Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 07F7252
NICHOLSON, J.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant Daniel Ray McDonald entered a negotiated plea of no contest to possessing hydrocodone, a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on formal probation for three years.
Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the drugs found at his home. The People respond that defendant waived his right to appeal the denial of the motion as part of the plea agreement, and thus, the appeal must be dismissed. We agree with the People.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal the denial of a suppression motion as part of a negotiated plea agreement. (People v. Castrillon (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 718, 721-722 (Castrillon); see also People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 (Panizzon).) “To be enforceable, a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [Citations.] Waivers may be manifested either orally or in writing. [Citation.] The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo. [Citation.]” (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 80.)
A defendant’s signature on a waiver form upon the advice of counsel, and the confirmation of his understanding of the consequences of the waiver by the trial court, furnishes adequate evidence of a knowing and voluntary plea. (Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 84.) “So long as the waiver form contains sufficient information, and both the defendant and his counsel attest to its valid execution, the judge may, in his discretion, dispense with further explanation to the defendant of his rights.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1175.) In other words, the written waiver of rights is sufficient unless events during the plea hearing raise a doubt that defendant understood and knowingly waived his rights. (Castrillon, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 722.)
The record in this case clearly establishes that defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. In executing the plea agreement, he agreed -- under the heading “WAIVER OF APPELLATE RIGHTS”) to “waive and give up my right to appeal from the sentence I will receive in this case... [and to] waive and give up my right to appeal the denial of any and all motions made in this case.” He also indicated that he had discussed the negotiated plea with his attorney, who has answered all his questions, and discussed with him possible defenses and motions. Moreover, his attorney attested to reviewing the document with him and explaining the consequences of the plea to him. Both defendant and his attorney attested to the document’s valid execution, and the in court questioning of defendant and his attorney raised no doubts as to defendant’s understanding of his rights and the consequences of his plea. There is nothing in the record to raise a doubt that defendant understood his rights and the consequences of his plea and knowingly waived his rights, so as to prompt additional inquiry by the court. (Cf. Castrillon, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 722.)
Defendant has filed no reply to the People’s argument he knowingly waived his right to appeal from the denial of his suppression motion.
We are satisfied that defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal any decisions on motions which preceded the plea or judgment, including the denial of his motion to suppress, was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary even though the trial court did not admonish him regarding the right to appeal. Accordingly, defendant’s appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress is dismissed. (See Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 89-90.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., BUTZ, J.