Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 157468
Pollak, J.
Defendant Maurice Anthony McMillan appeals from a judgment following his conviction by a jury of one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, with findings that he inflicted great bodily injury and had incurred a prior felony conviction. He challenges the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) when over his objection his attorney had declared a doubt as to his competency and told the court that he did not want the attorney to continue representing him. Although the trial court did not explicitly ask defendant why he was dissatisfied with his attorney as it should have done, any error in this regard was harmless. In the context of the exchange, which occurred during one of several in camera discussions with the court concerning defendant’s competency, it was apparent that defendant was displeased solely because the attorney was causing proceedings to be suspended for an evaluation pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. Moreover, after the court found defendant to be competent and reinstated proceedings, a new attorney took over defendant’s defense and defendant at no time expressed any dissatisfaction with the second attorney. Thus, there is no possibility that the failure to have strictly followed the prescribed Marsden procedures gave rise to any prejudice, and we shall affirm the judgment.
Background
Because defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or any rulings made during the course of the trial, a brief description of his offense is all that is necessary to evaluate the issue presented on appeal. The victim testified that he was walking to work near a BART station, wearing a San Francisco 49ers jacket, when a young African-American man approached him and said, “The fucking Raiders are better than the 49ers.” The man punched the victim on his head, the victim fell to the ground, and the man proceeded to kick the victim multiple times. A bus driver, who witnessed the assault and identified defendant as the assailant shortly after the attack and again at trial, yelled at defendant to stop. Defendant fled towards the BART station. A BART police officer who also witnessed the assault arrested defendant on the platform of the station.
Defendant was charged by information with one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), with an allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and an allegation that he had suffered one prior felony conviction for attempted second degree robbery (§ 211) within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1) and 667, subdivision (e)(1), and that he had suffered a prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
The jury found defendant guilty of the assault charge and found the great bodily injury allegation true. Defendant waived a jury on the prior conviction allegations and the court found true the allegation of a prior attempted robbery conviction and found that it was a serious violent felony. Defendant was sentenced to two years doubled because of the prior conviction, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and an additional five years for the prior conviction, for an aggregate prison term of 12 years. Defendant timely appealed.
Because defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to inquire into his reasons for wanting to replace his appointed counsel when proceedings were suspended for a competency evaluation, we set forth in some detail the relevant proceedings that took place prior to the start of trial.
Defendant was originally represented by a court-appointed attorney from the Public Defender’s office, Michael Wilson. On June 4, 2008, the matter was assigned to a trial department for a trial that was tentatively scheduled to begin the following Monday. The next day counsel asked to speak with the court in camera and he and defendant met with the court in the prosecutor’s absence. Wilson expressed his concern that his “client may or may not be suffering from some sort of mental illness.... This is a concern that has been raised by almost every attorney in my office that has worked on this case. However, the indications causing these concerns have been very, very subtle indications. They have not triggered a prior request for a [section] 4011.6 [evaluation], but it has raised the possibility.” Counsel acknowledged that an informal evaluation had been performed which concluded that “there appears to be nothing the matter at all with Mr. McMillan.” Nevertheless, counsel expressed his concerns arising from the “physical impossibility” of “Mr. McMillan’s account of his whereabouts on the day that this crime occurred and also his responses to specific pieces of evidence that the prosecution has produced.” His “fear and concern,” he told the court, “is that Mr. McMillan may be operating under some sort of delusion not rooted In reason.”
Section 4011.6 authorizes the court to order a mental health evaluation of a person in custody in the county jail.
Wilson asked the court to “put[] the matter over briefly so that we can request a 4011.6 report to assist me in evaluating whether it is appropriate to initiate 1368.1 proceedings....” Defendant indicated that he wanted to say something, but the court cautioned him to speak with Wilson first and gave him the opportunity to do so, after which defendant told the court that Wilson had answered all of his questions. Wilson then told the court that defendant was “not satisfied with the prospect of being evaluated, and wants to be very clear he is not asking for this, and he doesn’t want it to happen.” Nevertheless, counsel repeated his request for an evaluation pursuant to section 4011.6. The judge, although having previously indicated that she “personally [had] not observed any behavior on the part of Mr. McMillan that [gave her] doubt as to his competency,” ordered the evaluation.
Section 1368, subdivision (b) provides: “If counsel informs the court that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the court shall order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is to be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1 and 1369....” Subdivision (c) provides that “when an order for a hearing into the present mental competence of the defendant has been issued, all proceedings in the criminal prosecution shall be suspended until the question of the present mental competence of the defendant has been determined.”
At a further hearing on June 16, the court stated that it had received and reviewed the section 4011.6 report, which opined that defendant was “alert, oriented in all spheres, calm and cooperative.” The court commented, “I personally do not entertain a doubt as to the defendant’s competency to stand trial....” Defense counsel then indicated he wished to make a motion pursuant to section 1368 for a formal mental health evaluation, and requested that he be permitted to explain his request in another in camera session. The prosecutor was again excused from the proceedings. Wilson then explained, based on “my conversations with my client, and review of the facts in this case, and prior allegations, and the results of the defense investigation, I am definitely having doubt about the competency of my client to stand trial. And more specifically, my doubt is as to the prong that involves the ability to assist the client and my belief that my client may suffer from delusions.” Wilson stated that he wanted “to emphasize to the court and to Mr. McMillan, especially, because I can tell the court he is not requesting this. He believes absolutely that he is competent to stand trial, and I do want to emphasize that.” Wilson then proceeded to elaborate the basis for his concern at some length.
That report also states that defendant “presents with no reported history of mental health care and presents no symptoms of overt mental health problems now. There is no need of a [Welfare and Institutions Code section] 5150 and no apparent need of more stringent security precautions than those already in place. His needs for security and care can be satisfied with services available at this time in Santa Rita Jail.”
Wilson stated that while defendant “certainly understands the court process, appears to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, when describing any specific factual event, whether that is a prior incident or his own personal history or this incident, appears to recount events that are either impossible to have happened or just appear to be very fixed delusions in his own mind.”
At one point during Wilson’s explanation, defendant interrupted, disputing Wilson’s statements that the facts he had reported to Wilson were not true. When the court told defendant to let his attorney speak, defendant responded, “I don’t [want] him to be my attorney anymore.” The court replied, “Young man, just one moment” and Wilson continued with his explanation.
Defendant interjected, “Can I say something? I can’t make up any delay in the program. I can’t make up being private first class. I can’t create that. I was honorably discharged from the United States Marine Corps. My gunnery staff, Sergeant Pelosa, he was killed in active duty. I’ve been telling these people the truth since the day I was arrested. I was arrested at 12:10.”
The court ultimately acknowledged that it was “compelled by law to order a 1368, because you have indicated that you have a concern about whether he is able to assist with the defense of his case,” and ordered a further evaluation by two mental health experts. Defendant interjected, “I want to go to trial on my first court date ever, because I didn’t do this,” to which the court responded that defendant was “articulating a resistance to a time-waiver” and ruled that it would “suspend proceedings in a no-time-waiver status.” Defendant again objected, “I don’t want him to be my counsel anymore since I’m incompetent.” The court responded by stating, “All right. Now, again, I have a duty to advise you of certain[] constitutional and statutory rights,” and proceeded to enumerate various rights, including the right to an attorney, stating, “Your present attorney will continue to represent you in this special trial.” After the court scheduled a further hearing for June 30, the hearing ended as follows:
“THE DEFENDAN: Why do you keep putting the case off? Let’s go to trial.
“THE COURT: The matter is continued.
“THE DEFENDANT: I have to do about five or six times. When you tell somebody the truth, they say you’re lying and crazy. All I do is tell the truth.
“THE COURT: Okay....”
On June 30, reports from Dr. Joel Fort and Jules Burstein, Ph.D. were filed with the court. Both reports commented that the evaluator had been unable to obtain from counsel materials they customarily receive in connection with such evaluations, and that defendant wanted a new attorney because Wilson did not believe him. Dr. Fort considered defendant’s explanation of events to be “bizarre and implausible” but both evaluators unequivocally considered defendant competent to stand trial. Burstein concluded that “Not only do I find Mr. McMillan eminently competent to stand trial, but I am absolutely baffled and mystified as to what Mr. Wilson experienced as the defendant’s attorney that inclined him to ask for this assessment.”
Fort reported that defense counsel told him that defendant “appears on the surface to be competent with an understanding of the proceedings and a coherent account of his defense, but his explanations for a series of violent offenses seem bizarre and implausible. The current charge... is said to have involved a victim walking from a BART station suddenly being punched on the head from behind by Mr. McMillan who then kicked him in the head multiple times. The defendant’s explanation to Mr. Wilson was that he was attacked with a knife the night before and later taken to the jail so somebody else must have attacked the victim.” The report stated that “Unlike most cases I was never sent police, witness, or probation reports; or other documents from either attorney or from the court.”
Defendant and Wilson appeared at the hearing on June 30 at which the court reviewed the two psychiatric reports, found defendant competent to stand trial, and reinstated the proceedings. The trial court stated that it had “some concerns since both alienists seem to report that they made extensive effort to obtain information from counsel to no avail, although there was some phone conversation. In reviewing the report, both alienists have found that the defendant is competent to stand trial, that he does not appear to have any objective signs that he is incompetent to stand trial.” The court also informed defendant that Wilson was being transferred and that he would therefore have a new attorney from the Public Defender’s office. The court also told defendant it would “be in your best interest to see a therapist” though the court could not order him to do so. Defendant replied, “I don’t think it has nothing to do with it truthfully.” During the course of the hearing defendant said nothing indicating any further displeasure with the manner in which Wilson had represented him in connection with the competency evaluation or otherwise.
Defendant asked the court, “Do I have to have a public defender or could I have a court appointed attorney?” The trial court answered, “At this time, sir, you will have a public defender appointed to this matter. It will be perhaps another attorney in that agency.” Defendant asked if he could request a specific attorney and the court told him he could not.
Wilson waived defendant’s appearance at a brief hearing on July 7 at which the matter was continued to July 21. On July 21, 2008, another attorney from the Public Defender’s office, Cancion Soto, appeared to represent defendant. In camera, Soto explained to the court that Wilson was being transferred and that she had been assigned defendant’s case two weeks before. She requested a two week continuance of the trial to permit her to obtain two experts, one in the field of mental health, to permit her to evaluate two potential lines of defense that she was considering. The court indicated that it would not grant the motion, referring to the psychiatric evaluations that had already been performed and to defense counsel’s failure to have provided the experts with additional information in connection with those evaluations. In the presence of the prosecutor, the court then denied the motion for a continuance, stating, “I have taken into consideration information that was shared in camera regarding the status of the case. Based upon the recitation of facts that were provided to the court, at this time there does not appear to be good cause to grant the continuance for the requested two-week period.” Following consideration of additional in limine motions, the case proceeded to a jury trial on July 29. Defendant was represented throughout the trial by Soto and expressed no dissatisfaction with her representation.
Discussion
On appeal, defendant challenges only the trial court’s failure to hold a Marsden hearing after defendant stated that “I don’t [want] [Wilson] to be my attorney anymore,” and “I don’t want him to be my counsel anymore since I’m incompetent.”
“When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 854, italics added, overturned on other grounds in People v. Crayton 28 Cal.4th 346, 364.) “Marsden itself and virtually every other decision sustaining a claim of Marsden error emphasize that a judge cannot base his disposition of a request for substitution of counsel on his or her own confidence in the current attorney and observations of that attorney’s previous demonstrations of courtroom skill. [Citations.] Instead, the court must inquire on the record into the bases of defendant’s complaints and afford him an opportunity to relate specific instances of his attorney’s asserted inadequacy. [Citations.] Depending on the nature of the grievances related by defendant, it may be necessary for the court also to question his attorney.” (People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 753.)
Marsden instructs that a criminal defendant’s right to substitute counsel is within the discretion of the trial court, but that “the trial court cannot thoughtfully exercise its discretion in this matter without listening to his reasons for requesting a change of attorneys. A trial judge is unable to intelligently deal with a defendant’s request for substitution of attorneys unless he is cognizant of the grounds which prompted the request. The defendant may have knowledge of conduct and events relevant to the diligence and competence of his attorney which are not apparent to the trial judge from observations within the four corners of the courtroom. Indeed, ‘[w]hen inadequate representation is alleged, the critical factual inquiry ordinarily relates to matters outside the trial record: whether the defendant had a defense which was not presented; whether trial counsel consulted sufficiently with the accused, and adequately investigated the facts and the law; whether the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choice of trial tactics and strategy.’ [Citation.] Thus, a judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations, despite a defendant’s offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of the attorney. A judicial decision made without giving a party an opportunity to present argument or evidence in support of his contention ‘is lacking in all the attributes of a judicial determination.’ ” (People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 123-124.)
The court must hold a hearing when defendant seeks to replace his appointed counsel even if the request is made while the regular criminal proceedings have been suspended to determine defendant’s competence to stand trial. “Even though ‘section 1368 mandates the suspension of “ ‘all proceedings in the criminal prosecution’ ” once the court has ordered a hearing into the mental competence of the defendant,’ the Supreme Court held, ‘the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation compels a hearing and an order granting a motion for substitution of counsel when there is a sufficient showing that the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel will be substantially impaired if his request is denied.’ ” (People v. Solorzano (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069 ; see also People v. Govea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 57.)
Thus, when defendant stated that he did not want Wilson to continue representing him, the court should have given defendant the opportunity to explain fully the basis of his dissatisfaction. The Attorney General argues that “the court conducted an adequate Marsden hearing if a hearing was required.” This contention is incorrect because the court never asked defendant to state why he wanted a different attorney. Nonetheless, the proceedings that did take place were not greatly different from what undoubtedly would have occurred in a formal Marsden hearing. The proceedings were conducted in camera so that the defense could advise the court of its concerns without divulging privileged or confidential information. Wilson explicitly advised the court that defendant disagreed with his requests for psychiatric evaluations and defendant’s interjections made clear that he was dissatisfied with Wilson because he questioned his competency. While the court should have asked defendant to state explicitly why he wanted another lawyer, the court undoubtedly thought that was obvious, and it is difficult to disagree. At no point in the trial court or on appeal has defendant suggested that there was any other reason for his dissatisfaction or that he had anything else to tell the court that was not disclosed during the in camera sessions.
Moreover, any error on the trial court’s part in not questioning defendant further was rendered harmless by the substitution of new counsel to represent defendant throughout the entire trial. When proceedings resumed after the section 1368 evaluation, defendant never again complained of the failure to have replaced Wilson earlier, nor did he express any dissatisfaction with his new lawyer. (Cf. People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 732 [“the court’s error in failing to consider Lloyd’s first Marsden motion became harmless when Lloyd failed to reassert the reasons underlying the motion at the later hearing.”]) In People v. Govea, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 57, the court initially improperly denied a defendant’s request for a Marsden hearing on the erroneous premise that since his attorney had declared a doubt as to his competency, it was necessary to have defendant evaluated pursuant to section 1368 before conducting such a hearing. Although the court there eventually did conduct a Marsden hearing and denied the Marsden motion before finding defendant competent to stand trial, the reasons for which the court held the initial failure to conduct the Marsden hearing to be harmless are applicable here. “Defendant suffered no harm from the delay [in conducting the Marsden hearing] for another reason. Defendant’s dissatisfaction stemmed from his belief that counsel had no basis for declaring a doubt as to his competency. He did not concur with counsel’s decision to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Ultimately, the court declared defendant competent to stand trial, relieved counsel, allowed defendant to represent himself and withdraw his not guilty plea by reason of insanity, and appointed a new attorney upon his request. Put simply, the trial court gave defendant everything he sought. Under these circumstances, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to conduct an earlier Marsden hearing.” (People v. Govea, supra, at p. 62.)
The decision in People v. Solorzano, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 1063 may be thought to provide support for defendant’s contention that the failure to have complied with the mandate of Marsden requires reversal, but a closer analysis of that case indicates that the decision is distinguishable. Solorzano asserted that he was not competent to stand trial and complained of his attorney’s failure to obtain documents that he believed would support a finding of incompetency. However, the trial court refused to hold a Marsden hearing until after the competency hearing, at which the defendant was found competent. The appellate court held that the trial court had erred by failing to conduct the Marsden hearing when defendant made the request, before the competency proceedings. The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the failure to hold the Marsden hearing when the defendant requested it was “cured” by the fact that the defendant was represented at trial by a different attorney. The court held that retrial was necessary because, “[n]ow, almost two years after... the court found Solorzano competent to stand trial after abruptly refusing to hear his Marsden motion on whether his appointed counsel was rendering effective assistance at his competency hearing, we can but speculate how things might have been different had the court instead safeguarded his constitutional rights to effective assistance and due process by granting him the Marsden hearing to which he was entitled.” (People v. Solorzano, supra, at p. 1071.) The court concluded, “ ‘Given the inherent difficulties’ of ‘retrospectively determining an accused’s competence to stand trial,’ due process compels us to reverse the judgment, remand the matter, and order a new trial.” (Ibid.)
Solorzano differs from the present case in that there the defendant was dissatisfied with his attorney’s representation in connection with the competency proceedings. The defendant considered himself incompetent and believed he was not receiving effective assistance in establishing his incompetency. The fact that he was represented by different counsel at his subsequent trial did not establish that there were no grounds for providing him with new counsel in connection with the competency proceedings. (People v. Solorzano, supra, 126 Cal.App.4that p. 1070.) A new trial was deemed necessary because the court could not determine whether there was good reason to provide the defendant with a new attorney for the competency proceedings and, if there were, whether with new counsel the defendant would have been found competent to stand trial. Here, in contrast, defendant considered himself competent and was dissatisfied with Wilson because he caused a delay in the start of trial by expressing a doubt as to his competency. There is no suggestion that defendant was dissatisfied because Wilson was not more effectively seeking to establish his incompetency, or that a full Marsden hearing when defendant said he no longer wanted Wilson to represent him would in any way have affected the outcome of trial. As in Govea, defendant received “everything he sought.” (People v. Govea, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 62.)
Although asserting no other ground of appeal, defendant’s appellate briefs suggest that his real grievance is with rulings that were made after he was found to be competent, and with the effectiveness of his representation at trial. Defendant seems to question the propriety of the court’s order denying his new attorney a continuance and to the failure of his trial attorney to present evidence indicating that because of prior injuries he was physically incapable of engaging in the conduct for which he was convicted. Other portions of the record seem to call into question whether defendant was in fact competent at the time of trial. We express no opinion on questions that are not before us or which can be properly raised, if at all, by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We conclude only that the trial court’s failure to have explicitly asked defendant why he wanted to replace Wilson when Wilson declared a doubt as to his competency caused no prejudice and provides no basis for reversing defendant’s conviction.
As noted above, both of the section 1386 evaluators commented on their inability to obtain from counsel information that may have borne on their evaluation of defendant’s competency. A “Psychiatric Service Discharge Summary” prepared on August 14, 2008, after the trial, reported that although defendant had “no prior [mental health] history,” he “complained of voices,” and was being given Risperidone, an antipsychotic medication. A report prepared on August 21 by the Alameda County Department of Behavioral Health Care Services Mental Health Division states, “This writer was notified by the... deputies that this [inmate] recently returned from Santa Clara. [Inmate] reported that he was released tonight and had taken his meds prior to being released. [Inmate] denied [suicidal ideation/homicidal ideation]..., however reported that he is ok when taking medications, and the voices don’t bother him as much.”
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.
Counsel went on to tell the court that defendant had “recounted to me and to prior attorneys an extremely detailed account of his military history with the United States Marine Corps,” but that counsel had gotten confirmation from the Marine Corps that they had no records of defendant having served in the Corps. Nevertheless, defendant “has provided me with the very specific name of the gunnery sergeant who supervised him in his training program, and informed me that the gunnery sergeant was killed while on active duty. I have searched all of the names of all casualties for both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. There is no person with that name.” Defendant also told counsel that the sergeant was killed in a specific location in Islamabad, but “[t]here has been no military action that I’m aware of in Islamabad.” Defendant told counsel that “he was honorably discharged” from the Marine Corps, “[a]nd he informs me that the reason he was discharged [was] that, having completed his training program, the military informed him because he was his mother’s only son, he could not be on active duty, because the military only permits... people with other male siblings to serve. That is to all of my information and belief, not at all the case and not an actual policy.”
Defense counsel then detailed the logical and logistical problems with defendant’s account of the incident at the BART station. “[N]otwithstanding... records very clearly showing and recording the arrest of... Mr. McMillan at 6:20 in the morning, Mr. McMillan is adamant that he was arrested at 12:10, right after midnight; that he was in custody for about three hours and then transported to North County Jail; that he was at North County Jail while these events were transpiring; and that at 8:00 o’clock he was very mysteriously booked for the crime that the other person who had been arrested at 6:20 in the morning had committed, and that that person had been released for reasons that nobody can particularly explain.” These discrepancies and factual impossibilities, counsel argued, were “particularly significant in this particular case, because [defendant] will need to decide whether or not to testify.... And if he is making that decision while suffering under a delusion as to his whereabouts for hours at a time, his ability to assist is next to zero.”
The report notes that “On examination Mr. McMillan was fully cooperative, oriented, of above average intelligence, and responsive to questions. He was aware of the charge, the date and time of the hearing, the names of his attorney and of the doctors who have seen him at Santa Rita and of the possible sentence he faces. As to the present charge he states he is innocent and wants a trial, that he has been wrongly identified by some of the witnesses, ‘the paperwork has been messed up and they don’t want to admit it,’ and Mr. Wilson ‘doesn’t believe me and is making up things.’ ” The report states that defendant has “no overt delusions or hallucinations and he denies any history of having any,” though the report also states that many of the things defendant reported about his personal history were “implausible” or “unlikely at best.” The report concludes that “The defendant is not mentally incompetent or psychotic and no antipsychotic medicines are appropriate. Because of the several past episodes of involvement in violence with others he may be a danger to others but clearly his alleged violent behavior has been limited/under control as compared to thousands of others; and on interview he shows no signs of anger, hate or rage.”
Burstein’s report states that “Mr. McMillan presented with a mental status comparable to my own. He was coherent, courteous, cooperative, and totally devoid of any symptoms of mental illness.... He claims that Mr. Wilson ‘won’t listen to me.’ When I asked why he felt his attorney will not listen to him he replied, ‘Because I’m a convicted felon.’ He reported that he wishes to have Mr. Wilson replaced as his attorney, but that obtaining a new attorney is not without its difficulties and frustrations.” The report also noted that “As part of my standard procedure in competency evaluations I called the client’s attorney, public defender Michael Wilson, last week, and left a message asking him to send me a copy of the police report and to get back to me to provide some context for understanding why he raised the issue of Mr. McMillan’s competency. Not hearing from him for two days, I called and left a second message, making the same requests. As of the writing of this report I have still not heard from Mr. Wilson, whom the receptionist at the Public Defender’s Office told me was not on vacation. Thus, I have not had an opportunity to review the police report in this case, nor do I have any idea why Mr. Wilson believed that his client might be incompetent.”