Opinion
No. 2021-269 S C
05-26-2022
The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Tyler McNeil, Respondent.
Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for appellant. McGuire, Pelaez & Bennett, P.C. (Brett J. Bennett of counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).
Unpublished Opinion
Suffolk County Traffic Prosecutor's Office (Justin W. Smiloff of counsel), for appellant.
McGuire, Pelaez & Bennett, P.C. (Brett J. Bennett of counsel), for respondent (no brief filed).
PRESENT:: TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, J.P., JERRY GARGUILO, ELIZABETH H. EMERSON, JJ
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Suffolk County, Suffolk County Traffic and Parking Violations Agency (W. Alexander Melbardis, J.H.O.), entered April 23, 2021. The order granted defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment entered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a upon the charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance and, in the interest of justice, conditionally granted dismissal of the accusatory instrument charging that offense.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Defendant, insofar as is relevant to this appeal, was charged in a simplified traffic information with operating a motor vehicle without insurance (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 319 [1]). On June 18, 2019, upon defendant's failure to "answer," a guilty plea was entered on his behalf and the court awarded a default judgment of a fine (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1806-a). On November 7, 2019, a civil default judgment was entered against defendant.
On February 5, 2021, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment with respect to the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 319 (1) charge and, upon such vacatur, to dismiss that charge. In support of the motion, defendant alleged that he was not the owner of the vehicle he was operating and that, instead, the vehicle was owned by the father of his then-girlfriend. In addition, he alleged that, after he separated from his girlfriend, he was homeless from September 2018 to August 2019. He was not working and his driver's license was suspended. He was unable to answer the ticket since he had no means of transportation. Moreover, the pandemic made things difficult for him.
The People opposed the motion, arguing that defendant was properly served with a notice of default conviction at defendant's address of record with the Department of Motor Vehicles. On November 7, 2019, a civil judgment was entered against defendant and a notice of judgment was delivered via certified mail to defendant at his address of record. The People asserted that defendant's motion should be denied as untimely since more than one year had passed from the date the judgment was entered. Moreover, the People contended, defendant had not demonstrated a meritorious defense or a reasonable excuse for the default.
The District Court granted defendant's motion to vacate the "default conviction" on the charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance and conditionally dismissed that charge in the interest of justice subject to the People having 15 days from the date of the order to serve on defense counsel and the court a sworn statement that the vehicle in question was owned by defendant and was uninsured at the time of the incident, in which case the matter would be set down for a discovery conference and for trial.
On appeal, the People's sole contention with respect to so much of the order as granted the branch of defendant's motion seeking to vacate the default judgment is that this branch of the motion was untimely. Contrary to the People's contention, the branch of the motion seeking to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) was not untimely as the record fails to contain proof of service of a copy of the judgment with written notice of its entry upon defendant (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]). Thus, defendant's time to move to vacate the default judgment has not been shown to have begun to run (see Empire Portfolios, Inc. v Margolin, 18 Misc.3d 126 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 52360[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]). In any event, a court has the inherent authority to "vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice" (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 68 [2003]). We further find that the People's challenge to so much of the order as conditionally dismissed, in the interest of justice, the charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance lacks merit.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
DRISCOLL, J.P., GARGUILO and EMERSON, JJ., concur.