * * *."

"In determining legislative intent, a court may examine not only the language used, but also the reason for the law and the evil to be remedied, as well as the objects and purposes of the statute." People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 774, 382 N.E.2d 858. • 2 Defendant first argues that it is the prosecutor who, by filing a petition for the imposition of natural life imprisonment, actually determines the sentence to be imposed.

Moreover, a law fails to meet the requirements of due process if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is or is not prohibited in any given case." People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 775, 382 N.E.2d 858, 860. • 1 Where a first amendment issue exists, a statute is required to possess a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts. ( Smith v. Goguen (1974), 415 U.S. 566, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242.)

• 1 Generally, a statute carries a presumption of constitutionality and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of upholding the statute. ( People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 382 N.E.2d 858.) Furthermore, where a statute has withstood the test of time, there is a strong presumption, although not conclusive, of its validity.

When faced with the issue of statutory interpretation, a court may examine not only the language used in the statute, but also the reason for the new law and the evil to be remedied, as well as the objectives and purposes of the statute. ( People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 382 N.E.2d 858.) Applying these principles, the fact that the legislature used the term "rebuttable presumption" rather than "abuse of discretion" in section 5-5-4.1 indicates that it intended to change the standard to be employed in reviewing sentences. This conclusion comports with the reason for the new law and the evil which it seeks to remedy by eliminating disparate sentences throughout the State for similar types of offenses. If appellate courts continued to defer to the discretion of trial courts whenever a sentence was within the statutory range without regard to whether or not it was appropriate under all the facts and circumstances, then the purpose of the new law would be defeated.

The principal record making and keeping requirement of the Act imposed upon practitioners is that set forth in section 312(d) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1312(d)). In People v. McPherson (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 772, 382 N.E.2d 858, this court ruled that provision to be unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void. Accordingly, section 312(d) cannot be the basis for a determination that the court set forth a continuing offense.