People v. McKenna

33 Citing cases

  1. Metropolis Etc. Sav. Bank v. Monnier

    169 Cal. 592 (Cal. 1915)   Cited 37 times

    It contains no averment of fact whatsoever and rests upon the naked, unsupported, legal conclusion of the pleader. (Kissling v. Shaw, 33 Cal. 425, [91 Am. Dec. 644]; Capuro v. Builders Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 123; Albertoli v. Branham, 80 Cal. 631, [13 Am. St. Rep. 200, 22 P. 404]; People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158, [22 P. 488].) Nor, as such an allegation tendered no issue upon the question of menace, fraud, or duress, was it incumbent upon appellants in availing themselves of this defect, to demur to the answer either upon general or special grounds.

  2. People v. Saffell

    74 Cal.App.2d 967 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that "such an appeal from the judgment entered on one count is proper although the other counts are not disposed of."

    While recognizing the rule that in general it is sufficient to charge an offense in the language of the statute defining it (14 Cal.Jur. 49-50), the courts had also held that where the words used in the statute have no technical meaning, or where the particular facts or acts which constitute the offense are not specified, it is necessary to set forth the acts constituting the offense. ( People v. Mahony (1904), 145 Cal. 104, 106 [ 78 P. 354]; People v. Perales (1904), 141 Cal. 581, 583 [ 75 P. 170]; People v. Neil (1891), 91 Cal. 465, 467 [27 P. 760]; People v. McKenna (1889), 81 Cal. 158, 160 [22 P. 488]; People v. Butler (1917), 35 Cal.App. 357, 362 [ 169 P. 918], 14 Cal.Jur. 49-50.) Since the general rule of following the statutory definition was thus recognized except in the one class of cases, without any statutory provision to that effect, the purpose of enacting the rule into statute without any exception must have been to abolish the exception and let the rule stand in complete generality, and section 952 is so construed.

  3. People v. Haas

    28 Cal.App. 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1915)   Cited 7 times
    In People v. Haas, 28 Cal.App. 182, 151 Pac. 672, it was 'did sell and dispose of.' A good pleader would not fail to make a direct allegation.

    It is said that fraud is an inference of law from certain facts; that the indictment must aver all the facts which constitute the fraud. ( People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158, [22 P. 488].) An indictment or information charging the crime of obtaining money or property by false representations and pretenses, must show the facts as to what the pretenses were; that there was an intent to defraud, the name of the person defrauded, with a description of the property and a statement of its value, together with an allegation that the false and fraudulent pretenses charged were relied upon by the party who claims to have been defrauded, and that he was induced thereby to part with his property.

  4. People v. Griesheimer

    176 Cal. 44 (Cal. 1917)   Cited 32 times
    In People v. Griesheimer, 176 Cal. 44, [ 167 P. 521], the defendant was charged with the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses.

    The rules of pleading of actual fraud in a criminal case are certainly no more relaxed than the rules which obtain in pleading the same fraud in a civil case, and, if anything, should be the more stringently applied where a man is put on trial for a crime. ( People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158, [22 P. 488].) But to make clear my meaning beyond peradventure, let those rules here be briefly summarized.

  5. People v. Mahony

    145 Cal. 104 (Cal. 1904)   Cited 21 times
    In People v. Mahony, 145 Cal. 108, [ 78 P. 354], the court said: "The attorney-general, in support of this indictment, relies almost entirely upon the decision of this court in Department, in People v. Carolan, 71 Cal. 195, [12 P. 52].

    This is necessarily so, in view of the fact that fraud is but an inference of law from certain facts. This was clearly set forth by this court in Bank in the case of People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158, where the defendant was charged in the language of the statute defining the offense with having defrauded one of personal property "by false and fraudulent representations and pretenses." After stating that fraud is merely an inference of law from certain facts, that the question as to whether a thing was done fraudulently is a matter of law, and that an allegation of fraud in general terms presents no issuable fact, the court said: "It is a sound principle that an indictment charging fraud of any kind should aver with particularity the facts relied upon to show fraud.

  6. People v. Finley

    174 Cal.App.2d 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 3 times

    The amended information accusing defendant of a violation of section 496 charges that between April 1, 1958, and August 31, 1958, he "did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously buy and receive certain property, to wit, one onyx ring and one Bulova watch, which said property had been stolen, knowing that said property had been stolen, and did conceal and withhold and aid in concealing and withholding said property from the owner, David Levin, knowing that said property had been stolen." Acknowledging the liberal rule of pleading established by section 952, appellant, citing People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158 [ 22 P. 488], suggests that it has no application here. This citation serves as no authority for his proposition since that case entailed a situation of fraud entirely dissimilar to the simple case of receiving stolen property here involved.

  7. People v. Walther

    27 Cal.App.2d 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938)   Cited 17 times
    In People v. Walther, 27 Cal.App.2d 583, 591 [ 81 P.2d 452], the court said: "When a codefendant who is a coconspirator has been offered immunity from prosecution in reward for his testimony, the cause should be promptly dismissed against him.

    On the contrary it is invariably necessary to specify the fraud relied upon with such particularity as to enable the court to determine whether it is of such a nature as to fall within the statute, and accurate enough to inform the accused of the particular charge which he is required to defend against. (25 C.J. 623, sec. 56; 12 Cal. Jur. 464, secs. 16 and 17; 11 R.C.L. 857, sec. 39; People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158 [22 P. 488].) In the text of 11 Ruling Case Law, supra, it is said:

  8. People v. Burke

    22 Cal.App.2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937)   Cited 3 times

    In this regard it may be stated generally that one of the chief purposes of an information is to apprise the accused with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation against him, to the end that he may prepare his defense accordingly. ( People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158 [22 P. 488].) [3] Where, therefore, there is an apparent attempt to charge a particular crime of which the court proceeding to try the case has jurisdiction, and the charge follows substantially the language of the statute, the information is not void even though the offense be defectively pleaded.

  9. People v. Rubens

    11 Cal.App.2d 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)   Cited 21 times
    In Rubens the issue was whether the trial court properly refused defense instructions stating that certain classes of instruments were not securities.

    ) There is no merit in the contention that the indictment fails to state facts sufficient to constitute the public offenses against the defendants which are sought to be charged therein. There appears to be nothing in the cases of People v. Mahony, 145 Cal. 104 [ 78 P. 354], People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158 [22 P. 488], or People v. Lamanuzzi, 77 Cal.App. 301 [ 246 P. 557], upon which the appellants rely, in conflict with the preceding determination as to the sufficiency of the allegations of the indictment. [4] There is a conflict of evidence regarding many issues of the case.

  10. Anderson v. Board of Medical Examiners

    117 Cal.App. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)   Cited 16 times

    It is an inference of law to be drawn from facts, and circumstances alleged and proved. ( People v. McKenna, 81 Cal. 158 [22 P. 488].) It "can and does assume so many shapes that courts and authors have ever been cautious in attempting to define it.