In any event, the court overruled a number of the prosecutor's objections to defense counsel's cross-examination and granted the defendant greater latitude than was required under the circumstances. The court properly sustained additional objections in order to prevent repetition and to protect the jury from being misled ( see People v Paixao, 23 AD3d 677, 678; People v McEachern, 237 AD2d 381, 381; People v Ashner, 190 AD2d 238, 246). The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 83).

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. The defendant's contention that the trial court improperly curtailed his right of cross-examination is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Lyons, 81 NY2d 753, 754; People v. Iannelli, 69 NY2d 684, 685, cert denied 482 US 914; People v. Odiot, 242 AD2d 308; People v. McEachern, 237 AD2d 381; People v. Dunbar, 145 AD2d 501). In any event, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the defendant's cross-examination of the eyewitness ( see People v. Odiot, supra; People v. McEachern, supra; People v. Daniels, 225 AD2d 632; People v. Delcarpio, 221 AD2d 359, 360; People v. Taylor, 214 AD2d 757).

o the very heart of the question of that individual's testimonial credibility" (People v. Walker, 83 N.Y.2d 455, 461-462; see also, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371). Furthermore, the defendant's prior drug-related convictions were indicative of his willingness to place his own interest before the interests of society (see, People v. Dwyer, 243 A.D.2d 645). The similarity of the prior convictions to the crime charged does not automatically shield the defendant from cross-examination as to the prior convictions (see, People v. Mattiace, 77 N.Y.2d 269, 275; People v. Thomas, 221 A.D.2d 388). Moreover, the record demonstrates that the court engaged in a proper balancing between the probative value of the prior convictions and the possible prejudice to the defendant (see, People v. Sandoval, supra, at 376; People v. Jamison, 228 A.D.2d 698). The trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting cross-examination by the defense counsel (see, People v. Roussopoulos, 261 A.D.2d 559; People v. McEachern, 237 A.D.2d 381; People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238). In any event, to the extent that any of the challenged rulings may have been erroneous, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, notwithstanding the court's rulings, the defense counsel realized his goal of placing the defendant's theory of the case before the jury (see, People v. Simmons, 237 A.D.2d 313, 314; People v. Chestnut, 237 A.D.2d 528; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237).

March 17, 2000 Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this court dated March 10, 1997 (People v. McEachern, 237 A.D.2d 381), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered April 4, 1995. Ernest McEachern, Stormville, N.Y., appellant pro se.

Ordered that the judgments are affirmed. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of witnesses at both the Wade hearing and at the trial of Indictment No. 8500/96. Although the right of cross-examination is constitutionally protected, trial courts retain broad discretion to restrict cross-examination where questions are, among other things, repetitive or of marginal relevancy ( see, People v. McEachern, 237 A.D.2d 381; People v. Ashner, 190 A.D.2d 238, 246). The defendant's sentence imposed under Indictment No. 8500/96 was not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).