Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR910915
Sepulveda, J.
Defendant Andre Lavont McDaniel was found guilty by jury trial of battery on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)) and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). He challenges his possession conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. We affirm.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Because defendant challenges only his conviction for possession, we summarize only the trial testimony relevant to his appeal. In October 2006, defendant and his girlfriend, Brandi McGinnis, lived together in a mobile home in Clearlake along with McGinnis’s seven-year-old and twelve-year-old daughters. Defendant had lived with McGinnis for about three months. Around midnight on October 25, 2006, McGinnis’s 12-year-old daughter called 911 to report that defendant had threatened to kill McGinnis.
When police arrived at the home, they first spoke with McGinnis outside the mobile home, then entered the residence. They found defendant lying on the bed in the bedroom that he shared with McGinnis. Police arrested defendant and placed him in handcuffs, and officers searched the bedroom. They found an extra-large sized brown leather jacket at the foot of the bed. Police searched inside a pocket of the jacket and found a bag containing a white crystallized substance, which was later found to be a useable quantity of methamphetamine (.27 grams). When a police officer showed the jacket to McGinnis the night police were called to her home, she told him that the jacket belonged to defendant. McGinnis talked to a defense investigator about two months later, and she again stated that the leather jacket belonged to defendant. McGinnis testified at trial, however, that she did not know to whom the jacket belonged, and that sometimes friends left items behind when they came to parties at her home.
Police who searched the bedroom also found a locked metal box next to the bed. A police officer asked defendant if he had a key to the box, and defendant told him where the key was. Police found the key in the master bathroom of the residence. The box contained plastic baggies, scales with white powdery residue (consistent with the appearance of methamphetamine) on them, and a cable bill with defendant’s name on it. The box also contained a vehicle registration with a name other than defendant’s or McGinnis’s on it. A police officer who was present when the box was opened, and who was a former member of the Lake County narcotic task force, testified that in his training and experience, the baggies found in the box were associated with possession of methamphetamine. Another officer who viewed the contents of the metal box, and who had training in the identification of methamphetamine and items associated with the drug, testified that scales such as the ones found in the box are generally used in the sale of controlled substances, and it appeared at least one of the scales that was found had been used recently. The officer testified that the box was “almost like a kit, a tool box. That’s been my experience and on search warrants that I’ve participated in and arrests made, it’s basically a seller’s kit” associated with methamphetamine. He explained, “I’d characterize it like a seller’s kit or somebody else’s work kit. . . . [Y]ou got your scales and you got your baggies, you got your packaging material there.” McGinnis first told police that the box belonged to defendant, and that defendant would hide things from her. She testified at trial that the items in the box belonged to her and defendant, but that she did not know where the key for the box was kept.
Defendant was charged by information with infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, a felony (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)—count 1), and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)—count 2). The information alleged that at the time of the commission of the offenses, defendant was released on bail in two pending cases (Pen. Code, § 12022.1), and that defendant had served a prior prison term for possession of methamphetamine (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of battery on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)) with respect to count 1, and convicted of count 2. Following a bench trial, the court found the enhancement allegations true. Defendant was sentenced to a total of three years in state prison. This timely appeal followed.
The sentence was composed of two years (the midterm) for count 2, and a consecutive one-year term for the prison prior allegation. Defendant also received a concurrent sentence of 270 days on count 1. Defendant also was ordered to pay various fines and fees.
II.
Discussion
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of possession of methamphetamine. When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] We need not be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; we merely ask whether ‘ “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. [Citation.] It is not our function to reweigh the evidence, reappraise the credibility of witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact. We may not reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conviction. [Citation.]” (People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955 (Tripp), original italics.) “This standard of review also applies to circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances, plus all the logical inferences the jury might have drawn from them, reasonably justify the jury’s findings, our opinion that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
As the trial court instructed the jury in the present case, unlawful possession of methamphetamine consists of the following elements: “(1) defendant exercised control over or the right to control an amount of methamphetamine; (2) defendant knew of its presence; (3) defendant knew of its nature as a controlled substance; and (4) the substance was in an amount usable for consumption.” (Tripp, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 956, citing Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), italics omitted.) It is well settled that each of these elements may be proved by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215; Tripp, supra, at p. 956.) Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence of elements one through three.
Sufficient evidence of defendant’s knowledge of the presence and character of a controlled substance supports his conviction. Although it is true, as defendant argues, that there was no direct evidence that defendant knew of the presence and character of the contraband, sufficient circumstantial evidence supports his conviction. We therefore disagree with defendant’s assertion that this case is “strikingly similar” to Tripp, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 951, which reversed a conviction for possession of methamphetamine. In Tripp, police conducted a probation search of a residence where defendant lived with his girlfriend and a house mate who had a history with narcotics and who had just been arrested. (Id. at pp. 954, 957.) Officers found white crystal powder on a nightstand next to a bed in a room shared by defendant and his girlfriend. (Id. at pp. 954-955.) The powder was about the size of the head of a pen and was “loose, ‘spilled out, like salt’ near the edge of the nightstand.” (Id. at p. 954.) There was no evidence of any type of packaging characteristic of methamphetamine, there was no paraphernalia nearby, the powder was not purposefully hidden, and it was not found on defendant’s person as if for his personal use. (Id. at pp. 957, 959.)
Here, by contrast, methamphetamine was found packaged in a bag inside of a jacket that belonged to defendant, and police also found a box belonging to defendant that contained baggies and scales, described as a “kit” associated with methamphetamine. Defendant stresses that although McGinnis told a police officer and later a defense investigator that the jacket where the methamphetamine was found belonged to defendant, she testified under oath at trial that she did not really know who owned the jacket. At trial, McGinnis repeatedly denied the truth of her prior statements to the police, even though she had read and signed a summary of her statement to police the same day as the police were called to her home, and even though she also gave consistent statements to the defense investigator weeks later. It was the function of the jury to assess the credibility of witnesses and resolve factual conflicts, and we may not reverse defendant’s conviction unless it appears that under no hypothesis whatever is there substantial evidence to support the conviction. (Tripp, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 955.) The jury was free to disregard McGinnis’s conflicting testimony and believe her prior statements to police and a defense investigator that the leather jacket belonged to defendant, substantial evidence that defendant knew of the presence of a controlled substance in his possession.
For example, McGinnis told police that defendant started punching her after an argument over a computer password on October 23, 2006. She testified at trial, however, that she and defendant argued, but that defendant did not do anything physical to her. Likewise, McGinnis told police when they arrived at her home on October 25, 2006 that she had bruises all over her body from defendant hitting her. At trial, however, she claimed that she had made up the story. McGinnis also claimed at trial that she asked her daughter to call 911 to get even with defendant, because she believed he was cheating on her.
Defendant also argues that he was never seen wearing the jacket, “even when he was taken to jail in the cool hours after midnight in late October.” The testimony cited by defendant makes no reference to what defendant was wearing when he was taken to jail.
Defendant argues that, like the defendant in Tripp, he made no attempt to flee or hide the methamphetamine that police found, and that he appeared resting and calm when police spoke with him. (Tripp, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 957.) He claims that McGinnis’s 12-year-old daughter called 911 “in [defendant’s] presence,” and that defendant had “ample opportunity to dispose of the methamphetamine” before police arrived, creating an inference that he was not aware of its presence. In fact, as the prosecutor stated during closing arguments in response to a similar argument made by defendant’s trial counsel, there was no evidence presented to the jury that defendant knew that a 911 call was placed. In fact, it appears from the trial testimony that defendant was not in the room when the 911 call was placed. Moreover, McGinnis’s 12-year-old daughter testified that police arrived 30 seconds after she called 911. Although it is unclear how long it took after police arrived to contact defendant, one officer testified that he contacted defendant “no more than five minutes” after he arrived at the scene and spoke to McGinnis, which was hardly “ample” time to dispose of drugs.
McGinnis’s 12-year-old daughter testified that she woke up to the sound of her mother and defendant fighting. When asked if she went into the “living room” at that point, she answered, “No, I went into the family room and picked up the phone.” (Italics added.) She sat in the family room holding the telephone for about 10 minutes. After her mother and defendant calmed down, the daughter hung up the telephone and sat next to her mother on a couch. Defendant, who was standing next to the couch, told McGinnis that if he took her (McGinnis) out it would be “doing the world a favor.” McGinnis’s daughter was asked, “And after he made the statement that’s when you decided to call?” She answered, “Yes, I got up and went to the phone.” (Italics added.) Assuming that the “living room” and the “family room” were two different rooms, and that the call was placed from the family room where the daughter originally was holding a telephone, it appears that the call was placed from a room different from the one where defendant was. This is consistent with McGinnis’s testimony that her daughter was not next to her when she called 911, but that she “was in the other room where the phone was. I was in the living room.” The 12-year-old daughter testified that her mother was sitting on the couch when she placed the call, and that “at some point” defendant went to the bedroom. McGinnis’s seven-year-old daughter testified that defendant was “[i]n my mom’s room” when her sister called 911.
As for the metal box with baggies and scales, defendant claims that McGinnis “claimed joint ownership and use of the box,” and that “the key to the box was accessible to anybody.” Although it is true that McGinnis testified at trial that items in the box belonged to her and defendant, she acknowledged that she did not know where the key was kept, and that defendant would “hide things from” her. She first told police that the box belonged to defendant. There was a document in the box with someone else’s name on it, but apparently nothing that appeared to belong to McGinnis. Although a police officer testified that the box’s key—which was found in a bathroom—was not “particularly hidden” and would have been accessible to anyone, there was substantial evidence to support a conviction in light of testimony that defendant directed police to the key, and a document in the box had his name on it. As our Supreme Court observed more than four decades ago: “[N]o sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries of facts which will and that which will not constitute sufficient evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of the presence of a narcotic in a place to which he had access, but not exclusive access, and over which he had some control, but not exclusive control.” (People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 287.) The fact that defendant had access and control—even if not exclusive—to a box that appeared to be a “kit” associated with methamphetamine was substantial evidence that defendant knew the nature of the methamphetamine in his nearby jacket.
While all the circumstances highlighted by defendant may be susceptible to an interpretation other than one supporting his knowledge of the presence and character of methamphetamine, that does not warrant reversal. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139; Tripp, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 955.) The circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s conclusion that the elements of the crime of possession of methamphetamine had been proven.
III.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J. Reardon, J.