People v. McNulty

4 Citing cases

  1. People v. Tucker

    631 P.2d 162 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 21 times
    In Tucker, we held that an indictment for embezzlement was insufficient where the indictment tracked the statutory language, but failed to allege specifically how the embezzlement was accomplished.

    Unlike other crimes, there are numerous ways in which embezzlement may be committed. See e.g., People v. McNulty, 184 Colo. 274, 519 P.2d 1195 (1974), (where a defendant was charged with failure to pay employee withholding tax during a specified period of time.) Defendant could have been charged with submitting false vouchers, billing counties for non-reimbursible expenses, double-billing expenses, stealing cash from the petty cash fund, converting deposits belonging to a county, or any number of other acts.

  2. People v. Maestas

    606 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1980)   Cited 5 times

    Thus, his claim of lack of specificity in the indictment has no basis in fact upon which he can reasonably assert that he was prejudiced. Cf. People v. Hoehl, 193 Colo. 557, 568 P.2d 484 (1977) (information sufficiently apprised defendant of charges); People v. McNulty, 184 Colo. 274, 519 P.2d 1195 (1974) (indictment sufficient to advise defendant of charges; he was also furnished with a bill of particulars and a transcript of the grand jury's testimony upon which the charges were predicated). II.

  3. People v. Donachy

    196 Colo. 289 (Colo. 1978)   Cited 15 times
    In People v. Donachy, 586 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1978), the Supreme Court of Colorado said: "[I]f the statute does not sufficiently set out the facts which constitute the offense, so that the defendant may have notice with what he is charged, then a more particular statement of facts is necessary."

    The reasoning in Zupancic is applicable to the case at bar and controls the result.The cases relied upon by the People to support the legal sufficiency of this indictment are inapposite because they either declare that an allegation of specific intent need not be included in an indictment, People v. Silvola, 190 Colo. 363, 547 P.2d 1283; People v. Ingersoll, 181 Colo. 1, 506 P.2d 364; Edwards v. People, 176 Colo. 478, 491 P.2d 566, or they deal with sufficiently precise statutes, People v. McNulty, 184 Colo. 274, 519 P.2d 1195 (tax evasion); Digiallonardo v. People, 175 Colo. 560, 488 P.2d 1109 (confidence game). The indictment in the present case charged that the defendant "* * * did unlawfully and feloniously convert such public moneys and property to a use other than the public use authorized by law * * *."

  4. People v. Marlott

    191 Colo. 304 (Colo. 1976)   Cited 12 times
    Requiring a defendant to be sentenced under the criminal statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime

    He maintains that such an instruction was necessary to prevent the jury from drawing any adverse inferences from his failure to present any evidence in his behalf. [4] On many occasions, this court has held that the sufficiency of instructions must be evaluated in the context of the instructions as a whole, and that it is not error to refuse to give a tendered instruction covering the same matter adequately covered in other instructions. See, e.g., People v. Mackey, 185 Colo. 24, 521 P.2d 910 (1974); People v. McNulty, 184 Colo. 274, 519 P.2d 1195 (1974). [5] In this case, on the matter of burden of proof, the trial judge instructed the jury to the effect that the burden of proof is solely upon the People to prove all elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt; that the mere filing of charges against the defendant did not in itself constitute evidence of the guilt of the defendant; that the "presumption of innocence remained with the defendant throughout the trial"; and that the mere number of witnesses appearing for or against a certain proposition did not in itself prove or disprove that proposition.