People v. McGuire

3 Citing cases

  1. People v. Solis

    207 Ill. App. 3d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 3 times

    In those cases, the Appellate Court for the Fifth District followed a doctrine which appears to state that when a court-appointed attorney withdraws on his own initiative due to a perceived conflict of interest, and not at the request of the defendant, any resulting delay cannot be charged to the defendant unless the withdrawal was made under circumstances from which it may be inferred that the defendant acquiesced in the delay, or in situations where the withdrawal was followed by a request that defendant's attorney be given additional time. (See, e.g., People v. McGuire (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 908, 911 (silence by defendant deemed acquiescence in withdrawal of appointed counsel for perceived conflict of interest and resulting delay where substituted counsel was granted continuance to prepare for trial); People v. Eason (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 308, 310-11 (delay occasioned by withdrawal of counsel and subsequent appointment of new counsel to which defendant acquiesced was chargeable to defendant).) We do not share the trial court's broad interpretation of Roberts and Collum, nor do we believe they are factually similar to the case at bar.

  2. People v. Bowman

    138 Ill. 2d 131 (Ill. 1990)   Cited 62 times
    Finding that defendant's acquiescence to a particular attorney's representation contributed to the delay; thus, delay would be charged to defendant

    It also recognized that a court of review will affirm a decision on such a motion as defendant's unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. 180 Ill. App.3d at 757 (citing People v. Roberts (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 731; People v. McGuire (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 908; People v. Keagbine (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 1039). Applying the cited precedent to the case at bar, the appellate court held that defendant did not voluntarily acquiesce in the delay occasioned by the withdrawal of his counsel.

  3. People v. Bowman

    180 Ill. App. 3d 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 3 times
    In Bowman, defendant's court-appointed attorney withdrew from the case and was replaced by another attorney approximately three weeks before the date set for trial. The defendant did not object to the substitution of attorneys. Shortly before trial, the defendant's new attorney sought and was granted a continuance.

    Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a)) provides that an accused in custody is to be brought to trial within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody, unless delay is occasioned by the defendant. When a court-appointed counsel withdraws on his own initiative due to a conflict of interest, any resulting delay cannot be charged to the defendant ( People v. Roberts (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 731, 479 N.E.2d 386), unless the withdrawal was made under circumstances from which it may be inferred that the defendant acquiesced in the delay ( People v. McGuire (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 908, 463 N.E.2d 1041). Since the trial court is in a better position to determine whether the defendant acquiesced in the delay, a reviewing court will affirm its decision unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion.